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Abstract
The thesis consists of three chapters of self-contained studies.
In Chapter 1, I examine the decision of individuals to secure the provision of an
environmental service under a Psychological Games framework. Since environmental
services are considered public goods, there is an ongoing depletion of natural resources.
While standard economic theory predicts the introduction of a PES is supposed to
correct the associated externality by establishing a market which offers a monetary
compensation to owners of vital natural resources as a recognition of their effort in
providing the environmental services, this chapter argues such intervention might
backfire: a motivation crowding-out arises if individuals believe others reciprocate
friendly behaviour solely to receive the monetary compensation, ultimately decreasing
total environmental protection. Even if environmental protection does take place, the
motivation of individuals to secure the provision of the environmental service becomes
commodified by the PES. Finally, awarding the PES only to a subset of individuals will
also have negative effects on environmental protection, since those not receiving the
PES will not want to do for free something that others are being paid to do.
Environmental policy implications of this economic instrument are further discussed.
In Chapter 2, a sample of the World Values Survey dataset is analyzed to show
there are substantial behavioural differences between immigrants and native-born
regarding pro-environmental action. In particular, while neither native-born nor
immigrants are more willing to sacrifice money to save the environment, immigrants
actually engage more on activities like choosing products that are better for the
environment, recycling, and reducing water consumption. The engagement in pro-
environmental behaviour of immigrants is region-specific and depends on their source
region. Moreover, such relatively higher actual engagement in environmentally friendly
behaviours can be explained by their high socio-economic status and their high
education level, i.e. “selective immigration”. When the behaviour of immigrants by
their length of residence in the host country is analyzed, no differences in pro-
environmental attitudes or pro-environmental behaviour are found, a result which
suggests they do not develop a “sense of belongingness” to the host country. Finally, in
line with the standard finding in the literature of acculturation in environmental
behaviour, this chapter finds that immigrants conform through time to some of the pro-
environmental actions of native-born.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the indirect effects on norm activation produced by
monetary environmental policy instruments which introduce a situational cue that
fosters a change of identity among individuals with potential negative consequences on
their pro-environmental behaviour. For that purpose, a two-period identity selection
model based on self-verification theory is developed. In each period there are two types
of selves an individual can adopt: selfish and pro-environmental. The process of identity
selection is driven by the desire of individuals to be consistent across the two periods in
order to avoid social disapproval due to self-change. Results show that the monetary
environmental policy introduces an asymmetry in the identity selection process that
produces a failure of norm activation: while selfish agents preserve their selfish identity
after the policy is implemented, pro-environmental agents might change their identity
despite they experience social disapproval due to a reduction in the cognitive benefits of
keeping such identity produced by the monetary component of the policy. Implications
for environmental policy design are discussed.
Introduction
The thesis Essays on Environmentally Friendly Behaviour and Environmen-
tal Policy consists of three self-contained studies. These are (i) Payments for
Environmental Services and motivation crowding-out: A Psychological Games
approach, (ii) This land is your land, this land is my land: The environmental
behaviour of native-born and immigrants and (iii) Identity selection and the ac-
tivation of pro-environmental behaviour. Here, an introduction to each chapter
is addressed.
1 Payments for Environmental Services and motivation crowding-
out: A Psychological Games approach
Research produced by the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment of the United
Nations showed that over the past 55 years, humans have changed ecosystems
more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human
history due to fast growing demand for food, fresh water, timber, ﬁbre and fuel.1
Since the environmental services that natural resources provide are consid-
ered public goods,2 depletion often occurs because of the diﬃculty of excluding
1http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx
2Natural ecosystems provide multiple environmental services: consumption goods and pro-
duction inputs; regulation of climate, and air and water quality; cultural services (e.g. recre-
ation and aesthetic enjoyment); support to other ecosystem services (e.g. soil formation); and
provision of a living (e.g. agriculture, ﬁshing, and forestry). Apart from contributing to key
sectors in developing countries like tourism, the provision of environmental services improves
the resilience of people to natural disasters and health risks, particularly of the poor.
1
potential users from its beneﬁts. The problem is originated by the individuals'
incentives to free ride from the provision activities of others, which is reﬂected
in a straightforward and pessimistic fashion in Hardin's [26] tragedy of the com-
mons, Olson's [40] impossibility of collective action argument, and the Prisoner's
Dilemma.
While some successful cases of independent sustainable management of nat-
ural resources have been documented, the problem persists in most parts of the
world. Land is usually managed for private beneﬁt and, since the cost of secur-
ing the provision of the environmental services falls only on local land managers,
it is generally more attractive for them to convert their land into more proﬁtable
uses, such as agriculture, rather than maintain it in its natural state.
Economists argue that this externality would be corrected by establishing
a market which oﬀers a monetary compensation to owners of vital natural re-
sources as a recognition to their eﬀort in providing an environmental service
which generates beneﬁts to other individuals. Such market, denominated Pay-
ments for Environmental Services (PES), is regarded as the eﬃcient means to
provide environmental services.3
However, some researchers have discussed the possibility that the monetary
reward can erode culturally-rooted conservation values (Wunder [60]; Kosoy et
al [34]; and Vatn [57]), and a few have empirically tested such issue (Reeson
and Tisdell [45] and Kerr et al [32]).4
While standard economic theory predicts that landowners would react to the
monetary payment of the PES scheme by increasing the provision of environ-
mental services, there is substantial evidence from the psychology and economic
3A commonly accepted deﬁnition of PES is found in Wunder [60]. PES are: i) a voluntary
transaction in which; ii) a well-deﬁned environmental service (ES) or a land-use likely to
secure that service; iii) is being purchased by at least one ES buyer; iv) from at least one ES
provider; v) if, and only if, the ES provider ensures the supply of the ES (conditionality).
4Cardenas et al [1] and Velez et al [58] have tested motivation crowding-out originated by
the introduction of a non-monetary formal regulation in a framed-ﬁeld common-pool extrac-
tion setting.
2
literature pointing out that this (external) incentive might actually have the
opposing eﬀect and undermine the internalized motivation of the landowners to
behave in such way.5 Such phenomenom is known in the literature as motivation
crowding-out .6
Once a PES has been established the following questions arise: Is the moti-
vation of participants to protect the environment undermined by the monetary
payment? Even if participants do secure the environmental provision, will they
do it because their culturally-rooted values are strengthened by the reward or
merely because of the monetary payment?7 If some potential participants are
excluded,8 will their motivation be undermined once they realize others are paid
for doing something they do (i.e. environmental protection) for free?
To address such issues, Chapter 1 sheds light on a mechanism through which
a monetary payment negatively aﬀects the motivation of individuals for envi-
ronmental protection. Moreover, it establishes a set of conditions under which:
a) environmental protection takes place because individuals are motivated to
reciprocate others' friendly behaviour; b) environmental protection takes place
because individuals receive a monetary payment in compensation, but their mo-
tivation is undermined; c) environmental protection does not take place even if
a payment is oﬀered in return; and d) partial environmental protection might
or might not take place if a payment is oﬀered only to a subset of potential
5See Chapter 1 for references on such evidence.
6The idea of motivation crowding-out was pointed out as early as Titmuss [54], who claimed
that paying blood donors deters their social values and reduces their willingness to donate
blood. See Chapter 1 for references on further motivation crowding-out literature.
7A plausible culturally-rooted value which dictates individuals to preserve the environment
is a sense of belongingness or sense of place. If individuals hold an attachment to a
particular physical space, they would take the necessary action to preserve it without any
external motivation. Would the monetary payment reinforce such positive emotional bond or
would it replace it instead? Section 4 in Chapter 1 discusses this issue in more detail.
8Some PES-like programmes do not establish a market and they are government managed
instead. In such case, a limited budget impedes to include all potential participants. Two
examples of PES programmes of this type are Pago por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) in
Costa Rica and Pago por Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos (PSAH) in Mexico, the two
most ambitious PES in Latin America.
3
participants.
Chapter 1 proposes a Psychological Games approach (Geanakoplos et al [24])
to analyze the consequences of introducing a subsidy to contributions into a 2 -
player public good game where the individual preferences about contributions
to the public good are assumed to be belief-dependent. Moreover, the model in-
cludes two relevant behavioural features widely studied in Economics and Social
Psychology: reciprocity and self-sacriﬁce. With respect to the former, most ex-
perimental results coincide that a consistent feature of the individuals' behaviour
is conditional cooperation. For that reason, the model assumes individuals are
driven by reciprocity and they are able to coordinate eﬀorts to provide the pub-
lic good.9 With respect to the latter, reciprocity norms are strengthened by
sacriﬁcial behaviour, especially when such sacriﬁce helps a group of individuals
to attain a particular goal.10 Taken together, these behavioural modiﬁcations
to the (standard) rational paradigm imply that individuals would be able to
provide the public good (i.e. secure the provision of the environmental service)
as long as they believe others sacriﬁce personal gains in favour of a social gain,
and when they believe others believe that as well, and when they believe oth-
ers believe they believe that as well, and so on. Moreover, not only does the
inclusion of such behavioural features allow the representation of a variety of
public good games outcomes also produced by the rational paradigm and alter-
native inﬂuential economic models (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt [19] and Rabin [43]),
but it also facilitates the representation of the motivation crowding-out eﬀect,
something those models cannot do.
Most economic models of motivation crowding-out conceive such eﬀect as a
9See Chapter 1 for references on experiments which show results on rewarding good be-
haviour, sanctioning bad behaviour, and reciprocity.
10See Chapter 1 for references on empirical evidence that self-sacriﬁce contributes to the
production of norms of reciprocity among individuals, and that it is enhanced when caring for
others. See also Chapter 1 for references on evidence that individuals sustain personal costs
to serve the mission of a group or an organization.
4
product of a change in (Frey and Stutzer [23]): individual's preferences; the per-
ceived nature of the performed task; the task environment; or the individual's
self-perception. Models related to moral motivation consider that motivation
crowding-out occurs when the monetary payment produces a dissonance within
the individual's personal norms realm (Brekke et al [12]). Others (Bénabou
and Tirole [7]) consider that since individuals do not know their own moral
values perfectly and they only learn how good they are by observing their
own behaviour, monetary payments might make the individuals unsure of why
they contributed in the ﬁrst place; hence, the monetary payment destroys the
own-signaling eﬀect of doing good deeds. With respect to the environment, mo-
tivation crowding-out has been studied by Ballet et al [4], Grepperud [25], and
Nyborg [38] (in the context of the eﬀects of taxation on individual responsibil-
ity), Barile et al [5] (in the context of nudging vs mandatory policies), Feldman
and Perez [20] and Ferrara and Missios [21] (in the context of framing eﬀects on
recycling behaviour), and Reeson and Tisdell [45] (in the context of provision
of environmental services). However, none of the studies related to the envi-
ronment have proposed a new analytical framework to understand motivation
crowding-out.
Yet, Chapter 1 stresses something not captured in previous models: the
crowding-out eﬀect can also be triggered by a change in the individual's per-
ception of others' motivation once the monetary payment is delivered. Such
change of beliefs might destroy the underlying contract of mutual acknowledg-
ment between parties about each other's engagement regarding the provision
of the environmental service. Moreover, Chapter 1 makes the case that the
proposed framework is more suitable to analyze the motivation crowding-out
problems posed by PES in the provision of environmental services than any of
the aforementioned studies.
5
Additionally, Chapter 1 studies the impact on the individuals' motivation of
non-monetary incentives and a combination of monetary and non-monetary in-
centives. Finally, it analyzes the policy implications of both types of incentives
and provides a discussion which compares the results of the model to those of
other motivation crowding-out models and situates its results within a theoret-
ical environmental protective behaviour sphere.
2 This land is my land, this land is your land: The envi-
ronmental behaviour of native-born and immigrants
Immigrants and problems are words commonly (and unfairly) used in the
same sentence by governments, particularly those of developed countries.11
They are seen as a burden which puts pressure on the job market through
wage inequalities and higher unemployment rates. They are feared to have a
detrimental eﬀect on the ﬁscal sustainability of the welfare state. Finally, im-
migrants are also thought to increase crime rates and have a negative impact
on the social cohesion of the host country.12
Since the United Nations Conference on Human Environment held in Stock-
holm in 1972, the environment became a matter of national (and international)
concern. Not surprisingly, immigrants were also blamed to contribute to the en-
vironmental degradation of the host country.13 One of the most relevant mani-
festations of such belief is the debate led by the Sierra Club (the most inﬂuential
grassroots environmental organization in the U.S.) about the environmental im-
11Despite the general aversion to immigration, at least four types of potential gains to the
host country are acknowledged (Nannestad [37]): 1) the immigration surplus, i.e. immigrants
could make a society richer; 2) the positive eﬀect on the age distribution of the host society;
3) a smoothing eﬀect on the labour market; and 4) the increase in the aggregate demand
for domestic goods and services. Borjas [9] also considers that beneﬁts of immigration to
native-born result from production complementarities between immigrant workers and other
factors of production. Further potential beneﬁts are discussed in Ratha et al [44].
12See Chapter 2 for literature which provides evidence that does not support either of such
negative impacts of immigration on the host country.
13See Chapter 2 for literature which provides evidence that contradicts this perception.
6
pact that immigrants posed in the U.S. and global ecosystems (Harris [28]).
The stance of immigration restriction supporters was that immigrants engage
in negative environmental behaviours just like Americans, therefore assuming
no immigrant/native-born environmental behaviour diﬀerences. If such argu-
ment is true, then immigration should be restricted in the U.S. but promoted in
countries where the native-born display a strong pro-environmental behaviour.
But, do immigrants really have the same environmental behaviour than native-
born? Research on the topic is scarce and so far, it has provided mixed results.
Moreover, it has focused on the environmental behaviour of native-born and
immigrants at state and national levels only.14
The results provided by the literature on the environmental behaviour of
immigrants and native-born can be accomodated by two competing hypothe-
ses regarding the individuals' environmental attitudes: the New Environmen-
tal Paradigm (NEP) proposed by Dunlap and Van Liere [17], and the Post-
materialistic hypothesis (PMH). The former proposes that the pro-environmental
attitudes of individuals are a global phenomenon. Thus, individuals would hold
the same environmental attitudes regardless of their culture, income, and educa-
tion level attained. The latter claims that individuals develop pro-environmental
attitudes once they achieve a standard of living such that they can shift their
attention from economic security concerns to quality-of-life issues.
Is the behaviour of immigrants a real threat to the host country's envi-
ronment? Should immigration policies therefore remain restrictive? Should
environmental awareness programmes and environmental policy in general be
group-targeted? If there are environmental behavioural diﬀerences between
native-born and immigrants, do all immigrants display the same behaviour? In
order to tackle such questions, Chapter 2 uses a sample of the World Values Sur-
14See Chapter 2 for a literature review on the environmental attitudes of immigrants and
native-born.
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vey dataset to analyze worldwide behavioural diﬀerences between immigrants
and native-born by looking at the probability of engagement of both groups of
individuals across a wide range of pro-environmental behaviours like water con-
sumption reduction, recycling and contributing to environmental organizations,
among others. The method used for the analysis consists in a series of ordered
probit and probit estimations that analyze each of the environmental behaviour
indicators. The proposed model predicts the probability that the individual
engages in a speciﬁc environmental behaviour considering his immigrant sta-
tus or his length of residence in the host country (in the case of immigrants).
The parameters oﬀered by the estimations would give information about which
group holds stronger environmental attitudes, but they will not give informa-
tion about how much stronger they are. Thus, marginal eﬀects are computed to
provide a quantitative measure of environmental behaviour diﬀerences between
immigrants and native-born.
It is the aim of Chapter 2 to pin down the origin of any behavioural discrep-
ancy encountered. If the NEP holds, immigrants and native-born individuals
will show no environmental behavioural diﬀerences because environmental con-
cern is a global phenomenon (Yearly [61]; Breching and Kempton [11]; and
Dunlap and Van Liere [17]). But if the PMH holds, two possible scenarios can
be observed: a) native-born hold stronger environmental attitudes than immi-
grants insofar as the latter are traditionally a vulnerable and poorer group which
come from less developed countries (Inglehart [30]; and Lapham et al [35]); b)
immigrants hold stronger environmental attitudes than native-born, thus in-
dicating the presence of selective immigration of individuals with relatively
high socio-economic status and education levels as well (Kidd and Lee [33]; and
Abrahamson [1]), and who have embraced post-materialistic views even prior to
their migration.
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The PMH, though, is not the only reason why environmental behavioural dif-
ferences between immigrants and native-born may arise. As Pﬀefer and Mayone
Stycos [42] point out, an alternative explanation to immigrants holding stronger
environmental attitudes than native-born might be that environmental prob-
lems in their country of origin sensitized them and motivated them to engage
in pro-environmental action (Martinez-Alier and Hershberg [36]). Likewise, an
alternative explanation to immigrants holding weaker environmental attitudes
than native-born is that immigrants lack a sense of belongingness or a sense
of place that would make them feel attached and identiﬁed to their physical
surroundings.15 Without that close relationship between immigrants and their
place of residence, the need to take pro-environmental actions when required
could be absent.
The Sierra Club's assumption of immigrants having the same environmental
behaviour as U.S. native-born is closely related to another central theme in
the discussion: the eﬀect on such behaviour of their length of residence in the
country. This process, denominated as environmental acculturation by Padilla
[41], helps the immigrants to learn the ways of the dominant culture. Thus, the
more time an immigrant spends on the host country, the more likely he is to
adhere to the behavioural rules of the native-born.16
Since acculturation seems to drive the environmental behaviour of immi-
grants by their length of residence, Chapter 2 incorporates such feature into
the analysis. Furthermore, since it has been acknowledged that environmental
behaviour diﬀerences among immigrants and native-born might arise because
of the presence (or lack) of a sense of place, the analysis uses an instrument
15The ﬁrst to conceptualize the sense of place of individuals was Tuan [55]. He regarded
the place as the centre of meaning or ﬁeld of care which emphasizes human emotions and
relationships. The individuals' sense of place is the perspective from which individuals
position themselves in relation to others to advocate particular standpoints regarding natural
resources management (Cantrill and Senecah [14]).
16See Chapter 2 for literature on acculturation.
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to avoid comparing individuals with heterogenous attachment to their place of
residence: the immigrants' oﬀspring. Hence, by comparing the behaviour of
native-born to that of second generation immigrants, it is assured that there
will not exist a variation in sense of place due to immigrant status, while allow-
ing to isolate the eﬀect of length of residence on their environmental behaviour.
3 Identity selection and the activation of pro-environmental
behaviour
Psychologists, sociologists and a growing number of economists have now rec-
ognized that worldwide environmental degradation is not merely a by-product
of industrial and technological evolution, but behavioural and attitudinal as
well. A certain environmentally friendly behaviour might be followed by those
individuals who are attached to a speciﬁc set of norms. Norms are shared beliefs
about how the individuals should act, and they are enforced by the threat of
sanctions or the promise of rewards (Schwartz and Howard [47]). Norms can be
divided into two groups according to their level of internalisation: personal and
social (Thøgersen [52]).
A personal norm is a self-expectation of speciﬁc action in a particular con-
text, commonly experienced as a feeling of moral obligation (Schwartz [46]).
Inasmuch as norms are a behavioural guide for individuals, their violation leads
to sanctions. When a sanction is executed by the same individual it is said
that the norm has been internalised. According to Schwartz [46], and Schwartz
and Howard [47], internalised norms are personal norms. Thus, personal norms
are followed because of internalised values and conceptions of what is right and
wrong.
On the other hand, a social norm is based on a group-expectation where the
rewards and punishment are externally enforced. Hence, individuals follow a
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social norm on account of (real or imagined) social pressure (Ajzen [2]). Biel and
Thøgersen [8] consider that social norms are a reason for departure from rational
choice insofar as they prescribe the manifestation of a particular behaviour and
the proscription of other in a given context. In that sense, Fehr and Fischbacher
[18] explain that, despite little is known about the formation process of social
norms, they are greatly driven by non-selﬁsh motives and largely enforced by
sanctions.
Norm adhesion is of great relevance to the analysis of pro-environmental be-
haviour. Bamberg and Schmidt [6], Bratt [10], Harland et al [27] and Thøgersen
have documented an important correlation between environmentally responsible
behaviour and social and personal norms. While there is research which demon-
strates that personal norms often have stronger and more reliable behavioural
implications than social norms (Thøgersen [51]), other studies have shown there
are cases where this need not be true (Bamberg and Schmidt [6] and Hunecke
et al [29]), at least in an indirect way.
It is possible for individuals to display pro-environmental behaviour if norms
which prescribe such type of behaviour are somehow activated. In social dilem-
mas, norm activation depends on personal and situational factors (Biel and
Thøgersen [8]). Personal factors are associated to an obligation that lies within
the individuals to protect a particular natural resource. The norms activated by
these factors are considered to be moral norms that individuals internalise and
that have a direct eﬀect on the environment. They determine the environmental
responsibility held by individuals through the establishment of environmental
values. Conversely, situational factors are associated with norms related to co-
operation, or in Kerr's taxonomy (Kerr [31]), general interaction norms that
are elicited by the behaviour of others and which have an indirect eﬀect both
on other individuals' welfare and on the environment. Situational factors that
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aﬀect the activation of norms indirectly encompass the salience of need and ac-
tions, beneﬁts and costs, framing eﬀects (e.g. market vs non-market frames),
behaviour of others, and communication. These situational factors alter the
individuals' perception of fairness and justice, reciprocity and commitment in
social dilemmas with consequences on cooperation.
The personal factors refer to the environmental responsibility that arises
in individuals from the activation of personal norms. One inﬂuential model
representing this activation mechanism is Schwartz's Norm Activation Theory
(Schwartz [46]). Under such model, a norm is activated when: a) the individual
recognizes his private actions have a public good aspect, or in other words,
become aware of the consequences of his actions; and b) the individual ascribes
personal responsibility for the issue at hand.
Although Schwartz's theory seems to enjoy empirical validation (Van Liere
and Dunlap [56], and Stern et al [48]), a group of researchers claim that some
environmental policies might actually disrupt such process of norm activation.
One plausible mechanism (Bruvoll and Nyborg [13]) occurs when information
campaigns seek to increase consumers' voluntary contributions to a public good.
Once consumers ascribe responsibility for a certain contribution level, they may
experience a warm glow of giving and a cold shiver of not giving enough. By
tightening the norm and thus requiring higher contributions from the individu-
als, environmental policy will usually increase the cold shiver. Another mecha-
nism (Brekke et al [12]) explains that environmentally friendly behaviour may
represent a burden, and so duty-oriented individuals (i.e. those who prefer to
think of themselves as a responsible person) may consciously or unconsciously
avoid settings in which they suspect a heavy burden of responsibility will be lay
upon them. Lastly, other mechanism (Nyborg [39]) considers individuals simply
do not want to know that contributions to a public good are socially valuable.
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Hence, information campaigns which promote environmental responsibility can
trigger irksome feelings of cognitive dissonance on individuals, imposing on them
an excessive feeling of moral responsibility.
The type of norms activated through situational factors are norms related to
cooperation or social norms. Communication, fairness, reciprocity and framing
eﬀects have been the drivers of social norms activation which have received most
attention by researchers.17
Most research focused on social norms activation failure due to a change in
the prevailing situational factors is related to the analysis of framing eﬀects. In
particular, interest has been drawn to analyze the eﬀects of monetary incentives
on the behaviour of individuals in laboratory experiments (Frey and Jegen [22]
and Reeson and Tisdell [45]).
Yet, an issue overlooked by the literature of norm activation is that the iden-
tity of individuals can also trigger a speciﬁc norm of environmental behaviour
given that identities describe social roles. An identity is a set of meanings re-
lated to the self that functions as a reference that guides behaviour in diﬀerent
contexts (Stets and Biga [49]). An environmental identity prescribes a course of
action that is compatible with the individuals' sense of who they are (Clayton
and Opotow [16]). Furthermore, Weber et al [59] stress that the identity of
the decision maker is a signiﬁcant factor for cooperation in social interaction
scenarios.
Stets and Biga [49] claim that while traditional environmental sociology
linked attitude processes to the determination of environmentally responsible
behaviour, it is the identity process which inﬂuences such type of behaviour. The
identity of the individual is also relevant for policy design. An individual's sense
of self is linked to his social environment (Akerlof and Kranton [3]), and so it is
17See Chapter 3 for references on studies about situational factors which facilitate social
norms activation.
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reasonable to suspect that by changing situational factors, environmental policy
might in turn aﬀect the individuals' sense of who they are. Hence, understanding
which identities are salient is important to evaluate how individuals react to a
particular threat or distribution of rewards (Clayton and Opotow [16]).
In order to ﬁll the aforementioned gap, Chapter 3 outlines an identity selec-
tion model based on Teraji [50] and self-veriﬁcation theory, and inquires about
how identity selection can activate a particular environmentally friendly norm.
In a two-period economy, there are two types of selves or identities the indi-
vidual can adopt: selﬁsh and pro-environmental. In the ﬁrst period and given
a particular self, individuals decide their level of contribution to a public good
and obtain material payoﬀs associated to such contribution. Pro-environmental
selves additionally receive cognitive payoﬀs related to a warm glow of giving.
In the second period, individuals decide whether to keep their identity. If they
keep the same identity their payoﬀs are materialized and are equivalent to those
of period one. But if they change their identity they face a cost of social dis-
approval. Chapter 3 shows that without any external intervention, individuals
prefer to be consistent across the two periods with respect to their identity
selection. However, if a monetary environmental policy (a situational factor)
is introduced, the identity selection process is aﬀected in an asymmetric fash-
ion: while selﬁsh selves still remain selﬁsh, pro-environmental selves might now
change their identity because of a situational factor that no longer allows the
activation of the social norm which prescribes a pro-environmental behaviour.
It is worth to notice though, that the issue at hand (i.e. social norms activa-
tion failure due to situational factors) should not be confounded with motivation
crowding-out. Whilst both can represent cooperation failure in a public good
provision setting, and so both can explain why individuals might not display
pro-environmental behaviours, motivation crowding-out theory does not seek to
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establish the origin of the environmentally friendly inclination of the individ-
ual, just the mechanism through which such preference is distorted. In turn,
Chapter 3 proposes that the literature has paid no attention to the identity
of individuals as a source of pro-environmental behaviour or to environmental
policies as key determinants of such source.
The remainder of the thesis consists of three chapters of self-contained stud-
ies. Chapter 1: Payments for Environmental Services and motivation crowding-
out: A Psychological Games approach, Chapter 2: This land is your land, this
land is my land: The environmental behaviour of native-born and immigrants
and Chapter 3: Identity selection and the activation of pro-environmental be-
haviour. Conclusions and implications of each chapter and conclusions of the
thesis are addressed in the Conclusion.
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Chapter 1: Payments for Environmental
Services and motivation crowding-out: A
Psychological Games approach.
Luis Serra-Barragán∗
Abstract
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are widely regarded as
the state-of-the-art environmental policy to address the ongoing deple-
tion of natural resources. The rationale is that since the environmental
services that natural resources provide are considered public goods, de-
pletion occurs because of the diﬃculty of excluding potential users from
its beneﬁts. Thus, since the cost of securing the provision of the envi-
ronmental services falls only on local land managers, it is more attractive
for them to convert their land into more proﬁtable uses than maintain
it in its natural state. PES are supposed to correct this externality by
establishing a market which oﬀers a monetary compensation to owners
of vital natural resources as a recognition of their eﬀort in providing the
environmental services. This chapter argues that even in the absence of
PES, individuals can secure the provision of an environmental service by
reciprocating friendly behaviour when they believe others are willing to
make a personal sacriﬁce. Yet, the introduction of a PES might back-
ﬁre: a motivation crowding-out arises if individuals believe others recip-
rocate friendly behaviour solely to receive the monetary compensation,
ultimately decreasing total environmental protection. Even if environ-
mental protection does take place, the motivation of individuals to secure
the provision of the environmental service becomes commodiﬁed by the
PES. Finally, awarding the PES only to a subset of individuals will also
have negative eﬀects on environmental protection, since those not receiv-
ing the PES will not want to do for free something that others are being
paid to do. Environmental policy implications on other economic instru-
ments are further discussed.
There are thousands of individual rules that can be used to manage resources. No
one, including a scientiﬁcally trained professional staﬀ, can do a complete analysis of
any particular situation E. Ostrom, 2000.
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Introduction
Research produced by the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment of the United
Nations showed that over the past 55 years, humans have changed ecosystems
more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human
history due to fast growing demand for food, fresh water, timber, ﬁbre and fuel.1
Since the environmental services that natural resources provide are consid-
ered public goods,2 depletion often occurs because of the diﬃculty of excluding
potential users from its beneﬁts. The problem is originated by the individuals'
incentives to free ride from the provision activities of others, which is reﬂected
in a straightforward and pessimistic fashion in Hardin's [53] tragedy of the com-
mons, Olson's [76] impossibility of collective action argument, and the Prisoner's
Dilemma.
While some successful cases of independent sustainable management of nat-
ural resources have been documented, the problem persists in most parts of the
world. Land is usually managed for private beneﬁt and, since the cost of secur-
ing the provision of the environmental services falls only on local land managers,
it is generally more attractive for them to convert their land into more proﬁtable
1http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx
2Natural ecosystems provide multiple environmental services: consumption goods and pro-
duction inputs; regulation of climate, and air and water quality; cultural services (e.g. recre-
ation and aesthetic enjoyment); support to other ecosystem services (e.g. soil formation); and
provision of a living (e.g. agriculture, ﬁshing, and forestry). Apart from contributing to key
sectors in developing countries like tourism, the provision of environmental services improves
the resilience of people to natural disasters and health risks, particularly of the poor.
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uses, such as agriculture, rather than maintain it in its natural state.
Economists argue that this externality would be corrected by establishing
a market which oﬀers a monetary compensation to owners of vital natural re-
sources as a recognition of their eﬀort in providing an environmental service
which generates beneﬁts to other individuals. Such market, denominated Pay-
ments for Environmental Services (PES), is regarded as the eﬃcient means to
provide environmental services.3 However, some researchers have discussed the
possibility that the monetary reward can erode culturally-rooted conservation
values (Wunder [98]; Kosoy et al [66]; and Vatn [96]), and a few have empirically
tested such issue (Reeson and Tisdell [83] and Kerr et al [63]).4
While standard economic theory predicts that landowners would react to the
monetary payment of the PES scheme by increasing the provision of environ-
mental services, there is substantial evidence from the psychology and economic
literature pointing out that this (external) incentive might actually have the
opposing eﬀect and undermine the internalized motivation of the landowners to
behave in such way.5 Such phenomenom is known in the literature as motivation
crowding-out .6
3A commonly accepted deﬁnition of PES is found in Wunder [98]. PES are: i) a voluntary
transaction in which; ii) a well-deﬁned environmental service (ES) or a land-use likely to
secure that service; iii) is being purchased by at least one ES buyer; iv) from at least one ES
provider; v) if, and only if, the ES provider ensures the supply of the ES (conditionality).
4Cardenas et al [12] and Velez et al [97] have tested motivation crowding-out originated by
the introduction of a non-monetary formal regulation in a framed-ﬁeld common-pool extrac-
tion setting.
5In the Psychology literature see Deci and Flaste [20] and Deci et al [21] for a supportive
comprehensive summary on the negative eﬀects of external incentives on intrinsic motivation.
In the Economics literature see Frey and Jegen [38] for an overview. For survey-based and
econometric evidence see Frey and Oberholzer-Gee [40], Frey and Götte [39], Torgler et al [93],
Greiner and Gregg [50], and Georgellis et al [44]. For experimental evidence see Gneezy and
Rustichini [45] and [46], Irlenbusch and Sliwka [56], Eckel et al [25], Meier [71], Mellstrom and
Johannesson [72], Reeson and Tisdell [83], Perino et al [81], d'Adda [17], Bernasconi et al [7],
and Goeschl and Perino [47]. In the environmental policy arena see Frey [37] and Frey and
Stutzer [41]. Finally, for evidence that do not support motivation crowding-out see Cameron
and Pierce [11], Eisenberger et al [26], Thøgersen [90] and Lacetera and Macis [67].
6The idea of motivation crowding-out was pointed out as early as Titmuss [92], who claimed
that paying blood donors deters their social values and reduces their willingness to donate
blood. The present model is closer to cognitive evaluation theory models such as Frey [36]
and Bénabou and Tirole [6]. Economic models based on cognitive evaluation theory have
generalized the hidden cost of rewards and established three main results (Frey and Stutzer
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Once a PES is established the following questions arise: is the motivation
of participants to protect the environment undermined by the monetary pay-
ment? Even if participants do secure the environmental provision, will they
do it because their culturally-rooted values are strengthened by the reward or
merely because of the monetary payment?7 If some potential participants are
excluded,8 will their motivation be undermined once they realize others are paid
for doing something they do (i.e. environmental protection) for free?
To address such issues, this chapter sheds light on a mechanism through
which a monetary payment negatively aﬀects the motivation of individuals
for environmental protection. It proposes a Psychological Games approach
(Geanakoplos et al [94]) to analyze the consequences of introducing a subsidy
(PES) to contributions into a 2 -player public good game where the individ-
ual preferences about contributions to the public good (environmental service)
are assumed to be belief-dependent. The motivation of individuals to provide
the public good is given by a sense of reciprocity9 and self-sacriﬁce10. Taken
together, these behavioural features imply that individuals would be able to
[41]): all external interventions aﬀect intrinsic motivation, not just rewards; such interventions
crowd-out individuals' motivation if they are perceived to be controlling, whereas they crowd-
in intrinsic motivation if they are perceived to be supporting; lastly, the relative price eﬀect
should be considered simultaneously to the motivation crowding-out eﬀect. See Nyborg and
Rege [75] for a survey of motivation crowding-out economic models based on: altruism, social
norms, fairness, commitment, and cognitive evaluation theory.
7A plausible culturally-rooted value which dictates individuals to preserve the environment
is a sense of belongingness or sense of place. If individuals hold an attachment to a
particular physical space, they would take the necessary action to preserve it without any
external motivation. Would the monetary payment reinforce such positive emotional bond or
would it replace it instead? Section 4 discusses this issue in more detail.
8Some PES-like programmes do not establish a market and they are government managed
instead. In such case, a limited budget impedes to include all potential participants. Two
examples of PES programmes of this type are Pago por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) in
Costa Rica and Pago por Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos (PSAH) in Mexico, the two
most ambitious PES in Latin America.
9 See Section 2 for a justiﬁcation and references.
10 See Section 2 for a justiﬁcation and references
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provide the public good (i.e. the environmental service) as long as they believe
the other sacriﬁces personal gains in favour of a social gain, and when they
believe the other believes that as well, and when they believe the other believes
they believe that as well, and so on.
Because of these behavioural features, the approach presented in this chap-
ter is related to the social preferences literature, speciﬁcally to models like Fehr
and Schmidt (FS) [31], Rabin [82], Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [24] (DK) and
Falk and Fischbacher [28] (FF). However, it especially shares more similiarities
with reciprocity models insofar as the motivation to provide the environmental
service is intention-driven like in Rabin [82] and the DK and FF models. It is
even closer to the FF model because such motivation is also outcome-dependent.
Although most diﬀerences betweeen the FF model and the framework provided
in this chapter will be addressed in the Discussion, let us state the following:
while it is true that the FF model can predict the same outcomes provided by
the reciprocity analysis of this chapter, their framework cannot -without any
substantial modiﬁcations- analyze this chapter's main result: the motivation
crowding-out produced by a PES. The reason is that the intention-based reci-
procity present in the FF model is not enough to establish the motivation that
drives the actions of the individuals (see Stanca et al [89]). Therefore, the nov-
elty of the current approach is that it both predicts the same results provided by
stylized facts about linear public goods games, and something social preferences
models -in general- and reciprocity models -in particular- cannot: motivation
crowding-out.
This chapter's framework is also related to motivation crowding-out models.
Most of them conceive such eﬀect as a product of a change in (Frey and Stutzer
[41]): individual's preferences; the perceived nature of the performed task; the
task environment; or the individual's self-perception. Models related to moral
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motivation consider that motivation crowding-out occurs when the monetary
payment produces a dissonance within the individual's personal norms realm
(Brekke et al [10]). Others (Bénabou and Tirole [6]) consider that since indi-
viduals do not know their own moral values perfectly and they only learn how
good they are by observing their own behaviour, monetary payments might
make the individuals unsure of why they contributed in the ﬁrst place; hence,
the monetary payment destroys the own-signaling eﬀect of doing good deeds.
With respect to the environment, motivation crowding-out has been studied by
Ballet et al [4], Grepperud [51], and Nyborg [74] (in the context of the eﬀects of
taxation on individual responsibility), Barile et al [5] (in the context of nudg-
ing vs mandatory policies), Feldman and Perez [32] and Ferrara and Missios
[33] (in the context of framing eﬀects on recycling behaviour), and Reeson and
Tisdell [83] (in the context of provision of environmental services). However,
none of the studies related to the environment have proposed a new analytical
framework to understand motivation crowding-out.
The present chapter proposes a novel application to understand the motiva-
tion crowding-out produced by PES. First, the chapter argues that even in the
absence of PES, individuals can secure the provision of an environmental ser-
vice by reciprocating friendly behaviour when they believe others are willing to
make a personal sacriﬁce. Second, the chapter claims that the introduction of a
PES might backﬁre: a motivation crowding-out arises if individuals believe oth-
ers reciprocate friendly behaviour solely to receive the monetary compensation,
ultimately decreasing total environmental protection. Even if environmental
protection does take place, the motivation of individuals to secure the provi-
sion of the environmental service becomes commodiﬁed by the PES. Third, the
chapter argues that awarding the PES only to a subset of individuals will also
have negative eﬀects on environmental protection, since those not receiving the
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PES will not want to do for free something that others are being paid to do.
Thus, the chapter proposes something that is not captured in any of the pre-
vious models: the crowding-out eﬀect can also be triggered by a change in the
individual's perception of others' motivation once the monetary payment is de-
livered. Such change of beliefs might destroy the underlying contract of mutual
acknowledgment between parties about each other's engagement regarding the
provision of the environmental service. Finally, this chapter makes the case that
the proposed framework is more suitable to analyze the motivation crowding-
out problems posed by PES in the provision of environmental services than any
of the aforementioned studies.
The plan for the rest of the chapter is the following. The next section explains
the reciprocity nature of the motivation of individuals to secure the provision of
an environmental service. Section 3 proposes a Psychological Games approach to
analyze the consequences of introducing a subsidy to contributions into a public
good game, and it elucidates the mechanism through which the motivation of
individuals for environmental protection is changed. It further analyzes the
impact on such motivation of non-monetary incentives and a combination of
monetary and non-monetary incentives. In section 4, policy implications about
both types of incentives are presented. Section 5 discusses the results of the
chapter. Finally, conclusions and future lines of research are outlined.
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2 A plausible motivation to provide
an environmental service
As an illustration to the motivation crowding-out problem produced by PES
and the mechanism through which it is originated, consider the following situa-
tion. Suppose Helen (H) and Nick (N) are neighbours and that they must decide
how to allocate their time between two activities. One is a private activity (e.g.
reading) and the other is a public activity (e.g. taking care of a common garden
that lies within their properties). Both of them have the same amount of time
and have the same preferences for reading and for taking care of the garden. If
Helen (Nick) chooses to take care of the garden, Nick (Helen) obtains a higher
reward from reading, i.e. collaboration is dominated by betrayal, and if Helen
(Nick) chooses to read, then choosing to read also gives Nick (Helen) a better
reward. The following is a representation of their payoﬀs:
H/
N Gardening Reading
Gardening 4,4 0,5
Reading 5,0 1,1
It is immediate to see that this game is a Prisoner's Dilemma and that
although both Helen and Nick would beneﬁt from cooperating to provide the
public good, it is in their self-interest to defect. Hence, in the Nash Equilibrium
of the game, gardening (i.e. the public good) is not provided.11
11For a detailed account on public goods provision see Ledyard [68] and Gäcther and Her-
rmann [42].
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Robust experimental evidence has shown that such gloomy scenario for Helen
and Nick is not inescapable, and also put forward diﬀerent explanations as for
why they might in fact be willing to cooperate to do some gardening.12
Most experimental results coincide that a feature that is present in the in-
dividuals' behaviour is conditional cooperation. Thus, driven by reciprocity,
Helen and Nick could be able to coordinate eﬀorts to do some gardening.13
Additionally, there is evidence from the Social Psychology literature that reci-
procity norms are strengthened by sacriﬁcial behaviour, especially when such
sacriﬁce helps a group of individuals to attain a particular goal.14
Consider again Helen and Nick's situation, only this time suppose that the
amount of time they would spend gardening does not depend only on the other's
decision, but also on their expectation about the other's decision, and on their
expectation of the other's expectation about their decision, and so on. In other
words, suppose that the beneﬁts that Helen and Nick derive from their deci-
sion do not depend only on the amount of time spent on reading or gardening,
12Communication as a driver for cooperation is discussed in Isaac and Walker [57], and
Ostrom and Walker [79]. The use of selective incentives to promote cooperation has been
explored by Ostrom et al [80], Fehr and Gächter [29], and Andreoni et al [3]. Social preferences
are modeled in Rabin [82], Fehr and Schmidt [31], Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [24], and Falk
and Fischbacher [28]. Institutional arrangements are investigated by Ostrom et al [78]. In-
group identiﬁcation is analyzed by Ellemers et al [27], and Hewstone et al [54]. Finally,
when social interaction is repeated, credible threats or promises about future behaviour can
inﬂuence current behaviour. So, according to the Folk Theorem, cooperation is attainable if
individuals are patient enough. See Dal Bó [18] for experimental evidence on this matter.
13In a survey of several one-shot public goods experiments, Dawes and Thaler [19] showed
that rewarding good behaviour was contingent on others' behaviour. With respect to the
sanctioning of bad behaviour, evidence is provided by Goranson and Berkowitz [48], Greenberg
[49], Güth et al [52], Kahneman [60], Kahneman et al [61], Roth et al [84], and Fehr and
Gächter [29]. The analysis of reciprocity is found in Sudgen [88], Keser and van Vinden [64],
Fischbacher et al [35], Charness and Rabin [13], Croson et al [16], Croson [15], and Fischbacher
and Gächter [34].
14Evidence that self-sacriﬁce is enhanced when caring for others is provided by Ames et al
[1]. In the context of leadership, De Cremer and van Knippenberg [22] found that individuals
sustain personal costs to serve the mission of a group or an organization. Singh and Krishnan
[86] found a positive relationship between self-sacriﬁce and caring for others, and claimed
that not only does self-sacriﬁcial behaviour increases contributions to the public good, but
it also facilitates in-group cooperation and group belongingness. Furthermore, self-sacriﬁce
contributes to the production of norms of reciprocity among individuals (Choi and Mai-Dalton
[14]) and it also builds trust among them (Yukl [99]).
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but also on their expectation about the other's decision.15As supported by ex-
perimental evidence, suppose that motivated by a positive inclination towards
reciprocity (and possibly gardening), each player is willing then to sacriﬁce some
payoﬀs in order to attain a social gain (by increasing the payoﬀs of the other
player). In consequence, the payoﬀs of players in this game consist in: material
payoﬀs, which are suitable to sacriﬁce and are a product of their time's alloca-
tion for reading or gardening; and psychological payoﬀs, which are a product of
players' expectations about the sacriﬁce made by each other. The following is
one possible representation of this feature:
H/
N Gardening Reading
Gardening 4+w , 4+w 0+x , 5+x
Reading 5+x , 0+x 1+z , 1+z
Where w > z > 0, x < 0, and z − x > 1. Suppose Helen decides to
cooperate. Then she makes a sacriﬁce because she does not select the strategy
that maximizes her material payoﬀs while increasing Nick's. If Helen believes
Nick sacriﬁces, and Nick believes Helen believes he does, then Nick ﬁnds fruitful
to sacriﬁce to beneﬁt Helen because she will do the same for him in return. So,
15It is fairly reasonable to assume belief-dependent individual preferences about contribu-
tions to a public good. Either Helen or Nick might be slightly more inclined to spend time
taking care of the garden because (s)he might hold greener preferences. In general, though,
they are willing to take care of the garden if the other does it as well since the beneﬁts of
unilateral gardening do not compensate its costs. If Helen believes Nick will spend time to
take care of the garden, she will be tempted to do the same, because of reciprocity. Moreover,
if Helen believes Nick believes she will spend time taking care of the garden, then she might
feel bad about disappointing him (probably even embarrassed). And so, she will decide to
spend time taking care of the garden. Finally, suppose that she has greener preferences and
she plans to do some gardening. But if she believes that he will not spend time gardening,
she might feel angry that her eﬀort is not corresponded and decide not to spend time taking
care of the garden in the end. Thus, beliefs play a major role in the decision of individuals to
contribute to a public good.
32
if both cooperate, they obtain high psychological payoﬀs denoted by w because
of the friendly environment created by positive reciprocity. Moreover, if both
players hold such beliefs, they might actually do some gardening.
If Nick selects to read (do some gardening) while Helen does some gardening
(reads) he betrays (is betrayed by) her. Hence, his psychological payoﬀs are
negative and denoted by x. This occurs because betrayal (or being betrayed)
triggers a feeling of remorse (anger) on him. However, this situation is unlikely
to hold because both are driven by reciprocity to the other player's sacriﬁce (or
betrayal).
If Nick decides to read he does not make a sacriﬁce because, conditional on
Helen's best reply, he selects the strategy that maximizes his material payoﬀs
while not helping to increase hers. Then, if Helen believes Nick does not sacriﬁce,
and Nick believes Helen believes so, Nick ﬁnds fruitful not to sacriﬁce because
Helen will do the same in return. So, both will read and attain low (but positive)
psychological payoﬀs denoted by z. It is true that (gardening,gardening) is
Pareto superior to (reading,reading), but it is also true for both players that
reading is a preferred strategy when the other player also chooses to read.
At ﬁrst glance, this motivation does not seem to diﬀer from fairness consid-
erations. If we consider Rabin's equilibrium concept (Rabin [82]), both (gar-
dening,gardening) and (reading,reading) are Fairness Equilibria because both
players are willing to reciprocate kindness and unkindness.
However, suppose now that an external party (Leo) derives beneﬁts from
Helen and Nick's garden when it has been taken care of. So, to motivate them
to do some gardening, Leo oﬀers a payment of 2 units is to that who takes care
of the garden. Then, the structure of the game is changed in the following way:
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H/
N Gardening Reading
Gardening 6,6 2,5
Reading 5,2 1,1
It is immediate to see that by considering material motives only, the reward
to contributions gives the incentive to both individuals to cooperate. Therefore,
in the Nash Equilibrium, they do some gardening.
Rabin's prediction remains the same despite the introduction of the pay-
ment, i.e. both players reciprocate kindness and unkindness. Thus, (garden-
ing,gardening) and (reading,reading) are Fairness Equilibria. The reward to
contributions does not change the perception of kindness among players. If one
player defects the other believes he is not being kind to him because he obtains
less than his equitable payoﬀ from such action, and in reciprocity he defects
too. If one player cooperates the other believes he is being kind to him since
he obtains more than his equitable payoﬀ out of such action, and in reciprocity
he cooperates too.16 But, what if Helen and Nick have a positive attitude or
inclination towards gardening given by sacriﬁce and reciprocity?
H/
N Gardening Reading
Gardening 6+x , 6+x 2+x , 5+z
Reading 5+z , 2+x 1+w , 1+w
16Notice that this claim does not hold for all values of the monetary payment. A higher
subsidy to contributions to the public good increases the material payoﬀs of the game, and as
Rabin [82] shows, there is a value of such material payoﬀs for which Fairness considerations
are weakened and for which the only Fairness equilibrium of the game is the Nash equilibrium.
However, this is not a motivation crowding-out eﬀect in the spirit of this chapter since the
beliefs of players regarding the kindness of others remain the same.
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And again w > z > 0, x < 0, and z − x > 1. If Nick selects to do some
gardening, and Helen believes Nick does, and Nick believes Helen believes he
does, gardening might not take place. The reason is that since Helen believes
Nick does some gardening and receives the reward for doing it, she deems that he
does not sacriﬁce any material payoﬀs to beneﬁt her, and he is rather pursuing
his own interest. Thus, Helen reciprocates such action by not gardening herself
because she is better oﬀ than doing it. Since Nick believes the same about
Helen, he ends up not gardening himself as well. Their beliefs are conﬁrmed,
and none of them takes care of the garden.
These examples have shown that introducing a monetary payment to incen-
tive individuals to contribute to the provision of a public good might actually
backﬁre and result in (lower or) no contributions. The next subsections formal-
ize the notion of the sacriﬁce made by individuals with a reciprocal behaviour,
and details the process through which such payment changes the beliefs of in-
dividuals about the behavioural motivation of others.
3 The Model
3.1 A Psychological Games approach
In this part of the chapter, the framework developed by Geanakoplos et al [46]
is used to formalize the idea presented in the 2 -player examples.
Consider a 2 -player, normal-form game with strategy sets A1, A2 for player
i=1, 2. Let pii :A1xA2 → R be player i 's material payoﬀs. Following Rabin [82],
I assume that each player's utility when he chooses his strategy depends on three
factors: (i) his strategy, (ii) his beliefs about the other player's strategy choice,
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and (iii) his beliefs about the other player's beliefs about his strategy. I also
keep Rabin's notation: ai ∈ Ai is the action chosen by player i , where i = 1, 2;
bji ∈ Ai represent player i 's beliefs about what strategy player j chooses, where
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, and j 6= i; cij ∈ Ai stand for player i 's beliefs about what
player j believes player i 's strategy is, where i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, and j 6= i.
3.1.1 The altruistic-sacriﬁce function
An altruistic-sacriﬁce is deﬁned as the renouncement of something of certain
value for the beneﬁt of someone.17 In this model, an altruistic-sacriﬁce is de-
noted as player i choosing a strategy by which he renounces to some material
payoﬀs for the beneﬁt of player j . Thus, the altruistic-sacriﬁce function si(·)
denotes the tradeoﬀ faced by player i in terms of material payoﬀs that are for-
feited so as to produce a social beneﬁt by increasing the payoﬀs of the other
player.
Deﬁnition 1. Player i's altruistic-sacriﬁce is given by:
si (ai, bji) ≡ pi
max
i (bji)−pii(ai,bji)+pij(bji,ai)−pii(ai,bji)
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
The ﬁrst term in the numerator of the altruistic-sacriﬁce function represents
the maximum payoﬀs that could be attained by player i, given his beliefs about
the strategy chosen by j. The second term stands for player i 's actual payoﬀs,
i.e. the payoﬀs he receives from choosing strategy ai, given his beliefs about
17This concept of sacriﬁce is contrary to the one deﬁned in Rand's Objectivism where
sacriﬁcing is the act of rejecting the good for the evil. In my opinion, human beings are
altruistic-egoists as in Seyle [85], i.e. they do not supress their natural instinct to look
after themselves ﬁrst, but they also keep their natural instinct to do some good to others.
Furthermore, notice that this is a broader notion than the standard self-sacriﬁce deﬁnition
which only stipulates that individuals give something up, but that does not specify who the
recipient of the beneﬁts originated by such sacriﬁce is. In this sense, the deﬁnition of sacriﬁce
I use resembles that of De Cremer and van Knippenberg [22].
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the strategy chosen by j . Hence, the ﬁrst two terms in the numerator represent
the material payoﬀs renounced by player i when he chooses strategy ai. The
last two terms of the numerator reﬂect the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs of
player j and the payoﬀs of player i ; the greater the diﬀerence, the bigger the
altruistic-sacriﬁce made by player i is, because it implies that his behaviour
is not reciprocated by the other player.18 The last two terms are thus used
to make an interpersonal comparison between player i and the average player
of the group excluding i . Notice that it is possible that the numerator of the
altruistic-sacriﬁce function is equal to zero whenever, given his beliefs of the j 's
strategy, player i chooses a strategy that maximizes his material payoﬀs and
which gives him the same material payoﬀs as j .
In the denominator, if pimaxi (ai) − pimini (ai) = 0 then si (ai, bji) = 0. As
in Rabin [82], the denominator of the altruistic-sacriﬁce function only considers
the payoﬀs player i receives independent of j 's action because in that way the
function is normalised along the Pareto frontier for i . Thus, a player's altruistic-
sacriﬁce must lie strictly between his worst and best Pareto eﬃcient payoﬀs
whenever the Pareto frontier is not a singleton, in which case the altruistic
sacriﬁce function is equivalent to zero. This might occur if any response of j to
ai yields i the same payoﬀs; in reciprocity, player i will not sacriﬁce.
19
Player i does not sacriﬁce if si (ai, bji) ≤ 0, which results from him not giving
up any material personal gains to create a beneﬁt for j , i.e. a social beneﬁt. In
18According to MacCrimmon and Messick [69], an individual manifests a social motive when
he takes the others' outcomes into consideration in making a choice. In turn, social motives
can interact to create composite motives which can better account for observed behaviour.
Choi and Mai-Dalton [14] relate self-sacriﬁce to Egalitarianism and claim that the former does
not necessarily result in equality in the sense that the one who sacriﬁces might end up better
or worse than the beneﬁciary. Moreover, Brandts et al [9] consider the interaction between
sacriﬁce and reciprocity and found experimental evidence that the former depends on whether
the individual is in an advantageous or disadvantageous position (i.e. being ahead or behind)
in monetary payoﬀs.
19Furthermore, by representing the denominator in this way, the altruistic-sacriﬁce function
is bounded away from zero even when the material payoﬀs are very small, which makes issues
relative to the environmental protection motivation relevant despite the altruistic-sacriﬁce of
the players is small.
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turn, if player i chooses an action which does not maximize his material payoﬀs
and provides higher payoﬀs for j then si (ai, bji) > 0.
The example of last section stressed that the (altruistic) sacriﬁce made by
i not only depends on his strategy choice, but also on his beliefs about the
(altruistic) sacriﬁce of the other player. The analysis of the reciprocity which
prevails in a group under this psychological games framework considers the
intention of individuals and the consequences of their actions. Individuals might
have a good or bad belief about what the others action is, but if second order
beliefs are considered, then the intentions of individuals can be inferred, and
will guide their behavioural response.20 Therefore, we require to consider both
ﬁrst order and second order beliefs.21
Let the function s˜j (bji, cij) denote player i 's beliefs about the altruistic-
sacriﬁce made by j . This function is conceptually equivalent but notationally
diﬀerent to si (ai, bji).
Deﬁnition 2. Player i's beliefs about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by j are
given by:22
20Consider the standard payoﬀs in the Prisoner Dilemma presented in section 2. Suppose
only ﬁrst order beliefs are considered. Suppose further player 1 cooperates and he believes
player 2 cooperates. Their payoﬀs are (4,4). But clearly, player 1 will be better-oﬀ defecting
and winning 5>4. Since he does not have any inference about 2's intention, he will end
up doing it. Now suppose second order beliefs are considered,. Suppose further player 1
cooperates; and 1 believes 2 cooperates; and 1 believes 2 believes 1 cooperates. Thus, 1 infers
that 2 has the intention to reciprocate 1. So, he ends up cooperating and their payoﬀs are
(4,4). Why would 1 not defect this time? If 1 would try to do that, 2 will infer his intentions
and would defect as well in reciprocity. Their payoﬀs would be (0,0). Hence, to analyze the
intention of actions in a reciprocity environment, second order beliefs are required.
21Rabin [82], Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [24], and Falk and Fischbacher [28] consider
also second order beliefs because they model the impact of the intention of the individual
on reciprocity. However, while the ﬁrst two models are only intention-driven, the latter also
captures the consequences of the actions of individuals. So, psychological games models that
analyze reciprocity through behavioural intention, require to consider second order beliefs.
22Player i might have beliefs about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by one par-
ticular player j . In that case, his beliefs are deﬁned by: s˜j (bji, cij) ≡
pimaxj (cij)−pij(bji,cij)+pii(cij ,bji)−pij(bji,cij)
pimaxj (bji)−piminj (bji)
.
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s˜j (bji, cij) ≡
pimaxj (cij)−pij(bji,cij)+pii(cij ,bji)−pij(bji,cij)
pimaxj (bji)−piminj (bji)
In this case, if pimaxj (bji)− piminj (bji) = 0, then s˜j (bji, cij) = 0.
These altruistic-sacriﬁce functions are one way to interpret a motivation for
environmental protection that individuals produce through social interaction.
There are other intuitive forms to express a sacriﬁce of course, but as it is shown
in Appendix C, none of those alternate forms can comply with the experimental
evidence about reciprocity, self-sacriﬁce and motivation crowding-out detailed in
the last section. Only the particular type of sacriﬁce denoted by si (ai, bji) and
s˜j (bji, cij) can account for such behavioural regularities. The three requirements
that need to be fulﬁlled for any function to be considered an altruistic-sacriﬁce
(AS ) function are:
1. The AS function is bounded and increasing . Thus:
• ∃ a number N : si (ai, bji) ∈ [−N,N ] ∀ai ∈ Ai and ∀bji ∈ Aj .
• si (ai, bji) > si
(
a†i , bji
)
⇐⇒ pimaxi (bji) − pii (ai, bji) + pij (bji, ai) −
pii (ai, bji) >pi
max
i (bji)− pii
(
a†i , bji
)
+ pij
(
bji, a
†
i
)
− pii
(
a†i , bji
)
.
Hence, because si(·) is bounded, the individuals cannot make an inﬁ-
nite altruistic-sacriﬁce. This is intuitive since the size of the altruistic-
sacriﬁce is determined by the size of the renounced material payoﬀs and
the diﬀerence between player i 's and j 's material payoﬀs. Furthermore,
an altruistic-sacriﬁce is deemed greater when the underlying action choice
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induces a higher renouncement of material payoﬀs and a higher material
payoﬀs diﬀerence between players j and i .
2. Consider Π(bji) as deﬁned in this chapter, then any function displays an
altruistic-sacriﬁce if there exists some pisaci and pi
adv such that:
• pisaci (ai, bji) > piadv (ai, bji) implies that si (ai, bji) > 0.
• pisaci (ai, bji) = piadv (ai, bji) implies that si (ai, bji) = 0.
• pisaci (ai, bji) < piadv (ai, bji) implies that si (ai, bji) < 0.
• The intensity of sacriﬁce is represented, i.e.: si
(
ai, b
∗
ji
) ≥ si (ai, bji) ≥
si
(
a∗i , b
∗
ji
) ≥ si (a∗i , bji) where a∗i ∈argmaxa∈Aipii (bji) and b∗ji ∈argmaxb∈Ajpij (cij).
For the particular AS function of this chapter pisaci (ai, bji) = pi
max
i (bji)−
pii (ai, bji) and pi
adv = pii (ai, bji)−pij (bji, ai). So, two things are required:
a measure of the renouncement or sacriﬁce of material payoﬀs incurred by
one player, and a measure of the advantageous position (in terms of ma-
terial payoﬀs) of the player making the sacriﬁce. The combination of this
self-sacriﬁce and interpersonal comparison yields an altruistic-sacriﬁce.
With respect to the intensity of the sacriﬁce it does not suﬃce that a
player renounces to higher material payoﬀs, it also matters if he is being
reciprocated. So, a player's sacriﬁce would be deemed weakly higher if he
renounces to material payoﬀs whilst getting the sucker payoﬀs than if he
still renounces to the payoﬀs and is reciprocated by the other player.
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3. The AS function is aﬃne. Therefore, si (ai, bji) is aﬃne if changing all
payoﬀs for both players by the same aﬃne transformation does not change
the value of si (ai, bji). Hence, an individual's altruistic-sacriﬁce remains
the same despite the material payoﬀs of both players change by the same
amount.
3.1.2 Equilibrium
With these altruistic-sacriﬁce functions, the players' preferences can be com-
pletely speciﬁed. Thus, player i chooses ai to maximize his expected utility
Ui (ai, bji, cij) which incorporates the traditional material payoﬀs of the game
and the players' altruistic-sacriﬁce:
Ui (ai, bji, cij) = pii (ai, bji) + θis˜j (bji, cij) · (1 + si (ai, bji))
θi denotes how salient are altruistic-sacriﬁce considerations for i . If θi = 0, i
is solely motivated by material interests and the rational paradigm predictions
apply. If θi 6= 0, these preferences reﬂect the reciprocal nature of the individuals'
willingness to cooperate, in the sense that i will put in some altruistic-sacriﬁce
as long as he believes j does it as well. On the contrary, when i believes j does
not give up personal beneﬁts to produce a social beneﬁt, he will not sacriﬁce in
return.23 I will assume henceforth that θi = 1.
Notice that these type of preferences can be accomodated within a Psycho-
logical Game, and therefore the concept of psychological Nash Equilibrium as
deﬁned by Geanakoplos et al [46] becomes relevant. In this chapter, the analog
23When θi = 1, such functional form is the same explored by Rabin [76] to conduct his
analysis of fairness. See Appendix B for a discussion about the implications of the adoption
of an alternative functional form.
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to such equilibrium will be referred to as altruistic-sacriﬁce Equilibrium, and
henceforth AS Equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3. The tuple of strategies (a1, a2) ∈ (A1, A2) is an AS Equilibrium
if, for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j 6= i:
1. ai ∈ argmaxa∈AiUi (ai, bji, cij)
2. cij = bji = ai
3.2 Baseline provision setting
To put this solution concept in action, I refer to the 2-player standard public
good game where each player has an endowment normalised to 1 that has to
be spread to consume either a private good or a public good. Therefore, the
material payoﬀs of the game for player i are deﬁned by: pii (ai, aj) = (1− ai) +
α
2 (ai + aj). If additionally it is assumed that 1 < α < 2, then such game
constitutes a prisoner's dilemma.
Players face a binary choice: spend all their endowment on the private good,
i.e. defect (D), or contribute all their endowment to the provision of the public
good, i.e. cooperate (C ). Table 1 shows the material payoﬀs of the game.
Table 1: Material payoﬀs of a standard public good game
i/
j C D
C α ,α α2 ,
α
2 + 1
D α2 + 1 ,
α
2 1 ,1
42
From standard game theory we know that (D,D) is the Nash Equilibrium
since there is no individual incentive to contribute to the provision of the public
good even though it is socially desirable to do so, i.e. α2 < 1.
Is (D,D) an AS Equilibrium?24 Notice that si (D,D) = 0 because given i 's
beliefs that j does not sacriﬁce, by reciprocity he does not give up any material
payoﬀs in order to produce a social beneﬁt.25 Then, by choosing to defect,
player i does not contribute to the provision of the public good. If he deviates
and chooses to cooperate, then si(C,D) > 0 because even though he believes j
does not sacriﬁce, he gives up some material payoﬀs to produce a social gain.26
Of course, this will not be a part of an AS Equilibrium because i is better oﬀ not
sacriﬁcing for that who does not reciprocate. Hence, (D,D) is an AS Equilibrium
∀α ∈ (1, 2).27 This means that player i has no incentive to sacriﬁce and produce
a social gain if he believes that j does not sacriﬁce in return. So, given that
the public good is not provided, both players in the game end up having lower
payoﬀs in comparison to the case where both perform the altruistic-sacriﬁce.
Is (C,C) an AS Equilibrium? In this case si(C,C) > 0 since player i is
willing to sacriﬁce material payoﬀs in order to create a social gain in reciprocity
to his beliefs about j 's altruistic-sacriﬁce.28 If player i deviates from cooperation
then si(D,C) < 0, reﬂecting the fact that he does not sacriﬁce whatsoever.
29 In
24I want to precise that I will use the notation in this section as follows. In a two-player case,
the altruistic-sacriﬁce functions are properly deﬁned as si(ai, bji) and s˜j(bji, ai). However,
I will denote them as si(ai, bji) and s˜j(ai, bji). For example, when analyzing the outcome
(C,D), I write si(C,D) and s˜j(C,D) to express the altruistic-sacriﬁce of i and his beliefs
about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of j, respectively, when player i chooses C and player j chooses
D.
25This is because pimaxi (D) = pii(D,D). Notice as well that the material payoﬀs of player i
and the payoﬀs of j are equivalent since both choose to defect, i.e. pii(D,D) = pij(D,D). So,
the numerator of si (D,D) is equal to zero.
26So, pimaxi (D) > pii(C,D). Moreover, because player i gets the sucker payoﬀs while j
defects, pii (C,D) < pij (C,D).
27(1) in Appendix D shows the condition for (D,D) to be an AS Equilibrium for the N -
player case.
28In this case pimaxi (C) > pii(C,C) and pii(C,C) = pij(C,C).
29The altruistic-sacriﬁce function is negative because pii (D,C) > pij (D,C) and pi
max
i (C) =
pii(D,C).
43
this case si(C,C) =
1−α2
α
2
and s˜j(C,C) =
1−α2
α
2
. Thus, the higher the marginal
return of the public good (α) is, the lower the altruistic-sacriﬁce player i makes
and the lower is also i 's perception about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of j . This is
rather intuitive since a greater return to a player's contribution to the public
good provision translate into a lower sacriﬁce, given that such return is part of
his material payoﬀs.30
In consequence, player i ﬁnds fruitful to reciprocate his beliefs about the
other j 's strategy, i.e. (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium.31 This is not such a realistic
scenario, since it is documented that individuals fail to provide public goods.
However, in the N -player case, (C,C) is not always an AS Equlibrium, providing
a realistic feature of public goods provision. 32 In a 2-player public good game,
as long as i holds beliefs that j sacriﬁces, he will renounce to some material
payoﬀs in order to produce a social gain. The public good is provided and all
players in the game obtain the highest payoﬀs in the game.
Notice that the underlying tradeoﬀ between material payoﬀs and a social gain
derived from the provision of a public good has been represented by an altruistic-
sacriﬁce function. Furthermore, in a prisoner's dilemma, the perception of the
altruistic-sacriﬁce among players depends on the marginal return of the public
good.
In the context of leadership, Singh and Krishnan [86] claim that self-sacriﬁcial
behaviour enhances: norms of reciprocity, contributions to the public good, in-
group cooperation, and group belongingness. Thus, the use of the notion of
altruistic-sacriﬁce to represent a motivation for environmental protection of the
30This is in line with Rabin's proposition that when the material stakes of the game increase,
players will be driven by self-interest and the Nash Equilibrium will prevail.
31(2) in Appendix D shows the condition for (C,C) to be an AS Equilibrium for the N -player
case.
32See Appendix A for the N -player case. In such case, (C,C) is only an AS Equilibrium for
suﬃciently high values of the marginal return of the public good. In Appendix C, an intuitive
reason within the realm of public goods provision is provided to understand why a suﬃciently
high marginal return of the public good does not yield the full cooperative equilibrium.
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players in the game is adequate because it represents their commitment to a
social cause.
The next deﬁnition describes the outcome of the game in terms of the
altruistic-sacriﬁce si made by each player. It will prove useful to determine
which Nash Equilibria must necessarily be AS Equilibria.
Deﬁnition 4. ∀i = 1, 2 an outcome is: caring if si > 0; indiﬀerent if
si = 0; egoistic if si < 0; mixed if
∏2
i=1 si ≤ 0.
Proposition 1. If the tuple of strategies (a1, a2) ∈ (A1, A2) is a Nash Equilib-
rium and an egoistic outcome, then it is an AS Equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix G. ‖
According to this statement, if players choose a contribution level that is a
Nash Equilibrium then they are maximizing their material payoﬀs. Moreover,
if the outcome is egoistic, then they do not increase the social gain by renounc-
ing to some material payoﬀs. Thus, to maximize their overall utility, players
reciprocate the egoistic outcome by pursuing their self-interest. In other words,
proposition 1 states that bad equilibria must necessarily be AS equilibria in
which players only care about themselves. As seen before, the same cannot be
guaranteed about good equilibria.
3.3 Monetary incentives
Advocates of the rational paradigm have proposed the use of incentive-based
mechanisms such as monetary payments to promote cooperation in social dilem-
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mas. The idea is to increase the return from contributing to the public good
and make its provision more attractive in relation to private good consumption.
So, suppose that players' contributions to the public good are subsidized and
that receiving such beneﬁt entails non-negative transaction costs (k) absorbed
by the players in the game.
The material payoﬀs for player i are given now by pii (ai, aj ; k) = (1− ai) +
(ai − k) + α2 (ai + aj). It is assumed that if ai = 0 ⇒ k = 0. Additionally,
to make the incentive mechanism eﬀective it is assumed that such transaction
costs are non-negative and strictly lower than the marginal return per capita of
the public good. In terms of the public good game: 0 ≤ k < α2 . Table 2 shows
the material payoﬀs of this game.
Table 2: Material payoﬀs of a standard public good game with subsidy
i/
j C D
C α+ 1− k ,α+ 1− k α2 + 1− k ,α2 + 1
D α2 + 1 ,
α
2 + 1− k 1 ,1
In this subsidy game the Nash Equilibrium is (C,C). With respect to the
2-player public good game, the subsidy scheme attains cooperation as the Nash
Equilibrium of the game. However, the example of section 2 suggested that
when players' beliefs matter, monetary incentives might not produce the desired
result if they change the beliefs about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the individuals
who receive it as a retribution to their contribution. So, the natural question
becomes: what does the AS model predict?
Let us start by checking (D,D). When player i chooses to defect, he is actu-
ally giving up some material payoﬀs because given his beliefs that j chooses to
defect, he would be better-oﬀ choosing to cooperate, i.e. pimaxi (D) > pii(D,D).
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Moreover, pii (D,D) = pij (D,D) implies si (D,D) > 0, and equivalently s˜j (D,D) >
0; i 's perception about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by j has been distorted be-
cause of the monetary payment. If player i deviates and chooses to cooperate,
then si (C,D) =
k
α
2
; so his action might be regarded as an altruistic-sacriﬁce
if there are strictly positive transaction costs from receiving the subsidy. The
monetary payment has altered i 's altruistic-sacriﬁce. As in the game without
monetary incentives, (D,D) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, 2), and this time
∀k ∈ [0, α2 ).33
To formalize the idea that a monetary payment aﬀects the beliefs of players
about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of others, I provide a precise deﬁnition of the policy
intervention.
Deﬁnition 5. A policy is material-eﬀective if the Nash Equilibrium at-
tained after its implementation is a Pareto-improvement over the previous Nash
Equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Material-eﬀective policy interventions change the beliefs among
players about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the other.
Proof. See Appendix G. ‖
In the 2 -player public good game, when both players are willing to cooperate
si(C,C) > 0 because given i 's beliefs that j sacriﬁces, he chooses to reciprocate
since he is better oﬀ than deviating. However, in the subsidy game, choosing to
cooperate when there is a monetary incentive to do so eliminates the altruistic-
sacriﬁce made by both players since they are not giving up any material payoﬀs
33(5) in Appendix D shows the condition for (D,D) to be an AS Equilibrium for the N -player
case.
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to produce a social gain. Hence, si(C,C) = s˜j(C,C) = 0.
34 If player i deviates
and chooses to defect, his altruistic-sacriﬁce is given by si (D,C) =
α
2−2k
α
2
. Then,
whether i sacriﬁces or not depends on the size of the transaction costs.35 Finally,
i 's beliefs about j 's altruistic-sacriﬁce depend again on the transaction costs,
because s˜j(D,C) =
2k
α . As it turns out, the fact that (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium
or not depends on the size of the transaction costs. For 0 ≤ k < α2 , (C,C,) is
an AS Equilibrium iﬀ k ≤ k∗.36
It is clear now that there is an asymmetry in the equilibria conditions of the
game because no matter what the value of the transaction costs is, (D,D) is
always an AS Equilibrium, whereas attaining (C,C) as an equilibrium depends
precisely on such value.
If individuals are solely motivated by selﬁshness, the introduction of the
monetary payment succeeds in eliciting cooperative behaviour from the indi-
viduals. But if they are motivated by reciprocity and altruistic-sacriﬁce and if
they believe the other does not sacriﬁce, the scheme will not produce the full
cooperative outcome. Additionally, there is a perception of no altruistic-sacriﬁce
among both players even when they are motivated to provide the public good
and choose to cooperate.
A monetary payment scheme does not attain full cooperation when the trans-
action costs of acquiring the payment are high enough. Yet, provided transac-
tions costs are low enough, individuals will contribute to the provision of the
public good even though it is clear they choose the strategy with the high-
est material payoﬀs and they do not believe the other player sacriﬁces. Thus,
the public good is provided not because of a cooperative motivation produced
through social interaction, but because of the material beneﬁts delivered by the
34In this case pimaxi (C) = pii(C,C) and pii(C,C) = pij(C,C) ∀i = 1, 2.
35Player i sacriﬁces if k < α
4
.
36(6) in Appendix D shows the condition for which (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium for the
N -player case, and (7) is the value of the transaction costs k∗ for which such condition holds.
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monetary reward.
These results indicate that the monetary payment established by the sub-
sidy scheme crowds-out the motivation of individuals to provide a public good.
Hence, when the reward is present in the game, individuals care about the mag-
nitude of such reward, and only if it is high enough (and therefore transaction
costs are low) they are willing to cooperate to provide the public good.
While proposition 2 claimed that material-eﬀective policy interventions de-
crease the altruistic-sacriﬁce of individuals by providing them with incentives
to maximize their material payoﬀs, it did not precise if such intervention would
ultimately change the outcome of the game. This idea is formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. If a material-eﬀective policy intervention changes the outcome
of a game from caring to indiﬀerent or to egoistic, then a motivation
crowding-out takes place.
Proof. See Appendix G. ‖
3.4 Limited monetary incentives
The subsidy game previously analyzed considered both players in the game
were allowed to participate in the PES programme and received the monetary
payment in return for their contributions to the public good. However, some
PES are not privately established and instead the government becomes an in-
termediary between sellers and buyers of environmental services that channels
the payment between parties through earmarked taxes (Muñoz-Piña et al [73]).
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The scope of PES might then become limited because it depends on the govern-
ment's budget and political agenda.37 Other issues that limit the participation
of potential environmental services sellers are the technical complexity of the ap-
plication procedure and the applicants' income constraints which impede them
to obtain technical assistance for the preparation of their conservation project.
To represent such constraints consider a modiﬁed subsidy game in which j re-
ceives the monetary payment and i does not.
Table 3 shows the material payoﬀs of this game.
Table 3: Material payoﬀs of a standard public good game with limited
monetary incentives
t/
s C D
C α ,α+ 1− k α2 ,α2 + 1
D α2 + 1 ,
α
2 + 1− k 1 ,1
In this modiﬁed subsidy game the Nash Equilibrium is (D,C) because coop-
eration is only attractive for those individuals receiving the monetary payment,
i.e. for the s members. With respect to the original subsidy game the Nash
Equilibrium is then altered. Is cooperation still possible in this modiﬁed subsidy
game if altruistic-sacriﬁce motives are considered?
Let us start by checking defection ﬁrst, i.e. (D,D). When i chooses to defect,
he does not give up material payoﬀs because given his beliefs that j chooses to
defect, he would be better-oﬀ not cooperating, i.e. pimaxi (D) = pii(D,D). More-
over, pii(D,D) = pij(D,D); thus si(D,D) = 0. However, since j is subject to
participate in the subsidy scheme, the perception of i is that he renounces to
37If the government gives priority to the programme's eﬃciency it will only fund those
applications with the highest probability of not delivering the environmental service without
the payment (additionality criterion). However, the PES might also be targeted to aid poor
landowners, in which case, more applications will be funded.
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some material payoﬀs by choosing to defect (and eventually not participating
into the subsidy scheme) and s˜j(D,D) > 0.
38 If i deviates and chooses to coop-
erate, he would give up material payoﬀs by selecting the strategy that does not
maximize his material payoﬀs, and additionally: pii(C,D) < pij(C,D). Hence,
si(C,D) > 0. Finally, s˜j(C,D) < 0 because although j renounces to some ma-
terial payoﬀs by choosing not to receive the subsidy, pii(C,D) < pij(C,D).
39 As
in the game without monetary incentives and the original subsidy game, (D,D)
is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, 2) and ∀k ∈ [0, α2 ).40
Let us turn now to (C,C). By choosing to cooperate, i willingly trades ad-
ditional monetary beneﬁts for a social gain. Thus, his altruistic-sacriﬁce is
positive: si(C,C) > 0.
41 In contrast, since j receives a monetary payment for
his contribution, i 's perception of his altruistic-sacriﬁce is distorted inasmuch
as he is not giving up any material payoﬀs to produce a social gain. Hence, the
beliefs of i about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of j are such that s˜j(C,C) < 0.
42 If i
deviates and chooses to defect, then he would not sacriﬁce because he chooses
the strategy that maximizes his material payoﬀs. In fact, si(D,C) ≤ 0.43 Fi-
nally, i 's beliefs regarding the altruistic-sacriﬁce of j might change, depending
on the size of the transaction costs faced by him when receiving the subsidy. In
particular, he might believe he sacriﬁces or that he does not: s˜j(D,C) =
2k
α .
The condition for (C,C) to be an AS Equilibrium is the following:
α+
(
k−1
α
2
)
·
(
1 +
1−α2
α
2
)
> α2 + 1 +
(
k
α
2
)
·
(
1− kα
2
)
38This is because pimaxj (D) > pij(D,D).
39In other words, given that i cooperates, the maximum payoﬀs that j can get are higher
than the actual payoﬀs that i ends up receiving, i.e. | pimaxj (C) − pij(C,D) |<| pii(C,D) −
pij(C,D) |.
40(8) in Appendix D shows the condition for (D,D) to be an AS Equilibrium for the N -player
case.
41So, pimaxi (C) > pii(C,C) and pii(C,C) < pij(C,C).
42This is because pimaxj (C) = pij(C,C) and pij(C,C) > pii(C,C).
43Speciﬁcally si(D,C) = − kα
2
.
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It can be checked that such condition cannot be satisﬁed and that (C,C) is
not an AS Equilibrium. Hence, the full cooperative equilibrium is not attained
when one player does not receive the monetary payment. The defector does not
reciprocate the cooperator precisely because the former believe the latter does
not sacriﬁce and he is better-oﬀ not contributing to the public good. The player
receiving the subsidy might cooperate because of the monetary incentive, and
not because of an altruistic-sacriﬁce of material payoﬀs to attain a social gain.
The modiﬁed subsidy game shows that the motivation crowding-out eﬀect
produced by a monetary incentive may have a wider scope than originally
planned, since it not only aﬀects the motivation of the individual who receives
the reward, but also of the individual who socially interacts with that who
receives it.44 The following proposition formalizes this point.
Proposition 4. Material-eﬀective policy interventions aﬀect the beliefs of the
unregulated individual about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the regulated indi-
vidual.
Proof. See Appendix G. ‖
3.5 Non-monetary incentives
The last couple of subsections have shown that monetary incentives have
potential adverse consequences for public goods provision. In some cases they
negatively aﬀect the beliefs of individuals regarding the altruistic-sacriﬁce of
the other, while in others they can even change such perception and produce
44If the incentive-based mechanism has an impact beyond the system of beliefs of regulated
individuals then the policy produces a spillover eﬀect (Frey and Stutzer [41]).
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a motivation crowding-out. So far, only incentives that damage the beliefs of
individuals about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the other have been analyzed. This
subsection explores non-monetary incentives which produce a positive change
in such beliefs.
A potential non-monetary incentive consists in the empowerment of the par-
ticipants of a public good provision process to increase their decision-making
abilities, improve their access to information and resources, and increase their
ability to gain skills in general. In that way, individuals learn how to overcome
typical obstacles of collective decision-making.
There is empirical evidence about the positive eﬀects of empowerment and
public goods provision. Zimmerman and Rappaport [100] found that the level
of participation in diﬀerent community volunteer activities and psychological
empowerment were positively correlated. Kelly and Breinlinger [62] showed that
expectations about the results of participation were determinant for cooperation.
Finally, Ando [2] found that empowering individuals of environmental groups
produces a sense of solidarity from participation among them.
Thomas and Velthouse [91] deﬁne psychological empowerment as the increase
in the intrinsic task motivation. Since the motivation for the provision of the
public good in the present model is given by the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the play-
ers, then empowerment should have a positive impact on the altruistic-sacriﬁce
function. In other words, empowerment will positively aﬀect the beliefs of indi-
viduals regarding the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the other, provided they do make an
altruistic-sacriﬁce.
The following deﬁnitions are a plausible generalization of the altruistic-
sacriﬁce of player i and his beliefs about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of player j while
allowing for the eﬀects of empowerment.
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Deﬁnition 6. Player i's generalized altruistic-sacriﬁce is given by:
sei (ai, bji) ≡ pi
max
i (bji)−pii(ai,bji)+pij(bji,ai)−pii(ai,bji)+piei (ai,bji)
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
where
piei (ai, bji) ≡ e (ai + ai (bji)) ,
and e ∈ [0, 1]
Deﬁnition 7. Player i's beliefs about the generalized altruistic-sacriﬁce made
by j is given by:
s˜ej (bji, cij) ≡
pimaxj (cij)−pij(bji,cij)+pii(cij ,bji)−pij(bji,cij)+piej (bji,cij)
pimaxj (bji)−piminj (bji)
where
piej ≡ e (bji + cij (bji)) ,
and e [0, 1]
Notice that both generalized altruistic-sacriﬁce functions are equivalent to
the ones established in deﬁnitions 1 and 2 if individuals are not empowered, i.e.
if e = 0 ⇒ si (ai, bji) = sei (ai, bji) and s˜j (bji, cij) = s˜ej (bji, cij) . This is also
true if the individuals do not make strictly positive contributions to the public
good.45
As it may be expected, introducing empowerment changes some results
about public goods provision. Let us revisit the standard 2 -player public good
game. Empowering an individual who is a defector does not produce any
change in his beliefs about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by the other. Hence,
s˜ej (D,D) = s˜j (D,D) and s
e
i (D,D) = si (D,D) . However, empowering a co-
operator will produce positive beneﬁts related to solidarity and trust which
45So, if ai = 0 ⇒ si (ai, bji) = sei (ai, bji) and if bji = 0 ⇒ s˜j (bji, cij) = s˜ej (bji, cij) .
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increases his motivation to provide the public good, i.e. it increases his beliefs
about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by the other. Thus, empowerment has a
crowding-in eﬀect: s˜ej (D,C) > s˜j (D,C) and s
e
i (C,D) > si (C,D) .
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Because empowering individuals only changes their beliefs about the altruistic-
sacriﬁce of the other when they contribute to the provision of the public good,
(D,D) is still an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, 2) and ∀e ∈ [0, 1] .47 Yet, empowering
individuals will always attain the provision of the public good, provided they
believe the other makes an altruistic-sacriﬁce.48
3.6 Provision under a dual incentive
The preferences of the individuals in the present framework depend on two
diﬀerent types of payoﬀs: material and psychological. When deciding to con-
tribute to provide a public good, both individuals have to take into account
the tradeoﬀ between those two types of payoﬀs. In this section, the provision
results are revisited when two diﬀerent incentives are simultaneously oﬀered to
the individuals: a monetary payment and empowerment.
Consider ﬁrst the subsidy game. (D,D) and (C,C) were always an AS Equi-
librium.49 Not surprisingly, allowing for empowerment changes the scenario.
Despite the beliefs about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the defector are not changed,
i.e. s˜ej (D,D) = s˜j (D,D) and s
e
i (D,D) = si (D,D), the incentive to deviate
and contribute to the provision of the public good is higher in both material
46Just as with monetary incentives, empowerment produces a distortion in the beliefs of the
individuals regarding the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the other. However, in this case such distortion
is positive because, provided individuals already believe the other makes an altruistic-sacriﬁce,
their perception is increased when they gain control over the decision making process.
47(9) in Appendix D shows the condition for (D,D) to be an AS Equilibrium for the N -player
case.
48(10) in Appendix D shows the condition for (C,C) to be an AS Equilibrium for the
N -player case.
49Remember this is not true for the N -player case though. In such case, the transaction
costs need to be low enough for (C,C) to be an AS Equilibrium.
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and psychological terms because of the beneﬁts originated by the monetary pay-
ment and empowerment. Yet, this depends on how small e is. Hence, (D,D) is
only an AS Equilibrium if e < e∗.50 If the individuals are empowered enough,
then it is a dominant strategy to contribute to the public good and receive the
monetary reward with it.
If the individuals instead cooperate, (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, 2),
∀k ∈ [0, α2 ), and if e > e∓.51 It can be further checked that for full provision
of the public good to take place, even in the presence of high transaction costs,
only little empowerment must be exerted.
Now consider the limited budget case where the monetary incentive is only
available to j. Remember that the introduction of the monetary payment creates
a distortion in the beliefs of i about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by j. Moreover,
if the former believes the latter decides not to contribute and receives the mone-
tary payment, then there are no additional beneﬁts originated by empowerment.
Thus, it is a dominant strategy for i not to contribute to the public good as well
and (D,D) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, 2), ∀k ∈ [0, α2 ) and ∀e ∈ [0, 1].52 In-
troducing empowerment is not enough to avoid the underprovision of the public
good if a monetary incentive is received only by one participant.
Without empowerment, (C,C) was not an AS Equilibrium. Hence, the full
cooperative equilibrium could not be attained if one player did not receive the
monetary payment. However, the introduction of empowerment has a positive
eﬀect on the beliefs of i regarding the altruistic-sacriﬁce of j . In particular it
makes salient that it might be a best response to cooperate because the loss
in material payoﬀs can be more than compensated by a gain in psychological
50(11) in Appendix D shows the condition for (D,D) to be an AS Equilibrium for the
N -player case and (12) shows the level of empowerment e∗ for which such condition holds.
51(13) in Appendix D shows the condition for (C,C) to be an AS Equilibrium for the
N -player case and (14) shows the level of empowerment e∓ for which such condition holds.
52(15) in Appendix D shows the condition for which (D,D) is an AS Equilibrium for the
N -player case.
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payoﬀs. Therefore, if e > e⊕ (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, 2)and ∀k ∈
[0, α2 ).
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Let us summarize the results of the model.54 Introducing the notion that the
individuals hold a motivation for public goods provision through an altruistic-
sacriﬁce does not discard the defective equilibrium of the standard theoretical
prediction, and because of their reciprocal behaviour it accommodates the case
in which a cooperative equilibrium is possible.55
If there is an external intervention in the game to promote cooperation,
then on the one hand, there is underprovision of the public good if it is made
through a monetary payment in which the transaction costs of receiving the
reward are suﬃciently high or in which the monetary reward is not available to
both players. On the other hand, the public good is still completely provided
if the transaction costs of receiving the subsidy are suﬃciently low, and the
subsidy is available to both players in the game. In both cases however, the
altruistic-sacriﬁce perception among players becomes distorted.
Things are diﬀerent when a non-monetary external intervention is used to
promote cooperation. While it does not work if both players do not contribute
to the public good, it will produce a motivation crowding-in that will facilitate
the full cooperative equilibrium.
If a dual incentive is used, i.e. both non-monetary and monetary incentives
are used simultaneously, then little empowerment is required to attain a full
cooperative equilibrium as the only AS Equilibrium of the game despite trans-
action costs of receiving the monetary payment are high. However, if the dual
53In Appendix D, (16) shows the condition for which (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium for the
N -player case and (17) is the empowerment level e⊕ for which such condition holds.
54Table 4 in the Appendix F contains a comparative summary of the pure strategy equilibria
of diﬀerent games for the N -player case.
55Moreover, the implications of such motivation on the cooperative behaviour among indi-
viduals, as well as the potential outcomes it produces on a public good game should be of
relevance to the analysis of economic interactions insofar as they are based on sound empirical
evidence.
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incentive has a limited monetary component and the payment is only available
to one player, then a no provision scenario is once again possible. The em-
powerment that must be exerted to attain a full cooperative equilibrium when
the payment is available to both players is substantially smaller than the one
required when such payment is limited to only one of them.56
4. Policy Implications
While it is true that if individuals perform an altruistic-sacriﬁce they can
escape the tragic fate of their social dilemma, cooperation failure is still possible.
Then, the relevant question for the policymaker is: how to avoid the destruction
of the perception of altruistic-sacriﬁce among players and promote the creation
of a motivation for environmental protection?
A PES produces a distortion of the beliefs of individuals regarding the
altruistic-sacriﬁce made by others. So, a pure monetary payment scheme can
become a disease if it crowds-out the environmental protection motivation of its
participants.
Nevertheless, it is not true this crowding-out will always result in underpro-
vision of the environmental service. Provided the transaction costs of PES are
low enough, full provision of the environmental service can be reached. Thus,
the presence of a monetary incentive for cooperation substitutes the individuals'
altruistic-sacriﬁce, for a market-type relationship where their actions are not the
result of a culturally-rooted arrangement anymore, but just another commod-
ity.57 In this case, the PES represents a temporary cure which will hold as long
56This means that e⊕ > e∓.
57Heyman and Ariely [55] investigated the relationship between eﬀort and payment in two
diﬀerent markets: monetary and social. Their experiments showed that when payments were
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as the payment keeps ﬂowing.
For the provision of the environmental service to take place, either all players
should be voluntarily willing to make an altruistic-sacriﬁce, or they should be
motivated by a suﬃciently high payment to be willing to be part of a market-
type relationship. Then, since the main objective of the PES designer is the
provision of the environmental service, he ought to follow the advice of Gneezy
and Rustichini [46]: pay enough, or don't pay at all.
This point is supported by evidence from Central America where water
users' fees are so small that it hardly creates an incentive for saving water,
and where PES compensations to upstream providers hardly cover opportu-
nity costs (Kosoy et al [66]). But even if payments are high enough to cover
opportunity costs, in some Latin American countries the buyers and sellers of
environmental services do not make transactions within a market. Rather, the
payments are obtained from earmarked taxes and channelized to the sellers by
the government (e.g. Mexico's PSAH).
When the monetary payment is not a product of supply and demand for
environmental services, but of the political agenda of a government at oﬃce,
a limited budget might impede to include all potential participants. The sub-
sidy game showed that in such case there is no room for full provision of the
environmental service. This could be attributed to a negative distortion of the
non-participants perception of the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the others. Yet, another
possible interpretation is that non-participants will not voluntarily undertake
environmental protective measures if they believe others receive a monetary re-
ward for doing something they do for free. So, even if no transaction costs
are originated by participating in the PES, the monetary reward becomes a
not mentioned or given in the form of gifts, eﬀort was originated by altruistic motives and it
was insensitive to the size of the gift. Yet, reciprocity and the magnitude of the payment were
relevant when such payment was monetary. More importantly, particularly in the context
of this subsidy game, they found that the driver of cooperation in mixed-markets resembled
more that of monetary markets.
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disease because it does not transform the individuals' altruistic-sacriﬁce into a
market-type relationship, but it totally erodes it.
The erosion of socially produced environmental protection motivation pro-
duced by PES programmes with limited participation must be seriously con-
sidered by policymakers. Southgate and Wunder [87] claim that the object of
PES-like schemes such as Mexico's PSAH is to provide temporary incentives for
environmental protection, and that once the contract with the environmental
services suppliers is over, it is expected they will make the transition towards
sustainable forestry management or a full market PES scheme. However, such
transition is likely to fail: if the players' altruistic-sacriﬁce becomes eroded, and
if the monetary reward stops ﬂowing to the participants, it is very unlikely that
environmental protection will take place, and in turn, trigger more environmen-
tal depletion than the one which originally prevailed.58
Empowerment as a policy remains a possibility. However, it cannot guaran-
tee by itself that the provision of environmental services will always take place.
Instead, a policy mix with pecuniary and non-pecuniary components will attain
better results in terms of environmental services provision by increasing the per-
ception of the motivation of environmental protection among individuals while
allowing them to obtain higher material payoﬀs.59
Finally, the use of PES in indigenous communities in developing countries
should be closely monitored. Not only because these groups are governed by
diﬀerent traditions and values to those inherent to PES, but also because they
58Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst [58] consider that withdrawing a ﬁnancial incentive does
not restore a social norm to contribute to a public good and might even reduce the level of
contributions further.
59A PES programme in this spirit is the Scolel Té project in Chiapas and Oaxaca, Mexico.
Its main objective is the creation of long-term carbon, livelihood and ecosystem beneﬁts.
Through participatory, bottom-up planning, and community-led design, such scheme builds
local capacity by introducing agroforestry systems. In that way, landowners improve soil
quality, increase their productivity and receive a payment in return for the environmental
services they provide according to the land use project. Van Hecken and Bastiaensen [95] also
argue that this type of PES programme has been successful in Nicaragua.
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diﬀer from modern economies in: altruistic-preferences, organizational capacity,
access to ﬁnancial resources and technical advice, and vulnerability to environ-
mental changes.60 Thus, although environmental and economic targets might
be reached by choosing a suitable combination of instruments, a disruption with
greater social consequences might originate from the introduction of a market-
type system.61
5. Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is to illustrate the mechanism through
which individuals produce a motivation to forego personal gains in order to at-
tain the provision of an environmental service, and show how such motivation
is deteriorated by a PES. However, as shown in Appendix E, the destruction
of such motivation is not exclusive to monetary incentives. In accordance to
the impaired self-determination process (Frey and Jegen [38]), any external
measure established as an imposition to the individuals' social interaction will
have a negative impact on their motivation to provide the environmental ser-
vice through a distortion of their perception of the altruistic-sacriﬁce of others.
60As Kosoy and Corbera [65] stress: When ecosystem services are commodiﬁed, they be-
come the basis for new socio-economic hierarchies, characterised by the re-positioning of exist-
ing social actors, the emergence of others and, very likely, the reproduction of unequal power
relations in access to wealth and environmental resources. p. 1234.
61Since some readers might consider that the present discussion maintains a romantic view
about the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities regarding natural resources man-
agement, a clariﬁcation statement must be made. My claim is not that such communities
always succeed in attaining a sustainable management of natural resources and thus, inter-
vention should be always avoided. Indeed, last section pointed out that if individuals believe
others do not hold a motivation for environmental protection then intervention with low costs
of participation and available to most owners of natural resources might bring about a co-
operative equilibrium where the environmental service is provided. Yet, the policymakers
must realize that a monetary scheme will commodify the beliefs of individuals aﬀected by
the policy. Hence, the consequences of a PES will spread beyond the environmental services
provision sphere and transform the social dynamics of those participant communities.
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However, whereas in the case of a monetary payment the individuals' altruistic-
sacriﬁce is reduced to a commodity that can be sold within a market, a non-
monetary and externally imposed policy erodes it.
TheAS model has clear diﬀerences with respect to other motivation crowding-
out models.62 As opposed to the AS model, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee [40] do
not formalize the mechanism through which the intrinsic motivation of individ-
uals (i.e. their civic duty) is deterred by the external compensation. Rather,
they just show how the optimal level of support for an unwanted siting facility
at their community might decline if there is motivation crowding-out. So, they
do not explicitly model the costs of the external compensation.
In contrast to Brekke et al [10] where individuals have a preference for think-
ing of themselves as socially responsible, the present model does not assume
individuals have that self-image as environmentally responsible. The motiva-
tion crowding-out in their model is originated by a dissonance produced within
the personal (or internalized) norms realm, while in the AS model it is orig-
inated by a change in the subjective beliefs of individuals, i.e. it is produced
by a distortion in the social norms realm. Finally, their model considers that
the scenario of underprovision of the public good always prevails, while the AS
model accommodates the case of full provision even where a monetary incentive
is oﬀered.
With respect to Bénabou and Tirole [6], diﬀerences are starker. In their
model, the extrinsic reward, oﬀered by a principal with vested interests in the
consecution of a task, crowds-out the agent's intrinsic motivation because such
reward signals the agent that the principal does not trust him. Hence, the
agent's self-conﬁdence is undermined by the extrinsic reward. In the AS model,
62Broadly, the AS model does not assume a change in the individuals' preferences or a
change in the individuals' self-perception. Instead, the monetary incentive transforms the
individuals' perception about the altruistic-sacriﬁce made by others, which changes the task
environment and the nature of the task itself.
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the motivation crowding-out originated by the monetary payment is not re-
lated to self-eﬃcacy as in Bénabou and Tirole's model. Moreover, whereas they
consider that rewards are positive reinforcers in the short run, the AS model
predicts that under certain conditions (high transaction costs and limited bud-
get that excludes potential participants from the PES) this would not be the
case.
A closer and more recent analysis to the present approach is carried out
by Dufwenberg et al [23]. Despite their use of Psychological Games as their
theoretical framework, and their use of the public good game as their workhorse,
there are subtle diﬀerences worth noticing. In Dufwenberg et al [23], the change
in motivation to contribute to the public good comes from valence and label
framing eﬀects under a take frame and a give frame. Yet, they do not explore
the motivation crowding-out eﬀects of monetary rewards as the AS model does.
As suggested by the example from Section 2, self-interest cannot accommo-
date the idea that individuals are able to produce a social motivation to provide
a public good and that it might become undermined by monetary payments.
However, other inﬂuential models that depart from self-interest and that explain
a wide array of empirical evidence on cooperation in diﬀerent games cannot ex-
plain such crowding-out either. Such is the case of the social preferences model
of Fehr and Schmidt [31], and more speciﬁcally, the reciprocity models of Rabin
[82] and Falk and Fischbacher [28] (FF).63
Take for instance the standard public good game. Rabin's framework pre-
dicts that the public good can be provided or not when individuals are willing
to reciprocate both kindness and unkindness, respectively. Fehr and Schdmit's
model also predicts that the public good can be provided or not. The former
63A stark diﬀerence between these three models is that while Fehr and Schmidt's model
is concerned with outcomes, Rabin's idea of fairness comes from the intention of players. In
turn, Falk and Fischbacher's is concerned with both outcomes and intentions.
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is true when the sum of the marginal return of investing in the public good
and the nonpecuniary beneﬁts of reducing inequality is higher than the amount
contributed to the public good, and if the number of individuals for which this
is true is suﬃciently high. The latter is attained if the reverse is true. If the
monetary payment is introduced to incentive contributions to the public good,
Rabin's and Fehr and Schmidt's predictions are not altered.64 This should come
as no surprise because the presence of a monetary payment does not change the
perception of kindness (and unkindness) or the inequity aversion among individ-
uals. So, the monetary payment cannot crowd-out the motivation of individuals
to produce a social gain in either case.
With respect to FF there are two similarities, but four key diﬀerences with
respect to the AS framework. The former refer to the fact that both frameworks
rely on outcome-dependency and intention-driven behaviour, i.e. in both models
individuals determine the kindness (or altruistic-sacriﬁce) of another given the
outcome of the game or the intention of the other when selecting an action. The
latter refer to the following cases. First, the standard to judge whtat is fair and
what not is diﬀerent. For FF it is the equitative payoﬀs, whereas for the AS
model it is both the willingness of individuals to sacriﬁce personal gains for the
social good and the intensity of such sacriﬁce. Second, in FF when a player
cannot behave more opportunistically, then the other cannot make a judgement
about his kindness, but this is not true for the AS ; even when an individual
is forced to behave in a speciﬁc way (command and control policies), like in
Appendix E, the other individual can judge his altruistic-sacriﬁce. Finally, for
FF it is not reasonable for an individual to demand that another behaves fairly
when it implies for such individual to put himself in a disadvantageous position;
64However, as Nyborg and Rege [75] point out with respect to Fehr and Schmidt's model,
if the society is already in an equilibrium in which inequity averse individuals contribute to
the public good, then a subsidy will increase the number of contributors and hence, produce
a motivation crowding-in.
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this again is not true in the AS model, where an individual not being beneﬁt
by the PES would not consider as an altruistic-sacriﬁce the fact that another
receives a payment for something he does for free.
The altruistic-sacriﬁce of individuals can be considered indeed as a general-
ization of particular environmental motivations. One example is the concept of
sense of place, which describes the meanings attached to a spatial setting by
an individual that reﬂects his level of commitment to a place expressed by so-
cial involvement and subjective feelings (Jorgensen and Stedman [59]). Through
such motivation, individuals position themselves in relation to others to advo-
cate particular standpoints regarding natural resources management. Moreover,
individuals with a sense of place are more willing to make personal sacriﬁces
that promote environmental protection (Brandenburg and Carroll [8]). The de-
struction of the individuals' sense of place is more common in situations where
individuals are not empowered and have no control over the disruptive process;
precisely, the same scenarios where the individuals' perception of the altruistic-
sacriﬁce of other individuals is distorted. Hence, the introduction of a monetary
scheme such as PES can erode the sense of place of individuals.
Finally, an interesting interpretation can be made regarding the monetiza-
tion of the individuals' contributions to the public good, especially in the realm
of environmental services provision. Kosoy and Corbera [65] claim PES schemes
have a negative impact on the individuals' motivation to provide the environ-
mental services because they simplify the complexity of natural ecosystems, pri-
oritise a single exchange-value, and mask the social relations embedded in the
process of producing and selling ecosystem services. They denominate this
process as commodity fetishism. In the AS model, a commodity fetishism takes
place once the payment for the environmental service provision is received. The
PES then becomes counterproductive for conservation because it transforms the
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logic of resource use and conservation from multiple non-monetary to monetary
values (Martinez-Allier [70]).
Conclusion
The social production of an environmental protection motivation and its
erosion originated by monetary incentives cannot be represented by behavioural
models based on self-interest, kindness or inequity aversion. Instead, it is best
described by the altruistic-sacriﬁce of individuals which leads them to exchange
personal material gains for a social beneﬁt. Without external intervention, such
social beneﬁt is delivered by the provision of an environmental service, if and
only if individuals believe their altruistic-sacriﬁce is reciprocated. However,
no formation of such motivation is possible for those individuals who believe
otherwise.
External intervention in the form of a monetary incentive produces a distor-
tion in the beliefs held by individuals regarding others' altruistic-sacriﬁce, and
despite their willingness to contribute their endowment to the provision of the
public good, such altruistic-sacriﬁce is deemed as inexistent. In other words,
their environmental protection motivation is deterred by PES programmes, i.e.
they become a disease. Yet, the provision of the public good is viable as long as
the transaction costs from participation in such incentive-based scheme are low
enough and if the monetary payment is available to all individuals. Then PES
become a temporary cure.
In general, not only monetary payments distort the perception of individuals
about the others' altruistic-sacriﬁce. Any external imposition that overlooks the
individuals' beliefs and which changes their social interaction will produce such
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distortion. In that respect, it is appealing to experiment with inclusive measures
such as grassroots participation schemes, and explore alternative designs of PES
programmes which might include a non-monetary component that reinforces the
perception of sacriﬁce of all participants and operate as a long-lasting cure.
The notion of the altruistic-sacriﬁce in the public goods provision decision-
making of individuals generalizes the cognitive processes between individuals
and their physical surroundings. An individual's sense of place can be con-
structed through the sacriﬁce of personal gains in beneﬁt of others, and the
identiﬁcation and attachment that he has with respect to a speciﬁc place might
be lost or reduced to a commodity by intrusive environmental policies. So, any
pro-environmental motivation like sense of place is generalized by the present
framework.
This chapter is only the ﬁrst part of a body of research on natural resources
management which tries to elucidate the motives for cooperation among indi-
viduals in order to provide environmental services and explain the mechanism
through which such motivation can be destroyed or altered by environmental
policy. Therefore, future research should be conducted along the following line.
Empirical evidence about the validity of the present model's predictions is
pending to show the actual eﬀects of incentive-based policies in developing coun-
tries, particularly of PES programmes in vulnerable communities which are en-
dowed with key natural resources and whose management is governed by socially
produced environmental protection motivations. Two potential candidates for
such assessment are Mexico's PSAH and the Scolel Té project. The former is
the largest PES in Mexico and consists in a pure monetary scheme (direct cash
transfer to the landowners), while the latter resembles a dual incentive PES that
increases the participation of individuals in the environmental services provision
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decision-making process and delivers a payment in recognition of such service.
Hence, the empirical research will consist in a frame ﬁeld experiment that will
test some of the propositions produced by this theoretical chapter. In partic-
ular, it will test diﬀerences between the motivation crowding-out produced by
pure monetary incentives and the one produced by a policy mix. Furthermore,
it will test what happens to the motivation of individuals who do not receive a
monetary compensation for their eﬀorts to provide environmental services while
others do.
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Appendix
A. The N -player case
Consider a N -player, normal-form game with strategy sets A1, ..., An for
players 1, ..., n. Let pii :A1x...xAn → R be player i 's material payoﬀs. Following
Rabin [82]: ai ∈ Ai is the action chosen by player i , where i = 1, ..., n; bji ∈ Ai
represent player i 's beliefs about what strategy player j chooses, where i =
1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., n, and j 6= i; cij ∈ Ai stand for player i 's beliefs about what
player j believes player i 's strategy is, where i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., n, and j 6= i.
The N -player altruistic-sacriﬁce function
Player i 's altruistic-sacriﬁce is given by:
si (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡ pi
max
i (b1i,...,bni)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)+piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ai)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
where piS−i (b1i, ..., bni, ai) ≡
∑
j 6=i pij(b1i,...,bni,ai)
N−1
The scaled payoﬀs of all players except i are deﬁned as the average payoﬀs
of the rest of the group and they are used to make an interpersonal comparison
between player i and the average player of the group excluding i .
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Let the function s˜−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) denote player i 's beliefs about
the (average) altruistic-sacriﬁce made by the rest of the players:
Player i 's beliefs about the (average) altruistic-sacriﬁce made by the rest of
players are:
s˜−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) ≡
pimaxS−i (ci1,...,cin)−piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)+pii(ci1,...,cin,b1i,...,bni)−piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)
pimaxS−i (b1i,...,bni)−piminS−i (b1i,...,bni)
where piS−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) ≡
∑
j 6=i pij(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)
N−1 ,
pimaxS−i (ci1, ..., cin) ≡
∑
j 6=i pi
max
j (ci1,...,cin)
N−1 ,
pimaxS−i (b1i, ..., bni) ≡
∑
j 6=i pi
max
j (b1i,...,bni)
N−1 ,
and piminS−i (b1i, ..., bni) ≡
∑
j 6=i pi
min
j (b1i,...,bni)
N−1
Equilibrium
With these altruistic-sacriﬁce functions, the players' preferences can be com-
pletely speciﬁed. Thus, player i chooses ai to maximize his expected utility
Ui (ai, b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) which incorporates the traditional material payoﬀs
of the game and players' altruistic-sacriﬁce:
Ui (ai, b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) =
pii (ai, b1i, ..., bni) + θis˜−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) · (1 + si (ai, b1i, ..., bni))
The tuple of strategies (a1, ..., an) ∈ (A1, ..., An) is an AS Equilibrium if, for
i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., n, j 6= i:
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1. ai ∈ argmaxa∈AiUi (ai, bji, cij)
2. cij = bji = ai
Baseline provision setting
The material payoﬀs of the game for player i are deﬁned by: pii (ai, a−i) =
(1− ai) + αN
(
ai +
∑
j 6=i aj
)
. It is additionally assumed that 1 < α < N .
Consider further that players are separated into two groups; one group is
conformed by player i and the other by the rest of players in the game (-i).
Table 4: Scaled material payoﬀs of a standard public good game
i/
−i scaled C D
C α ,α αN ,
α
N + 1
D αN (N − 1) + 1 , αN (N − 1) 1 ,1
The analysis is similar to the 2 -player case in that (D,D) is an AS Equi-
librium ∀α ∈ (1, N), i.e. for all the possible values of the marginal return
of the public good. However, in the N -player case si(C,C) =
1− αN
α(1− 1N )
and
s˜−i(C,C) =
1−α(1− 1N )
α
N
. Thus, the higher the marginal return of the public
good (α) is, the lower the altruistic-sacriﬁce player i makes and the lower is
also i 's perception about the altruistic-sacriﬁce of the rest of the players in the
game. This is rather intuitive since a greater return to a player's contribution to
the public good provision translate into a lower sacriﬁce, given that such return
is part of his material payoﬀs. In consequence, (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium iﬀ
α ≤ α∗.
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Monetary incentives
The material payoﬀs for player i are given now by pii (ai, a−i; k) = (1− ai)+
(ai − k)+ αN
(
ai +
∑
j 6=i aj
)
. It is assumed that if ai = 0⇒ k = 0. Additionally,
it is assumed that 0 ≤ k < αN .
Table 5: Scaled material payoﬀs of a standard public good game with subsidy
i/
−i scaled C D
C α+ 1− k ,α+ 1− k αN + 1− k , αN + 1
D αN (N − 1) + 1 , αN (N − 1) + 1− k 1 ,1
The fact that (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium or not depends on the size of the
transaction costs. For 0 ≤ k < αN , (C,C,) is an AS Equilibrium iﬀ k ≤ k∗.
(D,D) is always an AS Equilibrium.
Limited monetary incentives
Consider a modiﬁed subsidy game in which a number of s individuals receive
the monetary payment, and a number of t individuals do not.65
Table 6: Scaled material payoﬀs of a standard public good game with limited
monetary incentives
t/
s C D
C α ,α+ s− k αtN ,αtN + s
D αsN + t ,
αs
N + s− k t ,s
65It is assumed that s+ t = N and s = t. The latter is only used for its computational sim-
plicity because it eliminates the necessity to scale the payoﬀs in the interpersonal comparison
across members of both groups.
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As in the game without monetary incentives and the original subsidy game,
(D,D) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, N), ∀k ∈ [0, αN ), and ∀s, t : s ≥ 2, t ≥ 2
and s+ t = N .
The condition for (C,C) to be an AS Equilibrium is the following:
α+
(
k−s
α−αsN
)
·
(
1 +
αs
N +N−α−k
α−αtN
)
> αsN + t+
(
k
αt
N
)
·
(
1− kαs
N
)
It can be checked that such condition cannot be satisﬁed and that (C,C)
is not an AS Equilibrium regardless of the number of players in either group.
Hence, the full cooperative equilibrium is not attained when at least one player
does not receive the monetary payment.
Non-monetary incentives
Player i 's generalized altruistic-sacriﬁce is given by:
sei (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡
pimaxi (b1i,...,bni)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)+piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ai)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)+piei (ai,b1i,...,bni)
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
where piS−i (b1i, ..., bni, ai) ≡
∑
j 6=i pij(b1i,...,bni,ai)
N−1 ,
piei (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡ e
(
ai + ai
(∑
j 6=i bji
))
,
and e ∈ [0, 1]
Player i 's beliefs about the generalized (average) altruistic-sacriﬁce made by
the rest of players are given by:
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s˜e−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) ≡
pimaxS−i (ci1,...,cin)−piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)+pii(ci1,...,cin,b1i,...,bni)−piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)+pie−i(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)
pimaxS−i (b1i,...,bni)−piminS−i (b1i,...,bni)
where piS−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) ≡
∑
j 6=i pij(b1i,...,bni,ci1,...,cin)
N−1 ,
pimaxS−i (ci1, ..., cin) ≡
∑
j 6=i pi
max
j (ci1,...,cin)
N−1 ,
pimaxS−i (b1i, ..., bni) ≡
∑
j 6=i pi
max
j (b1i,...,bni)
N−1 ,
piminS−i (b1i, ..., bni) ≡
∑
j 6=i pi
min
j (b1i,...,bni)
N−1 ,
pie−i ≡ e
(∑
j 6=i bji
N−1 + c−ii
(∑
j 6=i bji
))
,
and e [0, 1]
Because empowering individuals only changes their beliefs about the altruistic-
sacriﬁce of others when they contribute to the provision of the public good,
(D,D) is still an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, N) and ∀e ∈ [0, 1] . Yet, empowering
individuals will always attain the provision of the public good, provided they
believe others make an altruistic-sacriﬁce and regardless of the marginal return
of the public good, i.e. (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, N) and ∀e ∈ [0, 1] .
Provision under a dual incentive
(D,D) is only an AS Equilibrium if e < e∗.
If individuals instead cooperate, (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, N),
∀k ∈ [0, αN ), and if e > e∓.
Now consider the limited budget case where the monetary incentive is only
available to a subset of the individuals in the game (s). (D,D) is an AS Equi-
librium ∀α ∈ (1, N), ∀k ∈ [0, αN ), ∀s, t : s+ t = N , and ∀e ∈ [0, 1].
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If e > e⊕ (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, N), ∀k ∈ [0, αN ), and ∀s, t :
s+ t = N .
B. Speciﬁcation of the utility function
The choice of a particular functional form to represent the players' utility de-
pends on the underlying behavioural feature to be represented and the corre-
spondent realism. The main behavioural component of the utility function used
throughout the chapter is the reciprocity of the players' strategies. So, a player
is better-oﬀ if he chooses to perform an altruistic-sacriﬁce given he holds beliefs
that the rest of players also renounce to material payoﬀs. But equivalently,
if he believes they do not make and altruistic-sacriﬁce, he would be better-oﬀ
reciprocating this bad behaviour.
This reciprocity feature can be represented as well by the next utility func-
tion:
Vi (ai, b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) =
pii (ai, b1i, ..., bni) + si (ai, bji) · s˜−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin)
This functional form is also mentioned by Rabin [82]. The diﬀerence between
Vi and Ui is that the latter prescribes that any individual will be better-oﬀ recip-
rocating good behaviour than bad behaviour. Thus, with Vi, the individuals
might end up as well-oﬀ after a hostile interaction, than after a friendly in-
teraction where all are willing to cooperate. It seems reasonable to expect that
this is not the case, and that individuals who undergo friendly interactions
will end up happier than when they deal with hostile situations.
A feature that is present in both Ui and Vi, provided the altruistic-sacriﬁce
function is bounded, is that issues regarding environmental protection become
less important as the size of the material payoﬀs increases (just as fairness in
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Rabin [82]). This is a suitable property since it is expected that to some extent,
particularly in modern societies, the tangible (and even more so the intangible)
beneﬁts to individuals of environmental protection become obscured by material
aspects.
In terms of the equilibrium outcomes of the diﬀerent analyzed games pre-
sented throughout the chapter, Vi does not yield exactly the same results as Ui.
In the standard public good game, (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium ∀α ∈ (1, N), so
it cannot include the impossibility of attaining the full cooperative equilibrium
when the value of the marginal return of the public good is suﬃciently high. In
Appendix C, it is brieﬂy discussed why this result is intuitive. For the subsidy
game, Vi prescribes that (C,C) is always an AS Equilibrium regardless of the
size of the transaction costs of receiving the subsidy, so it cannot accommodate
the crowding-out of the motivation for public good provision originated by the
monetary payment.
The speciﬁcation of the utility function does matter to obtain the most im-
portant result of the model. Yet, this should come as no surprise. As previously
mentioned, Vi cannot distinguish the individuals' well being when they face a
hostile situation from a friendly one, and in the subsidy game, the perception
of altruistic-sacriﬁce depends on the size of the transaction costs. Therefore,
that all players cooperate to the provision of the public good because of a mon-
etary payment (rather than because of a social interaction) is not regarded as an
altruistic-sacriﬁce and in turn, it is considered as hostile. Due to Vi's inability
to capture the utility diﬀerential which prevails between a hostile and a friendly
situation, (C,C) is an AS Equilibrium regardless of the size of the transaction
costs involved in the subsidy scheme.
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C. A family of sacriﬁce functions
I present here other speciﬁc functional forms that intuitively represent a personal
sacriﬁce, but that cannot account for the behaviour described in the Introduc-
tion of all experimental evidence about reciprocity and motivation crowding-out,
and in consequence, deliver diﬀerent results when used to analyze the games pre-
sented in the chapter, i.e. the standard N -player public good game, the subsidy
game and its modiﬁed version, and even a degenerate public good game which
can be found in Appendix E.
The ﬁrst alternative sacriﬁce function I revise captures the traditional con-
cept of self-sacriﬁce, where an individual is willing to incur a loss. Therefore, a
sacriﬁce function that captures this idea is:
ssi (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡ pi
max
i (b1i,...,bni)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
This sacriﬁce function is similar to the one used throughout the chapter,
but it lacks the altruistic component, i.e. it does not include the recipient of
the sacriﬁce's beneﬁts. There are three major drawbacks with this sacriﬁce
function. The ﬁrst of them is that it cannot represent the intensity of the
sacriﬁce, i.e. ssi(C,D) = ssi(C,C) and ssi(D,D) = ssi(D,C). The second
drawback is that (C,C) might not be an AS Equilibrium in the public good
game since the following condition is not fulﬁlled for any α and for any N ≥
2: α +
(
N−1−α+ αN
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
1− αN
α− αN
)
> αN (N − 1) + 1 +
(
N−1−α+ αN
α
N
)
. While
the altruistic-sacriﬁce function used throughout the chapter also considers the
possibility of no full cooperative equilibrium in the public good game, in such
case it stems from high values of the marginal return of the public good that
originate from considering also a high number of players in the game (if the
marginal return per capita is held constant), a result that is intuitive insofar as
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a fully cooperative equilibrium might be complicated to achieve when dealing
with a high number of contributors (e.g. it might be that assessing the altruistic-
sacriﬁce of other players becomes complicated when the number of assessments
becomes very high). However, with this self-sacriﬁce function, even in the two-
player case, (C,C) is not an equilibrium for any α, which is rather dissapointing.
Finally, the third drawback is that (C,C) is always an AS Equilibrium of the
subsidy game because the following condition is always fulﬁlled ∀α ∈ (1, N)
and ∀k ∈ [0, αN ): α + 1 − k > αN (N − 1) + 1. Hence, this sacriﬁce function
cannot account for the possibility of motivation crowding-out originated by the
introduction of a monetary payment to promote cooperation in a public good
game.
The second alternative sacriﬁce function I revisit includes the altruistic com-
ponent that the ﬁrst one lacked, and that it is used throughout the chapter.
However, the deﬁnition of such altruistic component is diﬀerent.
asi (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡ pi
max
i (b1i,...,bni)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)+piS−i(b1i,...,bni,ai)−piS−i(a∗i )
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
where a∗i ∈argmaxa∈Aipii (b1i, ..., bni)
There are three major drawbacks with this sacriﬁce function. The ﬁrst is that
it cannot represent (consistently) the intensity of the sacriﬁce, i.e. asi(D,D) =
asi(D,C) in the public good game, but that is not the case in the subsidy game.
Additionally, asi(C,C) = asi(C,D) in the subsidy game, but the same is not
true in the public good game. Actually, for such game, we have that asi(C,C) >
asi(C,D) for N > 2, a result which is not intuitive, since it is expected that
someone would be sacriﬁcing more when the rest of players do not reciprocate his
sacriﬁce. The second drawback is that once the monetary payment is introduced
into the public good game, it is expected that the perception of sacriﬁce of
players becomes distorted by it. In particular, the fact that asi(C,C) = 0 is
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acceptable because player i does not renounce to any material payoﬀs. Yet, if he
deviates and selects the strategy that does not maximize his material payoﬀs,
asi(D,C) = − kα− αN , which means that when i defects, he does not sacriﬁce
regardless the size of the transaction costs despite having renounced to non-
negative material payoﬀs. Finally, the last drawback is that (C,C) is always an
AS Equilibrium in the subsidy game because the following condition is always
fulﬁlled ∀α ∈ (1, N) and ∀k ∈ [0, αN ): α + 1 − k > αN (N − 1) + 1. Hence, as
with the past sacriﬁce function, this one does not contemplate the possibility
of motivation crowding-out originated by the subsidy introduced in the public
good game. If the ﬁrst two terms of the numerator are ommited and the sacriﬁce
function just denotes the altruistic component of player i 's sacriﬁce, i.e. if it is
transformed to: asi (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡ pi
S
−i(b1i,...,bni,ai)−piS−i(a∗i )
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
, then such sacriﬁce
function also has the same three drawbacks just mentioned.
The third alternative sacriﬁce function also considers the altruistic compo-
nent of player i 's sacriﬁce. However, the deﬁnition of the recipient of the beneﬁts
produced by such sacriﬁce is diﬀerent. So, the sacriﬁce function becomes:
asi (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡
pimaxi (b1i,...,bni)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)+
∑n
i=1 pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)−
∑n
i=1 pii(a
∗
i )
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
where a∗i ∈argmaxa∈Aipii (b1i, ..., bni)
This sacriﬁce function has two major drawbacks. Firstly, it cannot repre-
sent the intensity of the sacriﬁce, i.e. asi(C,D) = asi(C,C) and asi(D,D) =
asi(D,C). Secondly, (C,C) is always an AS Equilibrium in the subsidy game
because the following condition is always fulﬁlled ∀α ∈ (1, N) and ∀k ∈ [0, αN ):
α + 1 − k > αN (N − 1) + 1. Hence, as with the last two sacriﬁce functions,
this one does not include the possibility of motivation crowding-out originated
by the subsidy introduced in the public good game. If the ﬁrst two terms of
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the numerator are ommited and the sacriﬁce function just denotes the altruis-
tic component of i 's sacriﬁce, i.e. if it is transformed to: asi (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡∑n
i=1 pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)−
∑n
i=1 pii(a
∗
i )
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
, the new sacriﬁce function also has the same two
drawbacks.
The last alternative sacriﬁce function is composed by the last two terms
of the function used throughout the chapter. Thus, it considers the altruistic
component of the sacriﬁce as an interpersonal comparison of payoﬀs among the
player who makes the sacriﬁce and the recipient of the beneﬁts. The sacriﬁce
function becomes:
si (ai, b1i, ..., bni) ≡ pi
S
−i(b1i,...,bni,ai)−pii(ai,b1i,...,bni)
pimaxi (ai)−pimini (ai)
This sacriﬁce function has two major drawbacks. The ﬁrst is that the per-
ception of sacriﬁce in the public good game is counterintuitive. Even if the
player is renouncing to material payoﬀs, the function reports that he does not
sacriﬁce, i.e. si(C,C) = 0. Lastly, (D,D) is not a an AS Equilibrium in the sub-
sidy game when there are no transaction costs because the following condition
is not true: 0 < αN .
Thus, there are many intuitive forms to represent the (self or altruistic)
sacriﬁce that a player makes. However, only one (the one used throughout
the chapter) produces the desired results in the diﬀerent analyzed games and
in accordance with the behavioural regularities presented in the Introduction
about reciprocity, self-sacriﬁce and motivation crowding-out.
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D. Conditions for AS Equilibria
1. 1 > αN +
(
− 1α
N
)
·
(
1 +
2− αN
α(1− 1N )
)
2. α +
(
1−α(1− 1N )
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
1− αN
α(1− 1N )
)
> 1 + αN (N − 1) +
(
2−α(1− 1N )
α
N
)
·(
1− 1
α(1− 1N )
)
3. α∗ ≡ N6
(
ρ
N−1 +
2(3N−2)
ρ
)
ρ =
((
−324 + 12
√
− 324N3−648N2−297N+633N−1
)
(N − 1)2
) 1
3
4. α < αN (N − 1) + 1 + 1αN
5. 1+
(
α(1− 1N )−k
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
α
N−k
α(1− 1N )
)
> αN+1−k+
(
α(1− 1N )−2k
α
N
)
·
(
1 + k
α(1− 1N )
)
6. α+ 1− k > αN (N − 1) + 1 +
(
k
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
α
N−2k
α(1− 1N )
)
7. k∗ ≡ α4
α(N−1)+N2+
√
α2(N2−2N+1)+α(2N3−10N2+8N)+N4
N2
8. t+
(
αs
N −k
αt
N
)
> αtN +
(
α−αtN −k−s
αt
N
)
·
(
1 +
N−αtN
α−αtN
)
9. 1 > αN +
(
− 1α
N
)
·
(
1 +
2− αN+e
α− αN
)
10. α+
(
1−α(1− 1N )+Ne
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
1− αN+Ne
α(1− 1N )
)
> 1+ αN (N−1)+
(
2−α(1− 1N )+e
α
N
)
·(
1− 1
α(1− 1N )
)
11. 1+
(
α(1− 1N )−k
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
α
N−k
α(1− 1N )
)
> αN+1−k+
(
α(1− 1N )−2k
α
N
)
·
(
1 + k+e
α(1− 1N )
)
12. e∗ ≡ −αkN3−α2N2−3k2N3+α3N−α3−α2kN2+α2kN+α2NN2(αN−α−2kN)
13. α+1−k+
(
Ne
α
N
)
·
(
1 + Ne
α(1− 1N )
)
> αN (N−1)+1+
(
k+e
α
N
)
·
(
1 +
α
N−2k
α(1− 1N )
)
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14. e∓ ≡ 12 1N3
(−αN2 − 2kN + 2αN +4)
4 =
√
4α2kN2
(
N2
4k +
N
α −N + kα − 2α + 1k − αk +N − 1 + αkN + N
2
α − 2kN
2
α2
)
15. t+
(
αs
N +t−s−k
αt
N
)
·
(
1 + s−tαs
N
)
> αtN +
(
α−αtN −k−s
αt
N
)
·
(
1 +
N−αtN +te
αs
N
)
16. α+
(
k−s+Ne
αt
N
)
·
(
1 +
αs
N +N−α−k+Ne
αs
N
)
> αsN +t+
(
t−s+k+se
αt
N
)
·
(
1 + s−t−kαs
N
)
17. e⊕ ≡ 12 1sN3
(
Θ +
√
ϕ+ Λ + Φ + σ + Υ
)
Θ = sN
(
t
(
α+ k + t− s−N − αsN
)
+N (2s− k −N))
ϕ = s2N4
(
4 + 2αt− 8kt+N2 − 4sN)+ts2N3 (6αs− 6αt− 4kt− 2k2 + 6ks− 4αs2N )
Λ = s2t2N2
(
α2
(
1 + 2tα − 2sN
)
+ 2k
(
k
2 + t− s
))
+2stN
(
αs3
(
t+ t
2
s + 2α
2
)
+ 4kN3 (t−N)
)
Φ = 4s3N3
(
tNk2
s2 +
tα3
s − 2tα
3
N − αk + tNα
2
s − t
2α2
s − tα2 + t
2α2
N +
αkN
s
)
+
s2N5 (10t+ 6k)
σ = s2N4
(
t2
(
2s
t − 9− 2tN + 6sN − 4s
2
tN +
t2
N2 − 2stN2 + s
2
N2 + α
2s2
)
+ 5k2 − 8sk − 4α3 + 8sα3N
)
Υ = 4s3N4
(
αs
N − α− sα
3
N2 − t
2N
s2 +
t3
s2 − Nk
2
s2
)
+2αks2N2
(
st− Nα + t2 − st
2
N
)
E. A command and control policy
Command and control used to be the most common regulatory means to
achieve environmental objectives. Goverments simply impose a requirement
on the conduct of individual actors, e.g. restricting access to and regulating
the use of ecosystem services. To represent such type of policy in a voluntary
contribution setting, consider the situation where all players but i are forced to
contribute all their endowment to the provision of the public good, e.g. it might
be that the government is implementing a Zoning policy and somehow it does
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not apply to i . In terms of the game, the introduction of the policy derives in
a degenerate version of the original social dilemma.
In this case, standard game theory predicts that only those forced to con-
tribute to the provision of the public good will cooperate. Therefore, the Nash
Equilibrium is (D,C). What does the AS model predict? Notice that since all
players but i are forced to cooperate, i does not believe that they are perform-
ing an altruistic-sacriﬁce; they are just doing something they are obliged to do.
Hence, in reciprocity and by deﬁnition of the altruistic-sacriﬁce function, i does
not sacriﬁce. In other words we have that si(C,C) = s˜−i(C,C) = 0. As it turns
out, if player i deviates then si(D,C) = 0 by deﬁnition as well, because the
maximum payoﬀs he gets by cooperating are equivalent to his minimum pay-
oﬀs. Therefore, no matter what i 's beliefs regarding the rest of players' actions
are, he will not sacriﬁce, which resumes in (C,C) not being an equilibrium.
The AS Equilibrium in this game is (D,C) and coincides with the standard
prediction (see condition 4 in Appendix D).
Although the outcome under the two models is the same, the logical pro-
cess behind them is quite diﬀerent. Standard theory explains that (D,C) is
the Nash equilibrium because no player has the incentive to deviate from that
strategy. More precisely, all players but i cannot even deviate because they
are forced to cooperate whereas i takes advantage of this in pursue of his self-
interest by reaping a greater beneﬁt. The AS model establishes that (D,C) is
the equilibrium because i believes the rest of players' actions do not constitute
an altruistic-sacriﬁce and they are rather forced to cooperate; in return he will
not sacriﬁce either. Then, as mentioned in the Discussion, when cooperation is
not voluntary, individuals will not develop a social motivation simply because it
does not arise from an altruistic-sacriﬁce and it rather stems as an imposition.
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F. Comparison of models
Table 4: Equilibria comparison in all the games
GameEquilibrium Nash Kindness Inequity aversion Altruistic-sacriﬁce
Public Good Game (D,D)
(D,D)
(C,C)
(D,D)
(C,D)/(D,C)
(C,C)
(D,D)
(C,C)∗
Degenerate Public
Good Game
(D,C) (D,C)
(D,C)
(C,C)
(D,C)
Subsidy game (C,C)
(D,D)
(C,C)
(D,D)
(C,D)/(D,C)
(C,C)
(D,D)
(C,C)?
Modiﬁed subsidy
game
(D,C)
(D,D)
(C,C)
(D,C) (D,C)/(D,D)
‡
* AS Equilibrium iﬀ α ≤ α∗.
?AS Equilibrium iﬀ k < k∗.
‡(D,C) is AS Equilibrium if s ≤ t.
G. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
The tuple of strategies (a1, ..., an) ∈ (A1, ..., An) is a Nash Equilibrium
if pimaxi (a1, ..., ai, ..., an) ≥ pii
(
a1, ..., a
†
i , ..., an
)
∀ai ∈ Ai and ∀i = 1, ..., n.
Moreover, if si < 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n then pimaxi (b1i, ..., bni) − pii (ai, b1i, ..., bni) +
piS−i (b1i, ..., bni, ai)−pii (ai, b1i, ..., bni) < 0 and
∑
j 6=i pi
max
j (ci1, ..., cin)−
∑
j 6=i pij (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin)+
pii (ci1, ..., cin, b1i, ..., bni)−piS−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) < 0. Since Ui (ai, b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin) =
pii (ai, b1i, ..., bni)+s˜−i (b1i, ..., bni, ci1, ..., cin)(1 + si (ai, b1i, ..., bni)), then (a1, ..., an) ∈
95
(A1, ..., An) is such that ai ∈ argmaxa∈AiUi (ai, bji, cij) and cij = bji = ai
∀i = 1, ..., n, ∀j = 1, ..., n, and j 6= i.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose the tuple of strategies (a1, ..., an) ∈ (A1, ..., An) is a Nash Equilib-
rium. A policy intervention Γ is material-eﬀective if pii (a1, ..., an) ≤ pii
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
∀i = 1, ..., n and pii (a1, ..., an) < pii
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
for at least one player, where(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
is the Nash Equilibrium attained by Γ. Suppose that for j pij (a1, ..., an) <
pij
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
and j 6= i. Then, by deﬁnition of the altruistic-sacriﬁce function
s˜j is decreasing in pij . Therefore s˜j > s˜j (Γ), and the statement follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.
By deﬁnition, a caring outcome is such that si > 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n. Thus, i
makes an altruistic-sacriﬁce and his beliefs are such that s˜−i > 0. To maximize
utility, it must be that each i chooses ai so as to sacriﬁce material payoﬀs and
has no incentive to deviate. Once a material-eﬀective policy Γ is implemented
such that si = 0 and s˜−i = 0 or si < 0 and s˜−i < 0, then to maximize his utility i
must choose a‡i to maximize his material payoﬀs, i.e. pii
(
a‡1, ..., a
‡
n
)
. Therefore,
the motivation to choose a particular ai has been transformed because of Γ, i.e.
it has crowded-out i 's altruistic-sacriﬁce.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose player i is not regulated by a material-eﬀective policy Γ, which
regulates -i players. Then, by deﬁnition of Γ, pij (a1, ..., an) ≤ pij
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
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∀j = 1, ..., n − i, pij (a1, ..., an) < pij
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
for at least one player, and
pii (a1, ..., an) = pii
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
, where (a1, ..., an) was the Nash Equilibrium be-
fore the introduction of Γ and
(
a†1, ..., a
†
n
)
is the Nash Equilibrium attained by
Γ. By construction of the altruistic-sacriﬁce function, s˜i is decreasing in pi
S
−i.
So, it is also decreasing in pi−i. Thus, the claim follows.
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Chapter 2: This land is your land, this land is
my land: The environmental behaviour of
native-born and immigrants
Luis Serra-Barragán∗
Abstract
Should governments be concerned about immigrants on environmen-
tal grounds? On the one hand, immigrants are typically considered as
a burden in most aspects by the host country. On the other hand, the
New Environmental Paradigm hypothesis claims that environmental atti-
tudes are a worldwide phenomenon. Hence, individuals across the world
would display similar environmental behaviour and such concern should
not prevail. This chapter analyzes a sample of the World Values Survey
dataset to show that, despite there are substantial behavioural diﬀerences
between immigrants and native-born regarding pro-environmental action,
the perception of immigrants as an environmental burden is misplaced.
In particular, while neither native-born nor immigrants are more willing
to sacriﬁce money to save the environment, immigrants actually engage
more on activities like choosing products that are better for the envi-
ronment, recycling, and reducing water consumption. The engagement in
pro-environmental behaviour of immigrants is region-speciﬁc and depends
on their source region. Moreover, such relatively higher actual engage-
ment in environmentally friendly behaviours can be explained by their
high socio-economic status and their high education level, i.e. selective
immigration. When the behaviour of immigrants by their length of resi-
dence in the host country is analyzed, no diﬀerences in pro-environmental
attitudes or pro-environmental behaviour are found, a result which sug-
gests they do not develop a sense of belongingness to the host country.
Finally, in line with the standard ﬁnding in the literature of acculturation
in environmental behaviour, this chapter ﬁnds that immigrants conform
through time to some of the pro-environmental actions of native-born.
JEL Nos.: C13, C23, F22, J15, Q57, Q58, Y10.
Keywords: pro-environmental behaviour; environmental attitudes;
recycling; environmental policy; sense of place; selective immigration; im-
migration policy.
∗Contact information: The Department of Economics, The University of Warwick, Coven-
try, CV47AL, United Kingdom; email: L.A.Serra-Barragan@warwick.ac.uk. I would like to
thank my supervisor, Eugenio Proto, for his patient guidance and his time. All remaining
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Introduction
Immigrants and problems are words commonly (and unfairly) used in the
same sentence by governments, particularly those of developed countries.1 They
are seen as a burden which puts pressure on the job market through wage in-
equalities and higher unemployment rates. However, with respect to the former,
most studies coincide that the impact of immigration on the wage of native
workers appears to cluster around zero, and some even ﬁnd a positive impact
(Friedberg and Hunt [34]; and Borjas [13]).2 In regard to the latter, evidence
seems to indicate as well that immigrants are not to blame for higher unem-
ployment rates in the host countries.3 Immigrants are also feared to have a
detrimental eﬀect on the ﬁscal sustainability of the welfare state. Yet, no con-
sensus is found in the literature, and some studies even claim that the ﬁscal
impact of immigration is positive.4 Finally, immigrants are also thought to in-
1Despite the general aversion to immigration, at least four types of potential gains to the
host country are acknowledged (Nannestad [62]): 1) the immigration surplus, i.e. immigrants
could make a society richer; 2) the positive eﬀect on the age distribution of the host society;
3) a smoothing eﬀect on the labour market; and 4) the increase in the aggregate demand
for domestic goods and services. Borjas [12] also considers that beneﬁts of immigration to
native-born result from production complementarities between immigrant workers and other
factors of production. Further potential beneﬁts are discussed in Ratha et al [74].
2Despite Borjas et al [15] estimated that immigrants accounted for 30%-55% of the relative
wage decline experienced by high school dropouts and other low-wage workers in the U.S.,
they acknowledged the overall eﬀect on wages was small. Other studies in the same line are
Brücker et al [?] and Hanson et al [38]. Indeed, Card and Shleifer [21] found that immigrants
accounted only for a 5% share of the increase in the U.S. wage inequality between 1980 and
2000. Lerman [52] showed that if the rapid wage gains for immigrants are incorporated and
comparable populations are used, the wage inequalities in the U.S. disappear. A meta-analysis
carried out by Longhi et al [54] suggests the eﬀect of immigrants on local wages is very small,
but when native workers and immigrants are close substitutes the eﬀect becomes larger. Poot
and Cochrane [70] conclude wage inequalities are encountered in the short run or in closed
labour markets.
3Poot [69] rejected the hypothesis that immigration caused unemployment in New Zealand.
Borjas [11] determined there was no suﬃcient evidence to support an adverse impact of im-
migration on native employment opportunities in the U.S. In fact, Chapman and Cobb-Clark
[23] found that the employment probabilities of unemployed Australian native-born increased
in the short-run. Gross [36] showed that immigrants increase the unemployment rate in France
in the short run but decrease it in the long run.
4Auerbach and Oreopoulis [4] [5] argue that the impact of immigration on ﬁscal balance is
so small, that it should not be considered as neither a cause nor a solution to budget deﬁcits.
In that sense, Rowthorn [76] estimated that in most countries, the (positive or negative) net
ﬁscal impact is less than 1% of GDP. Lee and Miller [51] found that the marginal net ﬁscal
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crease crime rates and have a negative impact on the social cohesion of the host
country.5
More recently, the environment has become a matter of national concern, and
immigrants have also been blamed for contributing to the environmental degra-
dation of the host country.6 Muradian [61] considers such belief is promoted in
the U.S. by Malthusians, who advocate immigration restrictive policies based
on limited carrying capacity arguments, and Environmental Nativists, who
reject immigration on racist grounds.7
Despite there is solid evidence of the opposite, immigration is singled out
as the source of a wide array of problems in the host country because of its
political and national identiﬁcation implications.8 A strong case for this is the
beneﬁt of an immigrant is negative in his ﬁrst years at the host country, but then turns
positive within a 25 year-span and keeps on increasing. Gustafsson and Österberg [37] showed
that immigrants in Sweden generated a net burden on the public sector budget upon arrival,
but also that it was eventually reversed. Razin and Sadka [75] showed that in an inﬁnite-
horizon overlapping generations economy, the net ﬁscal burden could change to net gain for
the native-born population. Finally, Nannestad [62] and Pekkala Kerr and Kerr [67] provide
surveys with mixed results with respect to the ﬁscal eﬀect of immigration.
5With respect to crime, a study regarding the incidence of crime amongst immigrants in
the U.S. is provided by Martinez and Lee [57]. A brief review from Australia can be found in
Mukherjee [60]. Poot and Cochrane [70] hint that immigration is likely associated with lower
crime rates through its eﬀect on a lower unemployment rate. Research on social cohesion is
provided by Smith and Edmonston [79] and Borjas [14] for the U.S., and Glover et al [35] for
the UK. Karagedikli et al [48] suggest that immigration has a negative impact on the social
cohesion of metropolitan cities in New Zealand.
6A brief review of evidence about negative environmental impacts of immigration can be
found in Hugo [43]. Price and Feldmeyer [72] discuss literature on the negative environmental
impacts produced by the social disorganization of local communities and the inhibition of its
residents' abilities to organize to combat sources of environmental degradation. Yet, they also
provide references on the Latino Paradox and the Immigrant Revitalization perspectives,
which state that immigration may actually have the reverse eﬀect by stabilizing communities
and reinforcing their social institutions and social networks.
7According to Malthusians, immigrants directly contribute to local environmental degra-
dation by means of: generation of urban sprawl; congestion and pollution; waste generation;
water consumption; land conversion; depletion of natural resources; and biodiversity loss.
Examples of Malthusians research are Beck [6], Daly [25], DinAlt [28], and Chapman [24].
Environmental Nativists critiques to immigration are based on racist arguments. They ar-
gue that immigrants will alter the racial composition of the U.S., leading then to the social
decadence and the collapse of Western values. Research along this line is provided by Hardin
[39], Abernethy [1] and [2], and Macdonald [56].
8Price and Feldemeyer [72] state that other motives to oppose immigration because of
its negative environmental impacts include the highly geographical concentration of their
settlements in the host country, higher fertility rates than native-born, and support to the
development of industrial and manufacturing sectors that tend to contribute to pollution
problems (e.g. meat processing and textile industries).
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debate led by the Sierra Club (the most inﬂuential grassroots environmental
organization in the U.S.) about the environmental impact that immigrants posed
in the U.S. and global ecosystems (Harris [40]). The stance of immigration
restriction supporters was that immigrants engage in negative environmental
behaviours just like Americans, therefore assuming no immigrant/native-born
environmental behaviour diﬀerences. If such argument is true, then immigration
should be restricted in the U.S. but promoted in countries where native-born
display a strong pro-environmental behaviour. But, do immigrants really have
the same environmental behaviour than native-born? Research on the topic has
provided mixed results and it is limited in scope because it has focused on the
environmental behaviour of native-born and immigrants at state and national
levels only.
DinAlt [28] claims that immigrants in the U.S. are a burden because they
adopt the consumption and pollution patterns of the world's most environmen-
tally destructive lifestyle. However, Ratha [73] deems such claim is incorrect
because immigrants are still commited to their families in their countries of ori-
gin, and send up large sums of money as remittances each year. Moreover, some
studies suggest that immigrants usually have a smaller ecological footprint and
create less pollution than U.S. native-born (Bohon et al [10]; Neumayer [63]; and
White [86]).
Lynch [55] was the ﬁrst to analyze the inﬂuence of culture on the individuals'
environmental attitudes. In particular, she focused on diﬀerences in the envi-
ronmental views between Anglos and Latinos regarding ideal landscapes and
the relationship of the environment to ethnic identity. Work in the same line is
that of Schultz et al [77]. They examined the environmental attitudes among
foreign-born Latino American students. But the ﬁrst one to properly compare
the environmental behaviour of immigrants and native-born is Sierra [78]. He
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focused on how immigrants diﬀer from native-born in behaviour which is de-
structive for the environment in tropical rainforests in Ecuador, but found no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in recent deforestation associated with each group based
on their ethnic background.
Hunter [44] found that immigrants in the U.S. had similar environmental at-
titudes than native-born regarding prominence of economic progress over envi-
ronmental quality, human responsibility for environmental damage, willingness
to sacriﬁce for environmental quality, and environmental activism. However, she
also found that immigrants of short residence in the country expressed higher
environmental concern and higher engagement in environmentally friendly be-
haviours compared to native-born.9
Pfeﬀer and Mayone Stycos [68] analyzed New York's immigrant/native-born
diﬀerences on the propensity to engage in constraining personal consumption,
green consumerism, and environmentally related political behaviour.10 They
found that immigrants were as likely as native-born to engage in most consump-
tion behaviours protective of the environment. Yet, while immigrants were more
likely to save water than native-born, the latter were more likely to engage in
environmentally related political behaviour than the former.11
Another study which analyzes diﬀerences in immigrant/native-born environ-
mental attitudes is Buijs et al [17]. They found that immigrants manifested a
9Using data from the 1993 General Social Survey, she deﬁned 5 factors and 19 variables
reﬂecting the individuals' environmental attitudes, environmental concern, environmental be-
haviours, and environmental activism. While she found no behavioural diﬀerences between
immigrants and native-born in general, she did ﬁnd a higher level of concern of immigrants
with respect to the impacts of pesticides, chemicals, pollution, and the greenhouse eﬀect.
Additionally, immigrants were more likely to adopt behaviours like buying organic products,
recycling, and driving a car less.
10They collected data in New York City from ﬁve boroughs in 1996 through 1500 random
telephone interviews. To assess the behavioural diﬀerences they controlled for diﬀerent factors
that may contribute to environmentally friendly behaviours like environmental orientation,
environmental knowledge, acculturation, race, community attachment and economic status.
11The odds that an immigrant saved water were 20% greater than for a native-born. The
odds for an immigrant to sign a petition were 24% lower, while they were 17% lower to talk
or write to an oﬃcial than for a native-born.
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more anthropocentric view of the human-nature relationship which involved a
preference for a high level of management of nature.12 In turn, Squalli [80]
found that U.S. states with a larger share of immigrants are associated with
lower NO2 and SO2 emmisions; in other words, immigrants exert less pressure
on the environment than their native-born counterparts.13 A related work is
that of Price and Feldmeyer [72]. They also found evidence that immigrants do
not contribute directly or indirectly to increase air pollution in the U.S.
The results of these behavioural studies can be accomodated by two compet-
ing hypotheses regarding the individuals' environmental attitudes: the New En-
vironmental Paradigm (NEP) proposed by Dunlap and Van Liere [29], and the
Post-materialistic hypothesis (PMH). The former asserts that the pro-environmental
attitudes of individuals are a global phenomenon. Thus, individuals would hold
the same environmental attitudes regardless of their culture, income and edu-
cation. The latter aﬃrms that individuals develop pro-environmental attitudes
once they achieve a standard of living such that they can shift their attention
from economic security concerns to quality-of-life issues.
Is the behaviour of immigrants a real threat to the host country's envi-
ronment? Should immigration policies therefore remain restrictive? Should
environmental awareness programmes and environmental policy in general be
group-targeted? If there are environmental behavioural diﬀerences between
native-born and immigrants, what is the source of such discrepancy? Does the
length of residence of immigrants in the host country aﬀect their environmental
behaviour? In order to tackle such questions, this chapter analyzes worldwide
behavioural diﬀerences between immigrants and native-born by looking at the
12Their study was based on 618 questionnaires to obtain preferences for landscape man-
agement and nature images on immigrants from Islamic countries and native-born in the
Netherlands.
13He used U.S. state-level data for CO, NO2, SO2, and PM10 emmisions in 2000, and a
Stochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Auence, and Technology model (STIRPAT)
to determine whether there are immigrant/native-born environmental behaviour diﬀerences.
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probability of engagement of both groups of individuals across a wide range of
pro-environmental behaviours. Moreover, it is the aim of this chapter to de-
termine the possible origin of any behavioural discrepancy encountered. If the
NEP holds, immigrants and native-born will show no environmental behavioural
diﬀerences because environmental concern is a global phenomenon (Yearly [90];
Breching and Kempton [16]; and Dunlap and Van Liere [29]). But if the PMH
holds, two possible scenarios can be observed: a) native-born hold stronger en-
vironmental attitudes than immigrants insofar as the latter are traditionally a
vulnerable and poorer group which come from less developed countries (Ingle-
hart [46]; and Lapham et al [50]); b) immigrants hold stronger environmental
attitudes than native-born, thus indicating the presence of selective immigra-
tion of individuals with relatively high socio-economic status and education
levels as well (Kidd and Lee [49]; and Abrahamson [3]), and who have embraced
post-materialistic views even prior to their migration.
The PMH, though, is not the only reason why environmental behavioural dif-
ferences between immigrants and native-born may arise. As Pﬀefer and Mayone
Stycos [68] point out, an alternative explanation to immigrants holding stronger
environmental attitudes than native-born might be that environmental problems
in their country of origin sensitized them and motivated them to engage in pro-
environmental action (Martinez-Alier and Hershberg [58]). Thus, immigrants
would display stronger environmental concern than native-born. Likewise, an
alternative explanation to immigrants holding weaker environmental attitudes
than native-born is that immigrants lack a sense of belongingness or a sense
of place that would make them feel attached and identiﬁed to their physical
surroundings in the host country.14 Without that close relationship between
14The ﬁrst to conceptualize the sense of place of individuals was Tuan [83]. He regarded
the place as the centre of meaning or ﬁeld of care which emphasizes human emotions and
relationships. The individuals' sense of place is the perspective from which individuals
position themselves in relation to others to advocate particular standpoints regarding natural
resources management (Cantrill and Senecah [19]).
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immigrants and their place of residence, the need to take pro-environmental
actions when required could be absent.
The Sierra Club's assumption of immigrants having the same environmen-
tal behaviour as U.S. native-born is closely related to another central theme in
the discussion: the eﬀect on such behaviour of their length of residence in the
country. This process, denominated as environmental acculturation by Padilla
[65], helps the immigrants to learn the ways of the dominant culture. Thus, the
more time an immigrant spends on the host country, the more likely he is to
adhere to the behavioural rules of the native-born. In this sense, Hunter [44]
found evidence of such process and showed there are no behavioural diﬀerences
between long-term immigrants and native-born. Mukherji [59] found that the
level of acculturation of Hispanics in Texas did inﬂuence their environmental
attitudes and behaviours.15 Most acculturated individuals had lowest scores on
environmental attitudes and engaged less in recycling activities. Finally, Pﬀefer
and Mayone Stycos [68] found that diﬀerences in acculturation between immi-
grants and native-born masked the prevailing behavioural divergence related to
eating less meat and saving water, but it also reduced behavioural diﬀerences
among both groups regarding green consumption behaviour.
Since acculturation seems to drive the environmental behaviour of immi-
grants by their length of residence, this chapter incorporates such feature into
the analysis. Furthermore, since it has been suggested that environmental be-
havioural diﬀerences among immigrants and native-born might arise because of
the presence (or lack) of a sense of place, the analysis will use an instrument
to avoid comparing individuals with heterogenous attachment and identiﬁca-
tion to their place of residence: the immigrants' oﬀspring. Hence, by comparing
the behaviour of native-born to that of second generation immigrants, it is
15She used survey data from 262 residents of a mid-size city on the U.S. side of the Mexico-
US border. The proxy for acculturation used was the language mostly spoken at home.
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assured that no variation in sense of place due to immigrant status will exist,
while allowing to isolate the eﬀect of length of residence on their environmental
behaviour.
This chapter makes three novel contributions to the native-born/immigrant
environmental behaviour literature. First, it is the only worldwide exploration
of native-born/immigrant environmental behavioural diﬀerences. This should
provide more robust ﬁndings than state or country level studies which use a
smaller dataset and consider a lower cultural variation. Second, unlike most pa-
pers in the literature, it disentangles environmental attitudes from behaviours
by analyzing the willingness to perform and actual engagement in environmen-
tally friendly behaviours of individuals. This oﬀers a clear separation between
intention and action with strong consequences for the design of environmental
policy programmes. Finally, in order to assess if immigrants experience an ac-
culturation process, it incorporates a control (second generation immigrants)
in the econometric analysis in the same vein of the epidemiological approach
(Fernández [33]) to address the heterogeneity of the individuals' sense of be-
longingness.
The plan for the rest of the chapter is the following: Section 2 describes
the data and methods used to evaluate the immigrant/native-born diﬀerences
in environmental behaviour. It oﬀers a description of the variables used in the
analysis and a brief literature review of the main ﬁndings regarding their impact
on environmental behaviour. Section 3 presents the results of the empirical
analysis. In section 4, a discussion of the ﬁndings and its policy implications
are oﬀered. Finally, concluding remarks are provided and further research is
suggested.
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2. Data and Methods
The data used in the present study are taken from the World Values Survey
(WVS). The WVS is a worldwide investigation of political and socio-cultural
change based on representative samples from over 80 countries in the world,
carried out in ﬁve waves and covering over 25 years. It is carried out by the
World Values Survey Association (WVSA), which is a non-proﬁt association
based in Stockholm, Sweden. In order to provide information about the be-
liefs, values and motivations of people all over the world, the WVS carries out
representative national surveys of people's values and beliefs. Thus, the WVS
is a cross-sectional study with individual-level data. Since the WVSA aims to
cover a wide variety of countries, it designates a Principal Investigator who is
in charge of conducting the survey in his/her country. Such investigator is also
responsible to analyze, interpret, and disseminate the data resulting from the
surveys. The interviews are conducted face to face by a local ﬁeld organization
and are supervised by academic researchers. Finally, the core questionnaire is
translated into the local language.
This chapter analyzes the diﬀerences in environmental behaviour of native-
born and immigrants regarding three general environmental issues: a) Money
and the Environment; b) Speciﬁc pro-environmental actions; and c) Environ-
mental politically related behaviour.
The Money and the Environment issues are investigated through three de-
pendent variables measured in a four-item likert scale.16 These variables mea-
sure the willingness to sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment of im-
migrants and native-born. The variables are:
16The scale is: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; and 4=strongly disagree. More
importantly, the items in the Money and the Environment category do not measure in fact
behaviour, rather attitudes.
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• Willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution.
• Willingness to give part of own income for the environment.
• Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the
environment.
The speciﬁc pro-environmental actions are investigated through four dichoto-
mous (1=yes/0=no) responses to questions indicating whether or not the re-
spondent had engaged in speciﬁc environmentally friendly behaviours. The
variables are:
• Choose products that are better for the environment.
• Recycle.
• Reduce water consumption.
• Contribute to an environmental organization.
The Environmental politically related behaviour issues are investigated using
two dichotomous (1=yes/0=no) responses to questions indicating whether or
not the respondent has engaged in politically related behaviour in favour of the
environment. The variables are:
• Attend meetings or sign petitions.
• Join boycotts.
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Table 1 in the Appendix shows the proportion of individuals by environmental
behaviour and by region of the world. It can be appreciated that the nine en-
vironmental behaviours analyzed cover on average survey responses of 101,677
individuals from 58 diﬀerent countries. Table 1 also shows that 36 in 100 respon-
dents were surveyed in Europe; 20 in 100 in Asia; 18 in 100 in Latin America;
10 in 100 in Africa; 5 in 100 in Oceania; 4 in 100 in the Nordic countries; 3 in
100 in North America; and about 3 in 100 in the Middle East. Table 2 in the
Appendix shows the proportion of individuals by environmental behaviour and
by the level of income of the surveyed country.17 About 4 in every 10 coun-
tries surveyed are upper middle income countries; slightly more than 3 in every
10 are high income countries; 2 in 10 are lower middle income countries; and
slightly less than 1 in every 10 are low income countries. Table 1 and 2 then
establish that the environmental behaviour to be analyzed corresponds to indi-
viduals living mostly in Europe, Asia and Latin America, in upper middle and
high income countries. Since the United States is included in the sample, it can
be said that the dataset contains those countries which are typically recipients
of high immigration ﬂows.
While the indicators of environmental behaviour selected are quite com-
prehensive, there is, as Pﬀefer and Mayone Stycos [68] point out, a limitation
regarding the use of dichotomous variables. In particular, the exact strength
of the environmental behaviour cannot be determined since those variables do
not quantify the frequency with which the individual has engaged in the speciﬁc
behaviour. Thus, an individual who has recycled once is treated equally as one
who has recycled more than once. The results obtained by the analysis will then
overestimate the engagement in environmentally friendly behaviours.
17The income level of the country was determined by the average gross national income
per capita of the country during the period of the WVS survey and the classiﬁcation made
by the World Bank. Low income countries have a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less; lower
middle income countries, $1,026-$4,035; upper middle income countries, $4,036-$12,475; and
high income countries, $12,476 or more.
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Another problem is that those individuals who have an interest in the en-
vironment are more likely to have completed the survey. Additionally, poorly
integrated immigrants who have not mastered the language of the host country
are less likely to have completed it. Thus, the survey captures the views of a
certain immigrant proﬁle. This can bias the results towards an overestimation of
the immigrants' pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour.
Given that, to my knowledge, there is no study which analyzes the envi-
ronmental behaviour of native-born and immigrants from all over the world, it
is complicated to determine the extent of these problems as there is no basis
for comparison. Nevertheless, section 4 will present a comparison of the results
obtained by other researchers with the results provided by the present chapter.
The key predictor variable in the analysis is immigrant status. Using the
WVS, a dichotomous variable is constructed to determine whether the individual
was born in the country of his residence or not. Those born in the country (i.e.
native-born) are coded 0, while those who did not (i.e. immigrants) are coded
1.18
To analyze environmental behaviour diﬀerences between immigrants and
native-born, a baseline model is deﬁned to predict the probability that the indi-
vidual engages in a speciﬁc environmental behaviour considering only his immi-
grant status. The issues regarding Money and the Environment (i.e. willingness
to sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment) are estimated through an
ordered probit model, while Speciﬁc pro-environmental actions and Environ-
mental politically related behaviour (i.e. actual engagement in environmentally
friendly behaviour) issues are estimated with a probit model. Given that the
Money and the Environment variables use a likert scale, an ordered logit model
could have been used. However, as it is shown by Tables 9-11 in the Appendix,
18The original variable in the WVS dataset is Born in this country: birth country. Possible
answers are: Yes, Latin America, USA/Canada, Asia, Europe, Africa, other, and Oceania.
Table 1 in the Appendix shows the distribution of immigrants in the sample.
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the data do not meet the proportional odds assumption that is required in
order to estimate them with an ordered logit model.19
According to Table 3 in the Appendix, immigrants represent 5.89% of those
who responded to the question Born in this country: birth country in the WVS
dataset throughout the 1989-2007 period.20 This is higher to the 2.9%-3.1% of
the total world population reported during the 1990-2010 period by the United
Nations International Migrant Stock.21
Table 4 in the Appendix shows the region of the world from which individ-
uals migrate (source region) and the region of the world they migrate to (host
region). It stands out that the greatest ﬂows take place: within Europe; from
Asia to Europe; and from the Nordic countries or the Middle East to Europe.
Table 5 shows the percentage of immigrants that migrate to countries by their
level of income. Slightly more than half of immigrants in the dataset migrate
to a high income country; almost 3 out of 10 immigrants migrate to an upper
middle income country; almost 2 out of 10 immigrants migrate to a lower middle
income country; and no immigrants migrate to a low income country. Table 6
shows the regions of the world from which individuals migrate by the level of
income of their source country. Almost half of immigrants come from Europe,
of which most come from upper middle and high income countries. One in ev-
ery four immigrants come from Asia, of which most come lower middle income
countries. Finally, almost 1 in every 10 come from Latin America, of which most
come from upper middle income countries. In consequence, Tables 4-6 suggest
19Thus, the coeﬃcients that describe the relationship between the lowest (i.e. strongly
agree to an increase in taxes to prevent environmental pollution) versus all higher categories
of the response variable (i.e. agree, disagree, and strongly disagree) are not the same as those
that describe the relationship between the next lowest category (i.e. agree to an increase
in taxes...) and all higher categories (i.e. disagree and strongly disagree). For the Speciﬁc
pro-environmental actions and Environmental politically related behaviour variables a probit
model is used just to be consistent in terms of the interpretation of the coeﬃcients and its
marginal eﬀects.
20Not surprisingly, Oceania, North America and Europe are the regions of the world with
the highest proportion of immigrants in their total population.
21www.esa.un.org/migration/
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that while the vast majority of immigration ﬂows in the dataset take place from
developed countries to developed countries (Europe to Europe, Nordic coun-
tries to Europe, and Europe to Oceania), the size of ﬂows from less developed
countries to developed countries is not negligible (Asia to Europe, Oceania and
North America, Latin America to Europe and North America). Additionally,
the amount of migration ﬂow between some less developed countries is notewor-
thy (Latin America to Latin America). This structure of the dataset is actually
useful to test the hypotheses about the environmental behaviour of individuals
by immigrant status previously discussed (i.e. the PMH and NEP).
An issue of concern when analyzing environmental behaviour diﬀerences of
individuals between immigrant status is that those diﬀerences might depend
on whether the scope of the environmental problem is local or global. For
example, it might be the case that an immigrant does not care about a local
environmental problem because he is not well adapted to the host country, but
at the same time he cares about global environmental problems. Table 8 in the
Appendix shows the perceptions of individuals by immigrant status about local
and global environmental problems. It shows that regardless of this possibility,
the individuals' environmental behaviour is similar in all cases. Thus, it is not
true that the immigrants' attitudes to environmental problems diﬀer depending
on whether they are local or global problems, i.e. the immigrant status of the
individual does not produce such environmental myopia. For that reason, this
feature will not be incorporated into the analysis.
Table 12 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of environmen-
tally friendly behaviour of immigrants and native-born. It would be a mistake to
conclude that behavioural diﬀerences are only a product of the individuals' im-
migrant status. It is well-known that several factors other than being a native-
born or immigrant aﬀect the individuals' environmental behaviour. For that
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reason, the following variables are included as controls in independent estima-
tions: education, income, age, gender, community attachment, environmental
orientation, social capital, national identiﬁcation, empowerment, and pro-social
traits. Tables 13 and 34 in the Appendix present the descriptive statistics of
these variables, while Table 14 in the Appendix shows the correlation between
these explanatory variables. I explain now why and how each control is included
in the analysis.
2.1 Variables of interest
Education
Higher levels of education lead to stronger preferences for environmental
protection because more educated individuals are supposed to possess better
information to make a decision regarding environmental issues (Danielson et al
[26]; Blomquist and Whitehead [3]; Engel and Pötschke [32]; Witzke and Urfei
[89]; Israel and Levinson [47]; and Veistein et al [84]). Traditionally, immigrants
are a vulnerable group which might be expected to have lower levels of education
than native-born. If the individuals' environmental behaviour is inﬂuenced by
their education, controlling for it would reduce the diﬀerence in native-born and
immigrants' environmental behaviour.
The variable from the WVS dataset used as a proxy for the education of
native-born and immigrants is highest educational level attained. The variable
uses a scale from 1 to 8 where 1 is the lowest educational level and 8 is the
highest.22
22From 1 to 8, the educational levels are: incomplete elementary school, complete ele-
mentary school, incomplete secondary school, complete secondary school, incomplete tertiary
education, complete tertiary education, incomplete university, and university with degree.
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Income
People from a higher social class are also supossed to be more pro-environmentally
oriented insofar as they have already satisﬁed basic needs, and consequently, can
focus on satisfying other less urgent preferences (Whitehead [88]; Stevens et al
[81]; Blomquist and Whitehead [9]; Popp [71]; Witzke and Urfei [89]; Bulte et
al [18]; Dupont [30]; Israel and Levinson [47]; Veisten et al [84]; and Hidano
et al [41]). Furthermore, it can be argued that engaging in pro-environmental
behaviour is costly, and since people in higher social classes do not face the
same budget constraints as people in lower social classes, they are more likely
to adhere to such behaviour. Given that immigrants usually leave their country
of origin to seek better economic opportunities, they might be expected to have
lower levels of income than native-born. If the individuals' environmental be-
haviour is inﬂuenced by their income level, controlling for it would reduce the
diﬀerence in native-born and immigrants' environmental behaviour.
The variable from the WVS dataset used as a proxy for income of native-
born and immigrants is scale of incomes. The variable uses a scale from 1 to
10 where 1 is the lowest income decile and 10 is the highest. This variable is
country-speciﬁc, e.g. the 4th decile of Mexico is not the same as the 4th decile of
Venezuela or Germany. Notwithstanding this fact, region eﬀects will be included
in the estimation so that these variables can somehow capture income diﬀerences
between regions.
Age
Younger people should possess stronger environmental preferences than older
people because they are more likely to live long enough to perceive the negative
eﬀects of any potential environmental damage. Alternatively, older people will
not live to enjoy the beneﬁts of resource preservation (Whitehead [88]; Howell
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and Laska [42]; and Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman [22]).23 If the individu-
als' age aﬀects their environmental behaviour, controlling for such factor would
reduce the diﬀerence in native-born and immigrants' environmental behaviour.
The variable from the WVS dataset used for the analysis is age. Age2 is also
incorporated to consider non-linear eﬀects on the individuals' environmental
behaviour.
Gender
Hunter et al [45] provide an overview of the increased likelihood to perform
behaviours directed at environment preservation due to the role of women's
work at home. Moreover, Zelezny et al [91] provide evidence that women dis-
play more environmental concern than men. Yet, their meta-analysis also found
that regarding actual pro-environmental behaviour, there is an inconsistent re-
lationship between such variable and gender, with a number of studies ﬁnding
men being more active in pro-environmental behavior. Despite these mixed
results, the control is included in a series of estimations.
The variable from the WVS dataset used for the analysis is sex. It is a
dichotomous variable coded 0 for men and 1 for women.
Community attachment
Individuals with a higher commitment to their local community should be
more actively concerned about its environmental problems. Some even claim
that environmental behaviours are essentially local, and that the boom of grass-
roots environmentalism provides evidence about the relevance of community
interests as a driving force (Szasz 1994). Pfeﬀer and Mayone Stycos [68] found
23Torgler and García-Valiñas [82] discuss that there is also a cohort eﬀect which encom-
passes the diﬀerence of attitudes between diﬀerent age-cohorts due to generational diﬀerences
in socialization, life experiences and economic conditions. Instead of a negative relationship
between age and environmental concern, this eﬀect describes a positive one (Nord et al [64];
and Vlosky and Vlosky [85]).
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evidence that controlling for community attachment reduced the diﬀerences be-
tween the native-born and immigrants' environmental attitudes in New York,
particularly regarding green consumerism environmental behaviours. Not sur-
prisingly, the community attachment of native-born should be higher than that
of immigrants. In consequence, I expect to ﬁnd the same eﬀect as in Pﬀefer and
Mayone Stycos [68].
Ideally, the variable from the WVS dataset that would be used as a proxy
for community attachment is I see myself as a member of my local community.
However, there are no observations for 6 out of the 9 environmental behaviours
to be included in the analysis. Therefore, the selected variable to be used as
a proxy for community attachment is Geographical group that I belong to ﬁrst.
The variable is coded in the following way: 1=locality ; 2=region; 3=country ;
4=continent ; and 5=the world. In order to clearly represent community attach-
ment, the variable is recoded as a dichotomous variable where 0 represents not
attached to the community and 1 describes attached to the community.24
Environmental orientation
I adopt here the concept of environmental orientation of Pfeﬀer and May-
one Stycos [68]. Environmental orientation is the logic with which individuals
understand their relationship with nature. Some individuals possess an environ-
mental orientation which dictates human domination over nature, while others
possess one that prescribes a harmonic relationship between humans and nature.
Having a particular environmental orientation might be closely related to the
individuals' income and education level. For that matter, controlling for this
factor would reduce the diﬀerence in native-born and immigrants' environmental
behaviour.
24Individuals who claim to belong to a region, country, continent or the world are coded
as not being attached to their community. Individuals who claim to belong to a locality are
coded as being attached to their community.
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Two proxies from the WVS dataset are used to describe the individuals'
environmental orientation. The ﬁrst one is the individuals' preferences regard-
ing Protecting the Environment vs Economic Growth. The variable is coded
in the following way: 1=protect the environment ; 2=economic growth; 3=other
answer. The variable was recoded as a dichotomous one where 0 represents
preference for economic growth and 1 represents preference for protecting the
environment.25 The other proxy describes the individuals' stance regarding Hu-
man and Nature. The variable is coded in the following way: 1=humans should
master nature; 2=humans should coexist with nature; and 3=other answer. The
variable was recoded as a dichotomous one where 0 stands for humans should
master nature and 1 represents humans should coexist with nature.26 In the
estimations, the variables are denominated Orientation 1 and Orientation 2,
respectively.
Social Capital
The social capital of individuals might have a positive eﬀect on their pro-
environmental behaviour. If people trust others, they are more likely to think
that if they behave in a pro-environmental fashion, others will do it as well, thus
increasing their motivation to engage in environmentally friendly behaviours.
Evidence of this claim is provided by Torgler and García-Valiñas [82]. They
found that trusting others leads to higher preferences for environmental protec-
tion.27
As it is standard in the literature, the selected proxy for social capital is the
individuals' trust in other members of the society. The variable in the WVS
25Those with score 3 (other answer) were coded as missing observations because they do
not prefer something relevant in terms of environmental orientation.
26Those with score 3 (other answer) were coded as missing observations because they do
not prefer something relevant in terms of environmental orientation.
27In fact, they showed that the probability that the willingness of those who trust others
changes from agree to strongly agree to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution
is 3.1% to 3.6% higher than that of those who do not trust others.
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dataset is coded: 1=most people can be trusted ; and 2=can't be too careful. It
is then recoded as: 0=do not trust others; and 1=trust others.
National identiﬁcation
An individual who is more identiﬁed with his nationality might develop
greater interest in preserving the natural resources of his country. Torgler and
García-Valiñas [82] found inconclusive support for the hypothesis that national
pride is correlated with higher preferences towards environmental protection.28
However, they did not investigate the relationship of those variables in a native-
born/immigrant context, where national pride might play an important role in
deﬁning the individuals' environmental behaviour. For that reason, the individ-
uals' national identiﬁcation is included as a control in the analysis of native-born
and immigrants' environmental behaviour diﬀerences.
The variable used as a proxy for national identiﬁcation from theWVS dataset
is How proud you are of your nationality. The original variable is coded in a
4-item likert scale where: 1=very proud ; 2=quite proud ; 3=not very proud ; and
4=not at all proud. The variable is recoded as a dichotomous one where 0=not
proud about own nationality and 1=proud about own nationality.
Empowerment
Empowerment is the liberty and control that individuals have on decision-
making processes that aﬀect their life. Those individuals who feel more em-
powered, i.e. who feel they have more freedom of choice and control over their
life, are more likely to display stronger pro-environmental preferences. Blake [7]
found that, at least at the individual level, the eﬀect of empowerment on environ-
28Of ten diﬀerent estimations they carried out, the coeﬃcient of national pride lost its
signiﬁcance in three of them. Yet, they point out that this might have been driven by a low
number of observations with respect to the estimations where it did have signiﬁcance.
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mental attitudes was as strong as that of environmental awareness. Paloniemi
and Vainio [66] found that empowerment predicted forest owners' willingness to
promote nature conservation in Finland. It is reasonable to consider that immi-
grants would feel less empowered than native-born because they hold a diﬀerent
citizen status in the country they live in. If the individuals' environmental be-
haviour is inﬂuenced by their empowerment, controlling for such factor would
reduce the diﬀerence in native-born and immigrants' environmental behaviour.
The variable used as a proxy for empowerment from the WVS dataset is How
much freedom of choice and action do you have. The original variable is coded
in a 1 to 10 scale where 1 is none at all and 10 is a great deal. The variable is
recoded as a dichotomous one where 0=disempowered and 1=empowered.
Pro-social traits
Pro-social behaviour shapes the individuals' environmental preferences be-
cause it is voluntary intentional behaviour that results in beneﬁts for another
(Eisenberg and Miller [31]). Thus, those individuals that are more pro-social
oriented are expected to display stronger environmental preferences. Pro-social
behaviour as a catalyst of norm activation has been useful as predictor of
willingness to pay for environmental protection, recycling and general pro-
environmental behaviour (De Groot and Steg [27]). Since pro-social traits are
likely to inﬂuence environmental behaviour, they might obscure diﬀerences in
the immigrants and native-born environmental behaviour. For that matter,
pro-social traits are included as a control in the analysis.
The variable used as a proxy for pro-social traits from the WVS dataset is
Income equality preferences. The original variable is coded 1 to 10 where 1 is
incomes should be make more equal and 10 is we need larger income diﬀerences.
The variable is recoded as a dichotomous one where 0=not pro-social and 1=pro-
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social.29
2.2 Method
First, environmental behaviour diﬀerences between immigrants and native-
born are investigated. For that matter, a series of ordered probit estimations
are carried out for the Money and the Environment issues, whereas probit esti-
mations are carried out for the Speciﬁc pro-environmental behaviour and Envi-
ronmental politically related issues. The equation to be estimated is:
Yit = α+ ϕisit + βXit + θRit + λROi + δTt + uit (1)
Where the dependent variable, Yit, is the willingness or actual engagement
to perform a particular environmental behaviour of individual i at time t. The
predictor variables are: isit, a dummy variable which indicates the immigrant
status of individual i at time t ; Xit, which is a vector of control variables
(previously deﬁned) of individual i at time t ; Rit, which is a vector of dummy
variables that indicate region-speciﬁc eﬀects (e.g. diﬀerences in culture, policy
or climate) that might aﬀect the environmental behaviour of individual i at time
t ; ROi, which is a vector of dummy variables that will provide information of
the eﬀect of immigration on the environmental behaviour of an individual from a
particular region relative to that of individuals from other regions; Tt, which is a
vector of dummy variables that indicate time-speciﬁc eﬀects which might aﬀect
all individuals equally but which change over time;α is a constant; and u is the
error term. The obtained parameters would give information about which group
holds stronger environmental attitudes, but they will not give information about
how much stronger they are. Thus, marginal eﬀects are computed to provide a
29From the original variable, individuals with score 1 to 5 were grouped into pro-social and
individuals with score 6 to 10 were grouped into not pro-social.
120
measure of diﬀerences between immigrants and native-born in the probability
of engaging in each of the nine environmental behaviours previously described.
It is reasonable to expect immigrant/native-born diﬀerences when key char-
acteristics that could shape their environmental behaviour are considered. Yet,
immigrants who have lived for many years in the host country might learn the
ways of the dominant culture (probably as a means to ﬁt in) and display a sim-
ilar behaviour to that of native-born, than immigrants who have just arrived in
the country. Thus, there should be a variation in the environmental behaviour
of immigrants by their length of residence in the country. For that reason, a
new series of ordered probit and probit estimations is made with a variable of
length of residence as main predictor.30 The equation to be estimated is:
Yit = α+ ϕlengthresidenceit + βXit + θRit + λROi + δTt + uit (2)
Which is the same as equation (1), only this time the main predictor variable
is changed so as to be able to analyze environmental behaviour diﬀerences be-
tween immigrants by their length of residence in the host country. Once more,
marginal eﬀects are also computed.
While there might be more similarities between immigrants of longer resi-
dence and native-born as opposed to immigrants of recent arrival in the country,
they are still immigrants who (to some extent) bring along their traditions and
habits to their new country of residence. Moreover, immigrants are expected to
lack a sense of belongingness to their new place of residence or at least dis-
play less attachment to such place if compared to native-born. This variation
30The variable When came to country from the WVS dataset is used for this matter. The
original variable has ﬁve possible answers, but it was recoded for the analysis in the following
way: 1=less than 10 years; 2=11-15 years; 3=more than 15 years.
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in sense of place might obscure the eﬀect of acculturation on the immigrants'
environmental behaviour. Therefore, a group which might be interesting to ana-
lyze is the second generation immigrants, i.e. those who are born in the country
of residence with at least one immigrant parent and who share the same institu-
tional structure as native-born to develop a sense of place. A series of ordered
probit and probit estimations are then carried out to analyze the diﬀerences
in environmental behaviour between native-born, second generation immigrants
and immigrants by their length of residence. The equation to be estimated is:
Yit = α+ ϕallgroupsit + βXit + θRit + λROi + δTt + uit (3)
Which is the same as equations (1) and (2), only this time the main predictor
variable is a modiﬁed immigrant status variable denominated allgroups.31 Once
more, marginal eﬀects are also computed for this set of estimations.
3. Results
3.1 Immigrants and native-born
Table 12 in the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics for each environ-
mentally friendly behaviour by immigrant status. If the issues regarding Money
and the Environment are considered ﬁrst, Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the average
willingness of individuals to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollu-
31To create such variable, four diﬀerent variables from the WVS dataset were used: Born in
this country: birth country,When came to country, Father immigrant, andMother immigrant.
It has been explained how the ﬁrst two variables are coded. The last two are dichotomous
variables with a 0=no and 1=yes code.
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Figure 1: Average willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution
native−born immigrant
tion, give part of their own income for the environment, and buy things at a 20%
higher price if it helped to protect the environment by their immigrant status.
It is clear that the average willingness of native-born to sacriﬁce money in order
to save the environment is higher than that of immigrants.32 The biggest dif-
ference in environmental behaviour between the two groups is regarding giving
part of their own income for the environment.
Figures 4-9 show the average engagement of individuals in the following
environmentally friendly behaviours by their immigrant status: choose better
products for the environment, recycle, reduce water consumption, contribute
to an environmental organization, attend meetings or sign petitions and join
boycotts. The graphs show that immigrants have engaged more (on average)
than native-born in such environmentally friendly behaviours except in attend-
ing meetings or signing petitions. As it can also be appreciated in Table 6 in
32Remember that the likert scale code of the variable implies that a lower score is associated
with higher willingness to perform the environmental behaviour.
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Figure 2: Average willingness to
give part of own income for the environment
native−born immigrant
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Figure 3: Average willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price
if it helped to protect the environment
native−born immigrant
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Figure 4: Average engagement in
choosing products that are better for the environment
native−born immigrant
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Figure 5: Average engagement in
recycling
native−born immigrant
the Appendix, the starkest diﬀerences in environmental behaviour between the
groups are regarding recycling and water consumption reduction.
With the information provided by ﬁgures 1-9 and that of Tables 3, 12 and 13
in the Appendix, ﬁve main observations can be drawn: 1) immigrants are slightly
overrepresented in the WVS sample if the data is compared to that of the United
Nations International Migrant Stock; 2) native-born seem to be more willing
to sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment than immigrants, but the
latter seem to have engaged more on environmentally friendly actions than the
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Figure 6: Average engagement in
reducing water consumption
native−born immigrant
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Figure 7: Average engagement in
contributing to an environmental organization
native−born immigrant
.127875
.132452
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
Av
er
ag
e 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t
Figure 8: Average engagement in
attending meetings or signing petitions
native−born immigrant
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Figure 9: Average engagement in
joining boycotts
native−born immigrant
former; 3) there seems to be selective immigration in the WVS sample, i.e.
immigrants are more educated and have higher income than native-born;33 4)
native-born appear to hold a stronger sense of place than immigrants;34 and
5) no group is substantially more environmentally concerned than the other.
While these observations provide support to the PMH, the statistical sig-
niﬁcance of these behavioural diﬀerences between native-born and immigrants
must be assessed ﬁrst. In order to do that, a series of ordered probit models are
estimated for those environmentally friendly behaviours presented in Figures
1-3, while probit models are used to evaluate diﬀerences in the environmentally
friendly behaviours depicted in Figures 4-9.
Table 15 in the Appendix presents the coeﬃcients and standard errors for the
33Some characteristics of the sample explain this seemingly counterintuitive observation.
First, most immigrants in the sample come from Europe and Asia (circa 7 out of 10 immi-
grants). Only 1 out every 10 immigrants in the survey comes from Africa or Latin America.
Second, there is no information regarding the source country of immigrants. So, the exact
proportion of immigrants coming from Western European countries, U.S., Canada, Japan or
Australia, versus the proportion coming from Eastern European countries or China or India
is unknown. Third, the sample contains immigrant data from 48 countries. Approximately
30 of those countries are middle income or lower income countries. There is no data for high
income countries like France, Italy, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, South
Korea, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Singapore.
34The components of sense of place used to make this claim are (community) attachment
and (national) identiﬁcation. On average, immigrants scored lower in both items, suggesting
they do not have such sense of belongingness.
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immigrant status regressor, as well as the number of observations of each model
corresponding to the Money and the Environment issues. It can be observed
that once the relevant controls that might aﬀect the environmental behaviour of
individuals, there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between immigrants
and native-born with respect to Money and the Environment issues. In other
words, there is no evidence that there are behavioural diﬀerences between im-
migrants and native-born with respect to their willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution, or their willingness to give part of their own
income to the environment, or their willingness to buy things at a 20% higher
price if it helped to protect the environment.
Table 16 in the Appendix presents the coeﬃcients and standard errors for the
immigrant status regressor, as well as the number of observations of each model
corresponding to the Speciﬁc pro-environmental actions. With the exception of
contributing to an environmental organization, there is statistically signiﬁcant
evidence that immigrants actually engage more than native-born on behaviours
such as: choosing products that are better for the environment, recycling, and
reducing water consumption.
Table 17 in the Appendix presents the coeﬃcients and standard errors for the
immigrant status regressor, as well as the number of observations of each model
analyzing the Environmental politically related issues. There is no statistically
signiﬁcant evidence that there behavioural diﬀerences between immigrants and
native-born with respect to Environmental politically related issues. Thus, there
are no diﬀerences between both groups with respect to attending meetings or
signing petitions, and joining boycotts.
What about the eﬀect of the (control) variables that could aﬀect the environ-
mental behaviour of individuals other than their immigrant status? Some of the
expected relationships with pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
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behaviour were conﬁrmed.
Education is found to be an enhancer of pro-environmental attitudes and pro-
environmental behaviour. So, more educated individuals will be more willing to
sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment, as well as engage in speciﬁc
pro-environmental behaviour and environmental politically related behaviour.
Income is also found to have a positive relationship with pro-environmental
attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour, with two exceptions: willingness to
give part of own income for the environment and actual engagement in reducing
water consumption.
Age is found to have a diﬀerent eﬀect on pro-environmental attitudes than on
pro-environmental behaviour. On the one hand, younger individuals are more
willing to sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment. On the other hand,
it is older individuals who actually engage more on speciﬁc pro-environmental
behaviour and on environmental politically-related behaviour.35
With respect to gender, results remain somewhat mixed. In general, women
seem to possess stronger pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour than men. But, there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their
actual engagement on attending meetings or signing petitions, and men seem
to be more inclined than women to contribute to environmental organizations
and join boycotts.
Social capital is found to have a positive relationship with pro-environmental
attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour; the only exception is in regard to
actual engagement in reducing water consumption, where such relationship is
negative.
Empowerment also shows a positive relationship with pro-environmental at-
titudes and pro-environmental behaviour, but there is no statistically signiﬁcant
35In both cases, however, there is a quadratic eﬀect of age on the individuals' environmental
behaviour.
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eﬀect of empowerment on the willingness of individuals to give part of their own
income to the environment.
Finally, there seems to be a positive relationship between environmental ori-
entation and pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour: a)
with respect to Economic Growth vs Protect the Environment preferences, in-
dividuals who prefer to protect the environment display stronger pro-environmental
attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour; b) with respect to Human vs Na-
ture stance, those who believe individuals should have an harmonic relationship
with nature show stronger pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour with two exceptions: such relationship is reversed for willingness to
buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment, and
for actual engagement in contributing to an environmental organization and
attending meetings or signing petitions; and there is no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the individuals' beliefs about their relationship with nature and their
willingness to give part of their own income to the environment.
Some other control variables show a counterintuitive relationship with pro-
environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour. There is no clear re-
lationship between the pro-social traits of individuals and their pro-environmental
attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour: there is a negative relationship be-
tween the immigrants and native-born pro-social traits and their willingness to
pay higher taxes to prevent pollution and to buy things at a 20% higher price if
it helped to protect the environment, as well as with their actual engagement in
reducing water consumption; there is a positive relationship between the indi-
viduals' pro-social traits and their actual engagement in choosing products that
are better for the environment, as well as their engagement in attending meet-
ings or signing petitions and joining boycotts; ﬁnally, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of pro-social traits on the individuals' willingness to give part
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of their own income to the environment, and actual engagement in recycling
and contributing to an environmental organization. With respect to commu-
nity attachment, results are contrary to what was expected: there is a negative
relationship between community attachment and the individuals' willingness to
pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution and to buy things at a
20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment, as well as with their
actual engagement in reducing water consumption, attending meetings or sign-
ing petitions and joining boycotts; and there is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the individuals' community attachment on their willingness to give part of
their own income to the environment, as well as their actual engagement in
choosing products that are better for the environment, recycling, reducing wa-
ter consumption and contributing to an environmental organization. There is
no clear relationship between national identiﬁcation and pro-environmental at-
titudes and pro-environmental behaviour: a positive relationship is found with
respect to individuals' willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental
pollution and to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the
environment, as well as with actual engagement in reducing water consumption;
a negative relationship is found with respect to actual engagement in recycling,
attending meetings or signing petitions, and joining boycotts; and no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant eﬀect is found with respect to willingness to give part of own
income to the environment and actual engagement in choosing products that are
better for the environment and contributing to an environmental organization.
Region-speciﬁc eﬀects are reported with respect to the reference group:
North America. With few exceptions, it can be established that there is statis-
tically signiﬁcant evidence that individuals in regions of the world other than
North America show higher willlingness to sacriﬁce money in order to save
the environment, but at the same time actually engage less in speciﬁc pro-
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environmental behaviours and environmental politically related behaviours. The
two most important exceptions are individuals from Africa, whose willingness
to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution is not statistically signif-
icant diﬀerent from that of individuals in North America; and individuals from
Oceania, who engage more than individuals from any other region in choos-
ing products that are better for the environment, recycle, reduce water con-
sumption, contribute to environmental organizations, attend meetings or sign
petitions, and join boycotts.
To understand diﬀerences in pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour due to the region of origin of immigrants, we look at the coeﬃcients
of the relevant dummy variables. The reference group is North America as well.
There are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the pro-environmental atti-
tudes of immigrants regardless of their source region. Thus, Asians do not have
diﬀerent willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution than
Latin Americans, just as Africans do not have diﬀerent willingness to buy things
at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment than Europeans.
The same claim cannot be made about pro-environmental behaviour, and there
is no clear pattern: a) immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, Nordic countries,
and Middle East engage less in choosing products that are better for the envi-
ronment than immigrants from North America, Latin America, and Oceania;
b) immigrants from Europe, Asia, Latin America, Nordic countries, and Middle
East engage less in recycling than immigrants from North America, Africa, and
Oceania; c) immigrants from Latin America and Oceania engage less in reducing
water consumption than immigrants from North America, Europe, Asia, Africa,
Nordic countries, and Middle East; d) immigrants from Asia and Latin America
engage less in contributing to an environmental organization than immigrants
from Europe, Africa, North America, Oceania, Nordic countries, and Middle
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East; e) there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences among immigrants of all
regions regarding their engagement in attending meetings or signing petitions;
and f) immigrants from Asia engage less in joining boycotts than immigrants
from the rest of the world.
Now, remember the aim of this section is to establish whether there are statis-
tically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in pro-evironmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour between immigrants and native-born. Results showed there are diﬀer-
ences regarding three speciﬁc pro-environmental behaviours. What is the mag-
nitude of that diﬀerence? Tables 24-26 in the Appendix present the marginal
eﬀects for the ordered probit and probit models. The interpretation for each
type of model is quite diﬀerent. On the one hand, the marginal eﬀects of the
ordered probit models indicate (ceteris paribus) the percentual change in the
probability that the willingness of immigrants changes from agree to strongly
agree to perform the environmentally friendly behaviour in consideration.36 On
the other hand, the marginal eﬀects of the probit models indicate the proba-
bility that the individual performs the environmentally friendly behaviour in
consideration when his status changes from being native-born to immigrant or
viceversa.
Let us analyze ﬁrst the marginal eﬀects of the immigrant status variable.
The probability that an immigrant chooses products that are better for the
environment is 13.21% higher than that of a native-born. The probability that
an immigrant recycles is 15.83% higher than that of a native-born. And the
probability that an immigrant reduces his water consumption is 12.42% higher
than that of a native-born.
If the source region of the immigrant is considered, the results are: a) im-
36The reported marginal eﬀects of the ordered probit models are MEM's, i.e. marginal
eﬀects at means. In general, there is no strong reason why one would suspect it would be best
to compute the average marginal eﬀect, i.e. why AME's would be best. However, although
not reported here, AME's were also computed and there was no substantial diﬀerence.
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migrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, Nordic countries and Middle East have a
20.25%, 24.49%, 23.04%, 11.83%, and 11.83% lower probability, respectively, to
choose products that are better for the environment than immigrants from Latin
America and North America; b) immigrants from Europe, Asia, Latin America,
Nordic countries and Middle East have a 26.32%, 23.98%, 18.13%, 21.21%, and
21.21% lower probability, respectively, to recycle than immigrants from Africa,
Oceania, and North America; and c) immigrants from Latin America and Ocea-
nia have a 14.87% and 31.22% lower probability, respectively, to reduce water
consumption than immigrants from the rest of the world.
What control variables have the greatest impact on pro-environmental atti-
tudes and pro-environmental behaviour? The probability that the willingness of
an individual with preferences oriented towards protecting the nature (envi-
ronmental orientation 1) changes from agree to strongly agree to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution is 11.1% higher than that of individuals with
preferences oriented towards economic growth. The same probability is 4.83%
and 7.31% higher for the willingness to give part of their own income to the
environment and to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the
environment, respectively. The probability that an individual with preferences
oriented towards protecting the nature (environmental orientation 1) chooses
products that are better for the environment, recycles, reduces water consump-
tion, contributes to an environmental organization, and attends meetings or
signs petitions is 10.18%, 9.65%, 7.65%, 3.84%, and 4.2% higher, respectively,
than that of an individual with preferences oriented towards economic growth.
Finally, the probability that an individual with social capital joins a boycott is
9.14% higher than that of an individual who does not trust others.
What about diﬀerences in pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour driven by the region of residence of individuals? Tables 24-26 in the
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Appendix suggest the following: a) the probability that the willingness of in-
dividuals in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Nordic countries, Middle East, and
Oceania changes from agree to strongly agree to pay higher taxes to prevent envi-
ronmental pollution is 7.71%, 11.91%, 8.99%, 8.55%, 19.03%, and 2.93% higher,
respectively, than that of individuals in Africa and North America; b) the proba-
bility that the willingness of individuals in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America,
Nordic countries, Middle East, and Oceania changes from agree to strongly agree
to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment is
6.98%, 8.46%, 2.98%, 8.44%, 2.33%, 16.94%, and 2.98% higher, respectively,
than that of individuals in North America; c) the probability that individuals
in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America choose products that are better for
the environment is 3.21%, 2.8%, 2.4%, and 2% lower, respectively, than that
of individuals in North America and Nordic countries. Individuals in Oceania
have a 9.5% higher probability to choose products that are better for the envi-
ronment than individuals in North America; d) the probability that individuals
in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Nordic countries recycle is 5.82%,
5.02%, 5.05%, 4.92%, and 7.62% lower, respectively, than that of individuals
in North America. Individuals in Oceania have a 2.31% higher probability to
recycle than individuals in North America; e) the probability that individuals in
Europe, Africa, and Nordic countries reduce water consumption is 7.02%, 5.9%,
and 21.41% lower, respectively, than that of individuals in Asia, Latin America,
and North America. Individuals in Oceania have a 15.49% higher probability to
reduce water consumption than individuals in North America; f) the probability
that individuals in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Middle East contribute
to an environmental organization is 12.48%, 4.69%, 5.36%, and 4.94% lower,
respectively, than that of individuals in Nordic countries and North America.
Individuals in Africa and Oceania have a 5.39% and 2.25% higher probability to
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contribute to an environmental organization than individuals in North Amer-
ica; g) the probability that individuals in Europe and Asia attend meetings or
sign petitions is 7.57% and 4.44% lower, respectively, than that of individuals
in Africa, Latin America, Nordic countries, Middle East, and North America.
Individuals in Oceania have a 9.78% higher probability to attend meetings or
sign petitions thant that of individuals in North America; and h) the probability
that individuals in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Middle East join
boycotts is 27.38%, 10.64%, 17.71%, 34.96%, and 28.38% lower, respectively,
than that of individuals in North America. Individuals in Nordic countries
and Oceania have a 12.69% and 5.14% higher probability, respectively, to join
boycotts than that of North America.
Because there are statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in some of the pro-
environmental behaviours, the NEP cannot be supported. Individuals do not
hold the same environmental preferences despite variation in personal charac-
teristics such as education, income, age, etc.
Now that the variation in the environmental behaviour of immigrants and
native-born across issues like Money and the Environment, Speciﬁc pro-environmental
actions, and Environmental politically related behaviour has been established,
the topic of the length of residence of immigrants becomes relevant. Are immi-
grants that have lived for longer time in the host country more pro-environmentally
inclined than those immigrants of recent arrival? It has been assessed that immi-
grants have a stronger engagement on environmentally friendly behaviours than
native-born, but do they do it as a means of strategic adaptation into their
new culture, thus making lighter the negative burden that their presence in the
host country already implies? Or is it simply because they are more educated
and face a less restrictive budget constraint than native-born? Do immigrants
engage more on environmentally friendly behaviours because previous exposure
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to environmental problems sensitized them, i.e. increased their environmental
awareness? Or do immigrants develop a sense of place that compels them
to behave in a more pro-environmental fashion? The next section investigates
these issues.
3.2 Immigrants and the length of residence
The diﬀerence in environmental behaviour between native-born and immi-
grants might reﬂect the fact that the degree of incorporation of immigrants to
their new society is not profound. The longer their residence in the host country
is, the more likely they will adopt features of the dominant culture, including
certain environmental behaviours. Since there is variation in the time that im-
migrants have resided in the host country, a proxy is created from the dataset
to deal with such issue. The variables Born in this country: birth country and
When came to country are used for that matter. The constructed variable length
of residence has three items: 1=10 years or less; 2=11-15 years; and 3=more
than 15 years. Descriptive statistics for immigrants by their length of residence
can be found in Tables 33 and 34 in the Appendix.37
Figures 10-12 show that the immigrants' willingness to give part of their
income for the environment and buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped
to protect the environment is lower when the immigrants have lived more years
in the country. With respect to the immigrants' willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution, such relation is not that clear. However, it
can be observed that the group of immigrants that display lower willingness is
the one with more than 15 years of residence in the country.
37Immigrants who have lived in the host country for 10 years or less, 11 to 15 years, and
more than 15 years represent 23.57%, 21.79% and 54.64% of the total immigrant population,
respectively.
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Figure 10: Average willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 11: Average willingness to
give part of own income for the environment
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 12: Average willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price
if it helped to protect the environment
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 13: Average engagement in
choosing products that are better for the environment
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 14: Average engagement in
recycling
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
Figure 13-18 shows that, in contrast to what prevailed in Figures 10-12, im-
migrants display more engagement on environmentally friendly behaviours when
their time of residence in the country is more than 15 years. Yet, a positive re-
lationship between engagement and time of residence cannot be established;
immigrants that have lived in the country 10 years or less show higher engage-
ment in environmentally friendly behaviours than those immigrants with 11 to
15 years of residence.
It becomes clear then, that there are behavioural diﬀerences within immi-
grants when their time of residence in the host country is considered. In order to
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Figure 15: Average engagement in
reducing water consumption
<10 years 11−15 years
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Figure 16: Average engagement in
contributing to an environmental organization
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 17: Average engagement in
attending meetings or signing petitions
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 18: Average engagement in
joining boycotts
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences, a series of ordered probit
models are estimated for those environmentally friendly behaviours presented
in Figures 10-12, while probit models are used to evaluate diﬀerences in the
environmentally friendly behaviours depicted in Figures 13-18.
Table 18 in the Appendix shows the coeﬃcients and standard errors for the
length of residence regressor, and the number of observations in each model
corresponding to the Money and the Environment issues. The reference group
in the estimations is the group of immigrants with 10 years or less of residence
in the host country. It can be observed that, in general, there is no evidence
that there are behavioural diﬀerences between immigrants of various lengths of
residence in the host country with respect to their willingness to sacriﬁce money
in order to save the enviroment, albeit there is one exception: immigrants of 11-
15 years of residence show stronger willingness to give part of their own income
to the environment than immigrants of less than 10 years of residence or those
of more than 15 years of residence in the host country.
Tables 19 and 20 in the Appendix presents the coeﬃcients and standard er-
rors for the length of residence regressor, as well as the number of observations
of each model corresponding to Speciﬁc pro-environmental behaviour and Envi-
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ronmental politically related issues. Once all relevant controls that might aﬀect
the environmental behaviour of immigrants, there is no evidence that there are
behavioural diﬀerences between immigrants of diﬀerent lengths of residence in
the host country.
What about the eﬀect of those (control) variables that could aﬀect the envi-
ronmental behaviour of individuals other than their length of residence? Once
again, some of the expected relationships with pro-environmental attitudes and
pro-environmental behaviour were conﬁrmed and some others were not.
While education was found to be an enhancer of pro-environmental attitudes
and pro-environmental behaviour when considering immigrants and native-born,
the same cannot be claimed, in general, when comparing immigrants by their
length of residence. There are three exceptions though: more educated immi-
grants are more willing to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution
and to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment,
as well as they engage more on contributing to environmental organizations.
Income was found to have no eﬀect with respect to pro-environmental at-
titudes, but it does have an eﬀect with respect to four pro-environmental be-
haviours; immigrants of higher level of income engage more on choosing products
that are better for the environment, recycling, contributing to an environmental
organization, and joining boycotts.
Age is found to have no eﬀect on the immigrants' pro-environmental atti-
tudes. However, older immigrants engage more on choosing products that are
better for the environment, recycling, reducing water consumption and attend-
ing meetings or signing petitions.38
With respect to gender, immigrant women show stronger pro-environmental
attitudes than immigrant men, as well as more engagement on choosing prod-
38A quadratic eﬀect of age is found to be signiﬁcant with respect to engagement in choosing
products that are better for the environment, reducing water consumption and attending
meetings or signing petitions.
142
ucts that are better for the environment. However, no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence is found among immigrant men and women regarding recycling, re-
ducing water consumption, contributing to an environmental organization and
attending meetings or signing petitions. Finally, immigrant men engage more
in joining boycotts than immigrant women.
Immigrants with higher social capital display stronger pro-environmental
attitudes, but with the exception of contributing to environmental organizations
and joining boycotts, the social capital of immigrants has no eﬀect on their
engagement in choosing products that are better for the environment, recycling,
reducing water consumption, and attending meetings or signing petitions.
The empowerment of immigrants by their length of residence has no eﬀect
on their pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour, with the
exception that empowered immigrants do show higher willingness to buy things
at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment, as well as more
engagement in choosing products that are better for the environment.
With two exceptions, pro-social traits do not have an inﬂuence on immi-
grants' pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour. Contrary
to what was expected, immigrants with pro-social inclination show lower willing-
ness to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment;
yet, immigrants with pro-social traits engage more in joining boycotts.
Once more, there is no clear relationship between national identiﬁcation
and immigrants' pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour:
there is a positive relationship with respect to immigrants' willingness to pay
higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution and buy things at a 20% higher
price if it helped to protect the environment; there is no relationship with respect
to immigrants' willingness to give part of their own income to the environment,
as well as with their engagement in choosing products that are better for the
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environment, recycling, reducing water consumption, contributing to an envi-
ronmental organization, and attending meetings or signing petitions; ﬁnally,
there is a negative relationship with respect to immigrants' engagement in join-
ing boycotts.
The community attachment of immigrants by their length of residence does
not have any statistically signiﬁcant impact on their pro-environmental attitudes
and their pro-environmental behaviour.
Finally, there is a positive relationship between environmental orientation
and pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour: a) with re-
spect to Economic Growth vs Protect the Environment preferences (orien-
tation 1), immigrants who prefer to protect the environment display stronger
pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour; b) with respect
to Human vs Nature stance, those immigrants who believe men should have
an harmonic relationship with nature show higher willingness to buy things at
a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment, as well as higher
engagement in choosing products that are better for the environment, and recy-
cling. However, those same immigrants show less engagement in contributing to
an environmental organization. The Human vs Nature stance of immigrants
has no statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence in their willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution and to give part of their own income to the
environment, as well as with their engagement in reducing water consumption,
attending meetings or signing petitions, and joining boycotts.
Region-speciﬁc eﬀects are reported with respect the same reference group:
North America. Now that the model speciﬁcation excludes native-born inviduals
and disaggregates immigrants by their length of residence in the host country,
there is evidence that immigrants in regions of the world other than North Amer-
ica show higher willingness to sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment.
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The two exceptions are immigrants living in Africa and Oceania who display the
same willingness as immigrants in North America to pay higher taxes to prevent
environmental pollution, as well as immigrants in Africa, Nordic countries and
Oceania who display the same willingness as immigrants in North America to
buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment. With
respect to pro-environmental behaviour, results are somewhat similar to those
found when comparing immigrants and native-born. Immigrants in Oceania en-
gage more in choosing products that are better for the environment, recycling,
reducing water consumption, and attending meetings or signing petitions. With
respect to contributing to an environmental organization, immigrants in Europe
engage less than immigrants who reside in any other region of the world. Finally,
with respect to joining boycotts, immigrants in Nordic countries and Oceania
show higher engagement than immigrants who reside in any other region of the
world.
Diﬀerences in pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour
due to the region of origin of immigrants are reported with the relevant in-
teraction dummies. Results are quite similar to those found when comparing
immigrants and native-born. With the exception of willingness to give part of
own income to the environment,39 there is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence
that pro-environmental attitudes of immigrants diﬀer because of their region
of origin. With respect to pro-environmental behaviour, with the exception of
engagement in choosing products that are better for the environment, recycling
and contributing to an environmental organization,40 there is no statistically
39In this case, immigrants from Europe, Africa, Nordic countries and Middle East show
lower willingness to give part of their income to the environment than immigrants from the
rest of the world.
40With respect to choosing products that are better for the environment, immigrants from
Europe, Africa, and Oceania show lower engagement than immigrants from any other region
of the world. With respect to recycling, immigrants from Europe, Nordic countries, Middle
East, and Latin America show lower engagement than immigrants from any other region of
the world. Finally, with respect to contributing to an environmental organization, immigrants
from Asia and Latin America show lower engagement than immigrants from any other region
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signiﬁcant evidence that the engagement of immigrants in pro-environmental
diﬀers because of their region of origin.
Let us look at the magnitude of the diﬀerences found in pro-environmental
attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour of immigrants by their length of
residence. Tables 27-29 in the Appendix present the marginal eﬀects for the
ordered probit and probit models.
Let us analyze ﬁrst the marginal eﬀects of the length of residence variable.
The percentual change in the probability that the willingness of an immigrant
of 11-15 years of residence in the host country changes from agree to strongly
agree to give part of his own income to the environment is 19.41% greater than
that of an immigrant of less than 10 years and that of an immigrant of more
than 15 years of residence in the host country.
If the source region of the immigrants is considered, the results are: a)
the percentual change in the probability that the willingness of immigrants
from Europe, Africa, Nordic countries and Middle East change from agree to
strongly agree to give part of their income to the environment is 14.2%, 21.09%,
18.52%, and 18.52% lower, respectively, than that of immigrants from Asia,
Latin America, Oceania, and North America; b) the probability that immigrants
from Europe, Africa and Oceania engage in choosing products that are better
for the environment is 12.97%, 20.64%, and 25.71% lower, respectively, than
that of immigrants from Asia, Latin America, Nordic countries, Middle East,
and North America; c) the probability that immigrants from Europe, Latin
America, Nordic countries and Middle East in recycling is 22.73%, 27.72%,
17.71%, and 17.71% lower, respectively, than that of immigrants from Asia,
Africa, and North America; and d) the probability that immigrants from Asia
and Latin America engage in contributing to an environmental organization is
13.16% and 13.21% lower, respectively, than that of immigrants from Europe,
of the world.
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Africa, Nordic countries, Middle East, Oceania, and North America.
What control variables have the greatest impact on pro-environmental atti-
tudes and pro-environmental behaviour? The probability that the willingness
of an immigrant with preferences oriented towards protecting the nature (en-
vironmental orientation 1) changes from agree to strongly agree to pay higher
taxes to prevent environmental pollution is 11.32% higher than that of immi-
grants with preferences oriented towards economic growth. The same prob-
ability is 7.87% and 6.57%, higher for the willingness to give part of own in-
come to the environment and to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped
to protect the environment, respectively. The probability that an immigrant
with preferences oriented towards protecting the nature (environmental ori-
entation 1), or an immigrant who is empowered, chooses products that are
better for the environment is 14.67% and 13.12% higher, respectively, than that
of an immigrant whose preferences are oriented towards economic growth or
a disempowered immigrant. The probability that an immigrant with prefer-
ences oriented towards protecting the nature (environmental orientation 1),
or an immigrant with a notion that humans should have an harmonic relation-
ship with nature (environmental orientation 2), recycles is 17.31% and 11.79%
higher, respectively, than that of an immigrant whose preferences are oriented
towards economic growth or who deems that humans should master nature.
The probability that an immigrant with preferences oriented towards protect-
ing the nature (environmental orientation 1) reduces his water consumption is
8.94% higher than that of an immigrant whose preferences are oriented towards
economic growth. The probability that an immigrant with preferences oriented
towards protecting the nature (environmental orientation 1), or an immigrant
with social capital, contributes to an environmental organization is 5.11% and
4.75% higher, respectively, than that of an immigrant whose preferences are
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oriented towards economic growth and that of an immigrant without social
capital. The probability that an immigrant with preferences oriented towards
protecting the nature (environmental orientation 1) attends meetings or signs
petitions is 4.16% higher than that of an immigrant whose preferences are ori-
ented towards economic growth. Finally, the probability that an immigrant
who is a man, or has preferences oriented towards protecting the nature, or
has social capital, join boycotts is 9.4%, 8.58% and 8.97% higher than that of a
woman immigrant, or an immigrant with preferences oriented towards economic
growth, or an immigrant without social capital.
What about diﬀerences in pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour driven by the region of residence of immigrants? Tables 27-29 in the
Appendix suggest the following: a) the percentual change in the probability that
the willingness of immigrants who reside in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Nordic
countries, Middle East, and Oceania changes from agree to strongly agree to
pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution is 14.89%, 26.88%, 16.09%,
16.83%, 21.52%, and 6.12% higher, respectively, than that of immigrants who
reside in Africa and North America; b) the percentual change in the probability
that the willingness of immigrants who reside in Europe, Asia, Latin America,
and Middle East changes from agree to strongly agree to give part of their own
income to the environment is 8%, 14.79%, 10.8%, and 11.36% higher, respec-
tively, than that of immigrants who reside in Africa, Nordic countries, Oceania,
and North America; c) the probability that immigrants who reside in Europe
and Oceania choose products that are better for the environment is 29.31% lower
and 19.03% higher, respectively, than that of immigrants who reside in Asia,
Africa, Latin America, Nordic countries, and North America; d) the probability
that immigrants who reside in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania re-
cycle is 52.13%, 35.42% and 32.98% lower, and 17.95% higher, respectively, than
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that of immigrants who reside in Asia, Nordic countries, and North America;
e) the probability that an immigrant who resides in Oceania reduces his water
consumption is 20.16% higher than that of an immigrant who resides in any
other part of the world; f) the probability that immigrants who reside in Eu-
rope contribute to an environmental organization is 11.58% lower than that of
immigrants who reside in any other part of the world; g) the probability that an
immigrant who resides in Oceania attends meetings or signs petitions is 10.95%
higher than that of an immigrant who resides in any other part of the world;
h) the probability that immigrants who reside in Europe, Latin America, and
Middle East join boycotts is 19.05%, 18.83%, and 20.55% lower, respectively,
than that of immigrants who reside in Asia, Africa, and North America; and
i) the probability that immigrants who reside in Nordic countries and Oceania
join boycotts is 23.27% and 13.28% higher, respectively, than that of immigrants
who reside in North America, Asia, and Africa.
Now that individuals with more similiarites where compared, behavioural
diﬀerences driven by the length of residence of immigrants in the host coun-
try were minimal. Although not yet a deﬁnite statement, this indicates that
immigrants do not develop a sense of belongingness to the host country with
time. The pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour of im-
migrants are rather aﬀected by three things: a) variables that could aﬀect pro-
environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour that are not speciﬁc
to immigrant status (e.g. social capital, empowerment, and environmental ori-
entation); b) the region of origin of the immigrant (region-speciﬁc characteristics
such as the institutional framework or climate); c) and the region where immi-
grants reside (region-speciﬁc characteristics such as the institutional framework
or climate).
The next part digs deeper into the immigrants' adaptation to their new
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culture and its eﬀect on their environmental behavior controlling for variations
in the individuals' sense of belongingness or sense of place to the host country
due to their immigrant status. In particular, do immigrants accomodate to the
environmental behaviour of native-born? Do immigrants' oﬀspring still behave
like immigrants in the environmental arena, or do they deﬁnitely blend in with
native-born?
3.3 Acculturation and second generation immigrants
The acculturation process could have been studied by comparing the envi-
ronmental behaviour of native-born to that of immigrants by length of residence.
However, the inherent variation in the individuals' sense of belongingness could
provide inaccurate results. A more suitable approach would require the intro-
duction of a control group with the same cultural characteristics of immigrants,
but also that at the same time develops a sense of belongingness to the host
country under the same institutional framework of native-born. Such group is
conformed by second generation immigrants. They are those native-born whose
fathers were born abroad (Card et al [20]). To determine such status, a dichoto-
mous variable (0=no, 1=second generation immigrant) was created using the
WVS variables: Born in this country: birth country , Mother Immigrant , and
Father Immigrant .
To capture the diﬀerences in environmental behaviour produced by the adap-
tation of individuals to a new culture through time, a series of ordered probit
and probit models are carried out introducing a status variable, denominated
allgroups, which identiﬁes the individual as native-born, immigrant by length of
residence, or second generation immigrant. If second generation immigrants' be-
haviour closely resembles that of native-born, then it can be ascertained that ac-
culturation does take place completely, because despite (probably) being raised
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Figure 19: Average willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 20: Average willingness to
give part of own income for the environment
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
under a set of foreign traditions and values, the immigrants' oﬀspring has now
learned the ways of the dominant culture. But if their behaviour is more similar
to that of immigrants, specially those of short residence, then it can be sup-
ported that despite exposure to a new culture, the environmental behaviour of
immigrants is inherited to younger generations.
Figures 19-21 show that immigrants of short residence and native-born are
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Figure 21: Average willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price
if it helped to protect the environment
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
(on average) more willing to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollu-
tion than immigrants of long residence and second generation immigrants. This
is not true for their willingness to give part of their income for the environment.
In such case native-born clearly show stronger willingness, followed by immi-
grants of short residence and second generation immigrants. Immigrants of long
residence display the lowest willingness to give part of their income for the envi-
ronment. Finally, with respect to the willingness to buy things at a 20% higher
price if it helped to protect the environment, the average levels are very similar
for native-born and immigrants of short residence. Immigrants of long residence
display the lowest willingness, while that of second generation immigrants can-
not be assessed because of missing data. So far, it seems that native-born and
short residence immigrants are more willing to sacriﬁce money to save the en-
vironment than second generation and long residence immigrants, suggesting
that acculturation might not take place at least regarding pro-environmental
attitudes.
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Figure 22: Average engagement in
choosing products that are better for the environment
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 23: Average engagement in
recycling
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 24: Average engagement in
reducing water consumption
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 25: Average engagement in
contributing to an environmental organization
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
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Figure 26: Average engagement in
attending meetings or signing petitions
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
Once again, Figures 22-27 show that when we consider pro-environmental
behaviour as opposed to pro-environmental attitudes, matters change.41 Immi-
grants of long residence are the group that has engaged more on environmentally
41Unfortunately, with respect to pro-environmental behaviour, the WVS dataset only con-
tains information of second generation immigrants for the joining boycotts variable.
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Figure 27: Average engagement in
joining boycotts
native−born 2nd gen immigrants
<10 years 11−15 years
>15 years
friendly behaviours like choosing products that are better for the environment,
recycling, and reducing water consumption. They are followed by immigrants
of short residence and native-born. There are no clear behavioural diﬀerences
regarding the contribution to environmental organizations and meetings atten-
dance or petitions signing. However, in terms of joining boycotts, immigrants
of short residence show the highest engagement, followed by immigrants of long
residence, native-born and second generation immigrants.
To establish the statistical signiﬁcance of these environmental behavioural
diﬀerences, a series of ordered probit models are estimated for the pro-environmental
attitudes, while probit models are used for pro-environmental behaviours.
Tables 21-23 in the Appendix show the coeﬃcients and standard errors for
the allgroups regressor, and the number of observations in each model corre-
sponding to the Money and the Environment issues, Speciﬁc pro-environmental
behaviour, and Environmental politically related behaviour. The reference
group in the estimations is the native-born individuals. It can be observed that,
despite there are some exceptions, there are substantial diﬀerences in the pro-
environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour of individuals. With
respect to pro-environmental attitudes, there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence
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that immigrants of 11-15 years of residence in the host country have more will-
ingness to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution and to give part
of their own income to the environment. With respect to pro-environmental
behaviour: a) immigrants of less than 10 years and more than 15 years of resi-
dence in the host country show higher engagement in choosing products that are
better for the environment and in reducing water consumption; b) immigrants
of more than 15 years of residence in the host country show higher engagement
in recycling; and c) immigrants of less than 10 years of residence in the host
country show higher engagement in contributing to an environmental organi-
zation. For the case of willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price if it
helped to protect the environment, engagment in attending meetings or signing
petitions and engagement in joining boycotts, there is no statistical evidence
which suggests that there are diﬀerences between immigrants by their length of
residence and native-born.
What about the eﬀect of those (control) variables that could aﬀect the en-
vironmental attitudes and behaviour of individuals other than their immigrant
status and (if immigrant) length of residence in the host country? As it should
be expected from the past sections, some relationships were conﬁrmed and some
others were not.
Education was found to be an universal enhancer of pro-environmental at-
titudes and pro-environmental behaviour. Thus, more educated individuals are
more willing to sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment and engage
more in both speciﬁc pro-environmental behaviour and environmental politi-
cally related behaviour, regardless of their immigrant status and (if immigrant)
length of residence in the host country.
Income was also found to be an enhancer, with the exception of willingness
to give part of own income to the environment and reducing water consumption;
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in such cases, income lacks impact.
Age was found to have a negative eﬀect on pro-environmental attitudes and
a positive eﬀect on pro-environmental behaviour, with the exception of engage-
ment in reducing water consumption; in such case, age has no eﬀect. Thus,
younger individuals show stronger pro-environmental attitudes, while older in-
dividuals show stronger pro-environmental behaviour.
Gender provides mixed results: while it has no impact on the individuals'
engagement in attending meetings or signing petitions, men do show higher
engagement in contributing to an environmental organization and joining boy-
cotts, whereas women show stronger pro-environmental attitudes and more en-
gagement in choosing products that are better for the environment, recycling
and reducing water consumption.
Individuals with social capital show stronger pro-environmental attitudes
and pro-environmental behaviour, with the exception of reducing water con-
sumption, where the impact of social capital is indeed negative.
Empowered individuals also show stronger pro-environmental attitudes and
pro-environmental behaviour, with the exception of willingness to give part of
own income to the environment, for which empowerment has no inﬂuence.
In general, environmental orientation has a positive eﬀect on the individuals'
pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour: a) With respect
to economic growth vs protecting nature preferences (environmental orienta-
tion 1), there is a universal positive relationship with pro-environmental atti-
tudes and pro-environmental behaviour; b) with respect to human vs nature
stance, there is also a positive relationship with pro-environmental attitudes
and pro-environmental behaviour with three exceptions: such relationship is
negative for the case of engagement in contributing to an environmental orga-
nization and attending meetings or signing petitions, and there is no inﬂuence
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with respect to the willingness of individuals to give part of their own income
to the environment.
With respect to pro-social traits, community attachment and national iden-
tiﬁcation, results are opposite to what was expected. For the case of pro-social
traits: a) there is a negative relationship with willingness to pay higher taxes
to prevent environmental pollution and to buy things at a 20% higher price if it
helped to protect the environment; b) there is a positive relationship with en-
gagement in attending meetings or signing petitions and joining boycotts; and
c) there is no inﬂuence of pro-social traits of the individuals on their willingness
to give part of their own income to the environment and their engagement in
recycling and contributing to an environmental organization. For the case of
community attachment: a) there is a negative relationship with the individuals'
willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution and to buy
things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment, as well
as with their engagement in reducing water consumption, attending meetings
or signing petitions and joining boycotts; and b) there is no inﬂuence of the
individuals' community attachment on their willingness to give part of their
own income to the environment and their engagement in choosing products
that are better for the environment, recycling and contributing to an environ-
mental organization. Finally, for the case of national identiﬁcation: a) there is
a positive relationship with the individuals' willingness to pay higher taxes to
prevent environmental pollution and to buy things at a 20% higher price if it
helped to protect the environment, as well as with the individuals' engagement
in reducing water consumption; b) there is a negative relationship with the in-
dividuals' engagement in recycling, attending meetings or signing petitions and
joining boycotts; and c) the individuals' national identiﬁcation has no eﬀect
on their willingness to give part of their own income to the environment and
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their engagement in choosing products that are better for the environment and
contributing to an environmental organization.
Region speciﬁc eﬀects are reported with respect the same reference group:
North America. Individuals in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Nordic countries,
Middle East, and Oceania have higher willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent
environmental pollution than individuals in North America and Africa. Indi-
viduals in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Nordic countries, Middle East,
and Oceania have higher willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price if it
helped to protect the environment. Individuals in Europe, Asia, Africa, and
Latin America engage less in choosing products that are better for the environ-
ment than individuals in Nordic countries and North America; yet, individuals
in Oceania engage the most in such behaviour. Individuals in Europe, Asia,
Africa, Latin America, and Nordic countries engage less in recycling than in-
dividuals in North America and Oceania. Individuals in Europe, Africa, and
Nordic countries engage less in reducing water consumption than individuals in
Asia and North America; yet, individuals in Oceania engage the most in such
behaviour. Individuals in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Middle East engage
less in contributing to an environmental organization than individuals in North
America and Nordic countries; yet, individuals in Africa and Oceania engage the
most in such behaviour. Individuals in Europe and Asia engage less in attending
meetings or signing petitions than individuals in Africa, Latin America, Nordic
countries, Middle East, and North America; yet, individuals in Oceania engage
the most in such behaviour. Finally, individuals in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and Middle East engage less in joining boycotts than individuals in
North America; yet, individuals in Nordic countries and Oceania engage more
in such behaviour.
Once more, diﬀerences in pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
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behaviour due to the region of origin of individuals (both immigrants and native-
born) are reported with the relevant interaction dummies. There are no diﬀer-
ences in the pro-environmental attitudes of individuals and in regard to their
engagement in attending meetings or signing petitions. Individuals coming from
Europe, Asia, Africa, Nordic countries, Middle East, and Oceania engage less in
choosing products that are better for the environment than individuals coming
from North America and Latin America. Individuals coming from Europe, Asia,
Latin America, Nordic countries, and Middle East engage less in recycling than
individuals coming from Africa and North America. Individuals coming from
Latin America and Oceania engage less in reducing water consumption than
individuals coming from any other region of the world. Individuals coming from
Asia and Latin America engage less in contributing to an environmental orga-
nization than individuals coming from Europe, Africa, Nordic countries, Middle
East, Oceania and North America. Individuals coming from Asia engage less in
joining boycotts than individuals coming from any other part of the world.
What about the magnitude of the diﬀerences found in pro-environmental
attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour of individuals? Tables 30-32 in the
Appendix present the marginal eﬀects for the ordered and probit models.
Let us analyze ﬁrst the marginal eﬀects of the allgroups variable. The per-
centual change in the probability that the willingness of an immigrant of 11-15
years of residence in the host country changes from agree to strongly agree to
pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution is 7.07% higher than that
of a native-born or that of immigrants of less than 10 years and more than 15
years of residence in the host country. Likewise, the percentual change in the
probability that the willingness of an immigrant of 11-15 years of residence in
the host country changes from agree to strongly agree to give part of their own
income to the environment is 34.62% higher than that of a native-born or that of
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immigrants of less than 10 years and more than 15 years of residence in the host
country. The probability that an immigrant of less than 10 years of residence
and an immigrant of more than 15 years of residence in the host country chooses
products that are better for the environment is 10.83% and 14.7% higher, re-
spectively, than that of native-born or immigrants of 11-15 years of residence
in the host country. The probability that an immigrant of more than 15 years
of residence in the host country engages in recycling is 18.36% higher than that
of a native-born or that of immigrants of less than 15 years of residence in
the host country. The probability that immigrants of less than 10 years and
more than 15 years of residence in the host country engage in reducing water
consumption is 10.81% and 13.47%, respectively, than that of native-born and
immigrants of 11-15 years of residence in the host country. Lastly, the prob-
ability that immigrants of less than 10 years of residence in the host country
engage in contributing to an environmental organization is 7.86% higher than
that of native-born or immigrants of more than 10 years of residence in the host
country.
If the source region of the immigrants is considered, the results are: a)
the probability that immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, Nordic countries,
Middle East, and Oceania choose products that are better for the environment
is 22.14%, 22.08%, 21.84%, 11.84%, 11.84%, and 28.81% lower, respectively,
than that of immigrants from North America and Latin America; b) the prob-
ability that immigrants from Europe, Asia, Latin America, Nordic countries,
and Middle East recycle is 28.76%, 20.83%, 21.5%, 20.92%, and 20.92% lower,
respectively, than that of immigrants from Africa and North America; c) the
probability that immigrants from Latin America and Oceania reduce their water
consumption is 13.33% and 25.27% lower, respectively, than that of immigrants
from any other region of the world; d) the probability that immigrants from
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Asia and Latin America contribute to an environmental organization is 10.24%
and 12.88% lower, respectively, than that of immigrants from any other region
of the world; and e) the probability that immigrants from Asia join boycotts is
13.63% lower than that of immigrants from any other region of the world.
What control variables have the greatest impact on pro-environmental at-
titudes and pro-environmental behaviour? The percentual change in the prob-
ability that the willingness of an individual with preferences oriented towards
protecting the nature (environmental orientation 1) changes from agree to
strongly agree to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution is 11.13%
higher than that of individuals with preferences oriented towards economic
growth. The same probability is 4.8% and 7.3% higher for the willingness to
give part of own income to the environment and to buy things at a 20% higher
price if it helped to protect the environment, respectively. The probability that
an individual with preferences oriented towards protecting the nature (envi-
ronmental orientation 1) chooses products that are better for the environment,
recycles, reduces water consumption, contributes to an environmental organi-
zation, attends meetings or signs petitions and join boycotts is 10.15%, 9.67%,
7.67%, 3.87%, 4.16%, and 1.81% higher, respectively, than that of individuals
with preferences oriented towards economic growth.42
With respect to diﬀerences in pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour driven by the region of residence of the individuals, results suggest the
following: a) the percentual change in the probability that the willingness of an
individual who resides in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Nordic countries, Middle
East and Oceania changes from agree to strongly agree to pay higher taxes to
prevent environmental pollution is 7.75%, 11.92%, 9.05%, 8.58%, 19.07%, and
42Trust and gender have a greater marginal eﬀect for the join boycotts variable. A man has
a 9.32% higher probability to join a boycott than a woman, whereas an individual with social
capital has 9.17% higher probability to join a boycott than an individual who does not trust
others.
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2.97% higher, respectively, than that of an individual who resides in Africa or
North America; b) the percentual change in the probability that the willingness
of an individual who resides in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Nordic
countries, Middle East, and Oceania changes from agree to strongly agree to
buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the environment is
7.03%, 8.47%, 3%, 8.49%, 2.36%, 16.96%, and 3.01% higher, respectively, than
that of an individual who resides in North America; c) the probability that
an individual who resides in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania
chooses products that are better for the environment is 32.06%, 28.01%, 23.93%,
19.97%, and 9.63% lower, respectively, than that of an individual who resides in
Nordic countries or North America; d) the probability that an individual who
resides in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Nordic countries recycles is
58.35%, 50.31%, 50.63%, 49.42%, and 7.72% lower, respectively, than that of an
individual who resides in Oceania or North America; e) the probability that an
individual who resides in Europe, Africa, and Nordic countries reduces his water
consumption is 6.86%, 5.79%, and 21.37% lower, respectively, than that of an
individual who resides in Asia and North America, but it is 2.89% and 15.46%
higher, respectively, if the individual resides in Latin America or Oceania; f)
the probability that an individual who resides in Europe, Asia, Latin Amer-
ica, and Middle East contributes to an environmental organization is 12.44%,
4.59%, 5.32%, and 4.89% lower, respectively, than that of an individual who
resides in Nordic countries or North America, but it is 5.48% and 2.25% higher,
respectively, if the individual resides in Africa or Oceania; g) the probability
that an individual who resides in Europe and Asia attends a meetings or signs
a petition is 7.54% and 4.39% lower, respectively, than that of an individual
who resides in Africa, Latin America, Nordic countries, Middle East and North
America, but it is 9.81% higher if the individual resides in Oceania; and h)
163
the probability that an individual who resides in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and Middle East joins a boycott is 27.42%, 10.75%, 17.74%, 34.99%,
and 28.4% lower, respectively, than that of an individual who resides in North
America, but it is 12.68% and 5.04% higher if the individual resides in Nordic
countries or Oceania, respectively.
There is statistically signiﬁcant evidence that there is no acculturation pro-
cess regarding pro-environmental attitudes. The exception to this claim is the
individuals' willingness to give part of their own income to the environment,
but the relatively low number of observations might inﬂuence such result.43
With respect to pro-environmental behaviour a general claim cannot be made.
There is statistically signiﬁcant evidence that there is an acculturation process
regarding the individuals' engagement in reducing water consumption, attend-
ing meetings or signing petitions, and join boycotts. However, there is no such
evidence for the individuals' engagement in choosing products that are better
for the environment, recycling, and contributing to an environmental organiza-
tion. The next section discusses the ﬁndings of the chapter and elaborates on
its policy implications.
4. Discussion
This study is the ﬁrst worldwide exploration of immigrant/native-born en-
vironmental behaviour diﬀerences. The objective is multiple. First, it seeks
to shed light on the debate about whether governments of recipient countries
should be threatened by immigration on environmental grounds. Second, it
43The number of observations is 448. The other two variables of pro-environmental attitudes
have 36681 and 36640 observations.
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provides quantitative measures about environmental behaviour diﬀerences be-
tween immigrants and native-born and between immigrants by their length of
residence. Third, it studies whether the environmental behaviour of immigrants
converges through time to that of native-born because of an environmental
acculturation process. And ﬁnally, it discusses whether the origin of the be-
havioural discrepancies accomodates to well known hypothesis in the literature.
Using data from the WVS dataset, variations across willingness to perform and
actual engagement on environmentally friendly behaviours are analyzed.
In general, there are no immigrant/native-born diﬀerences regarding pro-
environmental attitudes, but there are diﬀerences regarding pro-environmental
behaviour. Immigrants engage more in choosing products that are better for the
environment, recycling, and reducing water consumption. In turn, native-born
do not have a single stronger pro-environmental attitude or pro-environmental
behaviour. If diﬀerences between immigrants by their length of residence are
considered, then there are diﬀerences between immigrants regarding pro-environmental
attitudes: immigrants of 11-15 years of residence in the host country show
stronger pro-environmental attitudes than immigrants with less and more years
of residence. Of those immigrants who engage more than native-born on choos-
ing products that are better for the environment and recycling, it is immigrants
of less than 10 years and more than 15 years of residence in the host country
who engage more on the former, and it is immigrants of more than 15 years of
residence who engage more on the latter.
If region speciﬁc eﬀects are taken into account, individuals who reside out-
side North America show stronger pro-environmental attitudes, but weaker pro-
environmental behaviour. Yet, individuals who reside in Oceania display the
strongest pro-environmental behaviour of any region of the world. This claim
is valid for both native-born and immigrants, even accounting for diﬀerences in
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length of residence in the host country.
If the source region of immigrants is considered, no diﬀerences in pro-environmental
attitudes are recorded. Of those three pro-environmental actions for which im-
migrants show more engagement than native-born, i.e. a) choosing products
that are better for the environment; b) recycling; and c) reducing water con-
sumption: European immigrants engage less in a) and b) than immigrants from
any other region of the world; and immigrants from Latin America and Ocea-
nia engage less in reducing water consumption than immigrants from any other
region of the world.
In terms of the magnitude of probability divergence in immigrant/native-
born environmental behaviour, the diﬀerentials are of similar magnitude: 12.42%,
13.21%, and 15.83% for reducing water consumption, choosing products that are
better for the environment, and recycling. The magnitude of probability diver-
gence between immigrants by their length of residence in the host country is
starker: 19.41% for choosing products that are better for the environment. Fi-
nally, when all the groups are considered, the magnitudes increase: 18.36% for
immigrants of more than 15 years of residence in the host country with respect
to recycling, and up to 34.62% for immigrants of 11-15 years of residence in
the host country with respect to paying higher taxes to prevent environmental
pollution.
Because of these persistent environmental behavioural diﬀerences between
immigrants and native-born and within immigrants by their length of residence,
the results of this study discredit the NEP. Individuals have the same attitudes
and behaviour regarding their willingness to give part of their own income to the
environment, and regarding their engagement in contributing to an environmen-
tal organization and joining boycotts. When only immigrants and native-born
are considered, the results suggest the validity of the PMH through selective im-
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migration (as in Pﬀefer and Mayone Stycos [68]) for those engagement-related
environmentally friendly behaviours. On average, immigrants have higher in-
come and are more educated than native-born, and given that environmental
behaviours such as recycling and choosing products that are better for the envi-
ronment could entail costs for the individuals, it seems reasonable that those who
can aﬀord and are more aware of the beneﬁts of carrying out such behaviours
end up engaging more in them.
While it is true that immigrants are more educated and have a higher in-
come level than native-born, and there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence that
education and income have a positive inﬂuence on pro-environmental attitudes
and pro-environmental behaviour, the PMH can be supported only partially.
The reason is that not only education and income diﬀerences explain the envi-
ronmental behaviour discrepancies between native-born and immigrants. Other
variables like environmental orientation, empowerment, social capital, gender,
and age inﬂuence both native-born and immigrants' environmental attitudes
and behaviour. An alternative explanation that cannot be tested with the data
provided by the WVS is that the environmental behaviour of immigrants obeys
to a strategy that seeks to increase their level of integration into the native-born
society. This would explain why immigrants of very short residence (i.e. less
than 10 years) in the host country show high engagement in choosing products
that are better for the environment and in contributing to an environmental
organization.
The hypothesis that immigrants might display strong environmental be-
haviour due to previous exposure to environmental problems that sensitized
and increased their environmental concern could not be tested. Data for the
environmental awareness of individuals (local and global environmental prob-
lems) were only available for 3 out of the 9 environmentally friendly behaviours
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analyzed. The variable was dropped out, not only because there was virtually
no diﬀerence in the environmental awareness of individuals regarding local and
global environmental problems, but also because including it in the models pro-
duced no observations. Furthermore, there is no information about such variable
before and after immigration took place. However, if it is considered that only 1
out of 10 immigrants in the sample come from Latin America and Africa (places
where exposure to environmental problems might be more common, e.g. water
shortage that might sensitize an individual to reduce his water consumption),
it seems safe to rule out such hypothesis as the origin of immigrant/native-born
environmental behaviour diﬀerences.
It becomes clear that by rejecting the NEP in one pro-environmental at-
titude and two pro-environmental behaviours, there is room for environmental
policy to promote an attitudinal and behavioural change of both native-born and
immigrants for such actions. In particular, given that there are behavioural dis-
crepancies, environmental policies should be grouped-targeted and behaviour-
speciﬁc as opposed to being implemented with a general design. Moreover, an
interesting challenge for policymakers is to transform the high willingness of
immigrants of 11-15 years of residence in the host country to sacriﬁce money in
order to save the environment into actual engagement (value-action gap).44
More importantly, the results indicate that the negative connotation at-
tached to immigrants, at least on environmental grounds, is not well-founded.
Immigrants of diﬀerent length of residence in the host country engage more in
pro-environmental behaviour than native-born, even when variations in sense
of place solely due to immigrant status are controlled for. While it is true that
immigrants do not engage more than native-born in environmental politically
related behaviour, they engage as much as the latter in such behaviour, they
overpass native-born in engagement of certain pro-environmental actions, and
44For more on the value-action gap see Blake [8].
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they tend to be at least as willing as native-born to sacriﬁce money in order
to save the environment. Hence, no waste generation, pollution and excessive
water consumption as predicted by Malthusians is to be expected from immi-
grants, at least not in excess to that generated by native-born. In that respect,
there is no valid environmental protection argument to maintain immigration
restrictive policies.
What happened with the relationship between the variables used as con-
trols and the individuals' environmental behaviour? The ordered probit and
probit models conﬁrmed: a) more educated individuals display stronger pro-
environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour. But when only im-
migrants by their length of residence are considered, education has little ef-
fect on their pro-environmental behaviour; b) with some exceptions, individu-
als with higher income display stronger pro-environmental attitudes and pro-
environmental behaviour; in particular, it seems that the level of income of
native-born and immigrants does not inﬂuence their willingness to give part of
own income to the environment and their engagement in reducing water con-
sumption; c) younger individuals are more willing to sacriﬁce money in order
to save the environment, but older individuals show stronger pro-environmental
behaviour; d) in general, women seem to have stronger pro-environmental at-
titudes and pro-environmental behaviour. However, no gender shows more
engagement in attending meetings or signing petitions, and men show more
engagement in contributing to an environmental organization and joining boy-
cotts; e) individuals with social capital display stronger pro-environmental at-
titudes and pro-environmental behaviour, with the exception of reducing wa-
ter consumption where trusting others has no inﬂuence. Furthermore, social
capital has less inﬂuence on the environmental attitudes and behaviour of im-
migrants; f) more empowered individuals show stronger pro-environmental at-
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titudes and pro-environmental behaviour. But the impact is not extended to
immigrants by their length of residence; g) more environmentally oriented in-
dividuals have stronger pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental be-
haviour. In particular, the eﬀect is stronger if their preferences are closer to
protecting the nature than to economic growth; h) individuals with more
pro-social traits do not necessarily have stronger pro-environmental attitudes
and pro-environmental behaviour; i) individuals who identify more with their
nationality do not necessarily have stronger pro-environmental attitudes and
pro-environmental behaviour; and j) individuals with more attachment to their
community display weaker pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental
behaviour than those who do not possess such attachment.
While the results of national identiﬁcation and community attachment seem
counterintuitive, a potential explanation can be found in Lima and Castro [53].
They sustain that individuals might try to protect their identity by denying
environmental problems in their community because what is ours is best. So,
individuals might try to negate such problems as a defence mechanism and avoid
to engage in pro-environmental behaviours.
The control variable with stronger inﬂuence on the pro-environmental atti-
tudes and pro-environmental behaviour of both native-born and immigrants of
any length of residence is their environmental orientation. Speciﬁcally, the fact
that their preferences are oriented towards protecting the nature as opposed to
economic growth increase the probability of engagement in pro-environmental
behaviour from 1.81% (in the case of join boycotts), to 17.31% (in the case of
recycling).
How do the results of the present chapter compare to those of previous
research? The result that immigrants engage more on pro-environmental be-
haviour than native-born is in line with Hunter [44] and Pﬀefer and Mayone
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Stycos [68], particularly with respect to recycling and reduction of water con-
sumption, respectively. However, the results do not support Pfeﬀer and Mayone
Stycos' [68] ﬁnding that native-born engage more than immigrants on environ-
mental politically related behaviours; there is no statistically signiﬁcant evidence
that there are diﬀerences in the native-born and immigrants' engagement in at-
tending meetings or signing petitions and joining boycotts. With respect to
the impact of acculturation, the results support the verdict of Hunter [44] that
long residence immigrants behave as native-born regarding environmental polit-
ically related behaviours like attending meetings or petitions signing, and also
support the conclusion of Mukherji [59] that there are behavioural discrepancies
between immigrants with diﬀerent levels of acculturation regarding recycling ac-
tivities. The results do not support the acculturation argument with respect to
pro-environmental attitudes. But with respect to pro-environmental behaviour,
there is an acculturation process regarding the immigrants' engagement in re-
ducing water consumption, attending meetings or signing petitions, and join
boycotts. Thus, the acculturation hypothesis is partially supported.
Finally, it has been acknowledged that the use of dichotomous variables for
engagement in pro-environmental behaviour might overestimate such engage-
ment for both native-born and immigrants. It was also acknowledged that the
proﬁle of immigrants surveyed by the WVS could have biased the results, also
overestimating the engagement of immigrants in pro-environmental behaviour.
Yet, there is no other dataset which can be used as an alternative to analyze
the questions addressed by this chapter. So, the results provided and the policy
recomendations should be considered as a ﬁrst approach on the subject, and as
a recommendation for the WVS survey methodology so as to consider in future
waves a wider spectrum of individuals.
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Conclusion
Immigrants have been traditionally regarded as a burden to the host country
in a wide variety of issues. Yet, such negative connotation seems to be politically
charged insofar as there is strong evidence that their ﬂow into host countries
do not necessarily entail negative impacts. That is also true with respect to
environmental degradation issues.
This chapter analyzed a sample of the World Values Survey dataset and
showed the New Environmental Paradigm predictions do not hold inasmuch as
there are robust diﬀerences in immigrant/native-born environmental behaviour.
In that respect, claims that maintain immigration into an environmentally un-
friendly society such as the U.S. would increase environmental degradation are
not supported by the empirical results. Since immigrants display higher engage-
ment in environmentally friendly behaviours such as choosing better products
for the environment, recycling, and reducing water consumption, a greater ﬂow
of immigrants into the host country might actually have a positive impact on
the protection of the environment. In fact, while residents in North America
do have weaker pro-environmental attitudes if compared to residents from any
other region of the world, North American native-born and resident immigrants
engage more in pro-environmental action.
Although it cannot be fully discarded, the results do not suggest that immi-
grants display stronger engagement in pro-environmental behaviour than native-
born because of higher environmental awareness produced by previous exposure
to environmental problems in their source countries. They do not suggest either
that the individuals' community attachment and national identiﬁcation (i.e.
their sense of belongingness or sense of place) explain diﬀerences in envi-
ronmental behaviour. Rather, they suggest that a modiﬁed Post-Materialistic
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Hypothesis holds. A certain proﬁle of immigrant engages more than native-born
in pro-environmental behaviour: educated and of relatively high income, mostly
not from Europe, Latin America or Oceania, with preferences oriented towards
protecting nature as opposed to economic growth, who are also relatively old
and women, empowered and with social capital.
The policy implications are straightforward: restrictive immigration policies
should not be based on threats of negative environmental impacts for the host
country; and national environmental policy should be group-targeted, given
that native-born and short and long residence immigrants do not have the same
probability to actually engage or display willingness to perform an environmen-
tally friendly behaviour. However, there biggest challenge for the policymaker
is to transform the native-born and immigrants' willingness to sacriﬁce money
in order to save the environment into actual engagement.
There is ample room for further research in the topic. First, the results of
this chapter are driven by a dataset which considers highly educated and high
income immigrants. Thus, further research with a dataset which includes more
information about low-skilled immigrants could be conducted. Second, although
the present work controls the inﬂuence that the region source of the immigrant
has on his pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour, an ex-
tension to this chapter might try to establish if the results would hold controlling
for the source country of immigrants. Is there an inﬂuence on the immigrant's
environmental behaviour driven by speciﬁc cultural traits? If so, immigration
policy based on environmental impacts would likely become country-selective.
Third, the analysis of the individuals' development of a sense of belongingness
or sense of place for the host country will provide a better understanding of
why an environmental acculturation process does not take place. Finally, the
environmental behaviour of second generation immigrants deserves attention.
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Unfortunately, the WVS dataset does not contain enough information to carry
it out at the moment. But their apparent weak environmental behaviour raises
some questions: is it related to the fact they simultaneously do not identify
either with their immigrant parents' culture or the host country's culture? A
careful analysis of such topic is determinant to assess the long-run eﬀects of
immigration on the host country's environment.
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Appendix
I.
Table 1: Proportion of individuals by Environmental Behaviour
and by Region of the World.
Environmental Behaviour countries individuals Africa Asia Europe Latin America
Willingness to pay higher taxes 79 189379 14.21% 22.15% 30.11% 18.63%
Willingness to give part of own income 67 118467 18.84% 25.04% 23.53% 17.63%
Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price 51 66395 6.93% 18.23% 42.22% 16.98%
Choose better products for the environment 46 58600 7.92% 20.53% 39.94% 17.19%
Recycle 46 60189 7.83% 20.53% 38.43% 18.97%
Reduce water consumption 49 65749 7.19% 18.93% 43.3% 17.47%
Contribute to environmental organization 51 69392 6.77% 17.8% 41.44% 18.97%
Attend meetings or sign petitions 50 69554 6.78% 17.74% 41.5% 18.94%
Join boycotts 83 217367 17.41% 19.04% 27.78% 19.41%
Average 58 101677 10.43% 19.98% 36.47% 18.24%
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Environmental Behaviour countries individuals Middle East Nordic countries Oceania North America
Willingness to pay higher taxes 79 189379 4.19% 3.73% 2.82% 4.15%
Willingness to give part of own income 67 118467 4.32% 3.39% 1.87% 5.38%
Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price 51 66395 2.77% 4.61% 6.04% 2.22%
Choose better products for the environment 46 58600 0% 5.19% 6.69% 2.53%
Recycle 46 60189 0% 5.13% 6.74% 2.54%
Reduce water consumption 49 65749 0% 4.67% 6.12% 2.31%
Contribute to environmental organization 51 69392 2.71% 4.41% 5.73% 2.17%
Attend meetings or sign petitions 50 69554 2.70% 4.42% 5.74% 2.18%
Join boycotts 83 217367 6.14% 3.67% 2.96% 3.6%
Average 58 101677 2.54% 4.36% 4.97% 3.01%
Table 2: Proportion of individuals by Environmental Behaviour
and by Level of Income of Country.
Environmental Behaviour countries individuals Level of Income
1 2 3 4
Willingness to pay higher taxes 79 189379 7.45% 22.62% 37.89% 32.05%
Willingness to give part of own income 67 118467 10.75% 24.26% 33.27% 31.71%
Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price 51 66395 2.07% 21.31% 40.89% 35.73%
Choose better products for the environment 46 58600 2.27% 16.68% 42.87% 38.18%
Recycle 46 60189 2.25% 18.47% 41.3% 38%
Reduce water consumption 49 65749 2.19% 22.47% 40.35% 34.99%
Contribute to environmental organization 51 69392 2% 19.48% 45.38% 33.15%
Attend meetings or sign petitions 50 69554 2% 19.49% 45.36% 33.15%
Join boycotts 83 217367 6.54% 23.24% 40.2% 30.01%
Average 58 101677 4.17% 20.89% 40.83% 34.11%
The income level of the country corresponds to the World Bank classiﬁcation.
Table 3: Distribution and origin of native-born and immigrants.
WVS dataset years 1989-2007.
Born in this country: birth country
Frequency % of total % within immigrants
Yes 77130 94.11% -
Immigrants 4830 5.89% -
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Born in this country: birth country
Latin America 415 0.51% 8.59%
USA/Canada 195 0.24% 4.04%
Asian 1159 1.41% 24%
Europe 2114 2.58% 43.77%
African 110 0.13% 2.28%
Other 750 0.92% 1.8%
Oceania 87 0.11% 15.53%
Total 81960 100% 100%
Table 4: Source and Host Region of immigrants (Frequencies).
Source Region
Host Region Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
Latin America 144 94 17 85 0 34 11
North America 94 29 124 185 28 5 18
Asia 47 8 24 231 0 1 8
Europe 64 8 846 1119 6 0 409
Africa 20 11 6 55 42 1 11
Oceania 5 30 116 308 22 44 286
Other 41 15 26 131 12 2 7
Table 5: Where do indivdiduals migrate? Number and Percentage
of Immigrants to Countries by Level of Income.
Level of income of host country # of immigrants % of immigrants # of countries % of countries
1 0 0% 0 0%
2 830 17.18% 9 18.75%
3 1413 29.25% 20 41.67%
4 2587 53.56% 19 39.58%
Total 4830 100% 48 100%
The income level of the country corresponds to the World Bank classiﬁcation.
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Table 6: Where do individuals come from? Number and Percentage
of Immigrants to Countries by Level of Income.
Level of income of source country Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 5 3 1 0 0
3 8 0 1 9 1 0 1
4 1 2 2 9 0 2 3
Total 9 2 8 21 2 2 4
% of immigrants by region 8.59% 4.04% 24% 43.77% 2.28% 1.8% 1.53%
The income level of the country corresponds to the World Bank classiﬁcation.
Table 7: Environmental Behaviour by Region of the World.
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Environmental Behaviour Region of the world
Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
Willingness to strongly agree 17.08% 22.34% 15.16% 16.49% 21.57% 17.33% 15.51%
pay agree 44.9% 56.38% 47.46% 44.51% 40.2% 37.33% 47.78%
higher taxes disagree 24.79% 16.49% 29.28% 29.11% 29.41% 36% 23.96%
strongly disagree 13.22% 4.79% 8.1% 9.89% 8.82% 9.33% 12.74%
Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
Willingness to strongly agree 25% 33.33% 17.02% 14.23% 25.71% 13.64% 18.57%
give part of agree 51.04% 41.67% 63.12% 50.21% 48.57% 31.82% 48.93%
own income disagree 16.67% 16.67% 17.73% 25.94% 22.86% 36.36% 21.43%
strongly disagree 7.29% 8.33% 2.13% 9.62% 2.86% 18.18% 11.07%
Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
Willingness to strongly agree 10.42% 13.33% 9.09% 9.02% 11.69% 8.57% 8.62%
buy things at agree 38.33% 47.33% 34.31% 35.2% 35.06% 35.71% 41.38%
a 20% higher price disagree 33.33% 28.67% 45.89% 43.35% 35.06% 38.57% 36.64%
strongly disagree 17.92% 10.67% 10.71% 12.44% 18.18% 17.14% 13.36%
Choose better Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
products for have not 45.99% 28.48% 60.48% 50.48% 41.67% 30.99% 33.96%
the environment have engaged 54.01% 71.52% 39.52% 49.52% 58.33% 69.01% 66.04%
Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
Recycle have not 41.98% 28.39% 55.01% 47.29% 36.36% 28.77% 28.48%
have engaged 58.02% 71.61% 44.99% 52.71% 63.64% 71.23% 71.52%
Reduce Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
water have not 47.33% 33.12% 43.69% 43.51% 29.87% 43.66% 34.44%
consumption have engaged 52.67% 66.88% 56.31% 56.49% 70.13% 56.34% 65.56%
Contribute to Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
an environmental have not 87.8% 71.34% 92.3% 86.66% 72.73% 77.27% 78.49%
organization have engaged 12.2% 28.66% 7.7% 13.34% 27.27% 22.73% 21.51%
Attend meetings Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
or have not 84.9% 77.56% 92.02% 88.18% 77.03% 76.39% 76.55%
sign petitions have engaged 15.1% 22.44% 7.98% 11.82% 22.97% 23.61% 23.45%
Latin America North America Asia Europe Africa Oceania Other
Join boycotts have not 60.17% 47.28% 63.64% 58.05% 41.58% 57.14% 40.23%
have engaged 39.83% 52.72% 36.36% 41.95% 58.42% 42.86% 59.77%
Table 8: Immigrant and Native-born perceptions about Local
Environmental Problems.
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Local Environmental Problems Global Environmental Problems
Poor water quality Global warming and GHE
N-B I N-B I N-B I N-B I
# % # %
Very serious 715 162 25.98% 26.73% Very serious 1680 381 61.86% 63.5%
Somewhat serious 470 90 17.08% 14.85% Somewhat serious 842 167 31% 27.83%
Not very serious 615 159 22.35% 26.24% Not very serious 169 40 6.22% 6.67%
Not at all serious 952 195 34.59% 32.18% Not at all serious 25 12 0.92% 2%
Total 2752 606 Total 2716 600
Poor air quality Plant and animal loss
N-B I N-B I N-B I N-B I
# % # %
Very serious 700 180 25.34% 29.51% Very serious 1534 355 56.11% 58.29%
Somewhat serious 640 144 23.17% 23.61% Somewhat serious 975 204 35.66% 33.5%
Not very serious 727 165 26.32% 27.05% Not very serious 207 43 7.57% 7.06%
Not at all serious 695 121 25.16% 19.84% Not at all serious 18 7 0.66% 1.15%
Total 2762 610 Total 2734 609
Poor sewage and sanitation Pollution of rivers, lakes, and oceans
N-B I N-B I N-B I N-B I
# % # %
Very serious 584 133 21.49% 22.89% Very serious 2046 471 74.13% 76.96%
Somewhat serious 460 95 16.92% 16.35% Somewhat serious 650 122 23.55% 19.93%
Not very serious 662 143 24.36% 24.61% Not very serious 59 16 2.14% 2.61%
Not at all serious 1012 210 37.23% 36.14% Not at all serious 5 3 0.18% 0.49%
Total 2718 581 Total 2760 612
II.
An ordered logit model could have been used to estimate the three 4-item
likert scale dependent variables: willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent envi-
ronmental pollution; willingness to give part of own income to the environment ;
and willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price if it helped to protect the
environment. However, to establish that the ordered logit estimation is appropi-
ate, the proportional odds assumption must hold. Thereby, a Brant test was
performed in STATA. The results are:
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Table 9: Brant test (Willingness to pay higher taxes).
Estimated coeﬃcients from j-1 binary regressions
y>1 y>2 y>3
immigrant status .14917714 .0352456 .03651484
constant 1.4751824 -.54536426 -2.2401387
Brant test parallel regression assumption
Variable chi 2 p>chi 2 df
All 7.25 0.027 2
immigrant status 7.25 0.027 2
Table 10: Brant test (Willingness to give part of own income).
Estimated coeﬃcients from j-1 binary regressions
y>1 y>2 y>3
immigrant status .51868439 .23050007 .18878759
constant .95055123 -1.0666184 -2.568848
Brant test of parallel regression assumption
Variable chi 2 p>chi 2 df
All 8.99 0.011 2
immigrant status 8.99 0.011 2
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Table 11: Brant test (Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price).
Estimated coeﬃcients from j-1 binary regressions
y>1 y>2 y>3
immigrant status .21050834 .05937442 -.02017714
constant 2.0677841 .11204785 -1.9154548
Brant test of parallel regression assumption
Variable chi 2 p>chi 2 df
All 10.62 0.005 2
immigrant status 10.62 0.005 2
A signiﬁcant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression as-
sumption has been violated. Thus, since p<0.05 in all three cases, the propor-
tional odds assumption is not met and the ordered probit estimation is then
appropiate.
III.
Table 12: Environmentally friendly behaviours. WVS dataset years
1989-2007, Dependent Variables used in the regressions.
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Environmental Behaviour Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Willingness to pay higher taxes
I 2.30 .861 1 4 4526
N-B 2.27 .874 1 4 71671
Willingness to give part of own income
I 2.20 .839 1 4 850
N-B 2.04 .863 1 4 14388
Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price
I 2.57 .826 1 4 3766
N-B 2.54 .854 1 4 56392
Choose better products for the environment
I .51 .499 0 1 50554
N-B .47 .499 0 1 3213
Recycle
I .55 .496 0 1 3106
N-B .47 .499 0 1 50979
Reduce water consumption
I .57 .493 0 1 3781
N-B .49 .499 0 1 55590
Contribute to environmental organization
I .13 .345 0 1 3846
N-B .14 .347 0 1 57467
Attend meetings or sign petitions
I .13 .339 0 1 3858
N-B .12 .333 0 1 57603
Join boycotts
I .44 .496 0 1 4493
N-B .41 .493 0 1 66643
• The scale for the willingness items is 1-4 where 1 is strongly agree,
i.e. stronger pro-environmental behaviour and 4 is strongly disagree, i.e.
weaker pro-environmental behaviour.
• The scale for the actual engagement items is 0-1 where 0 is no en-
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gagement in pro-environmental behaviour and 1 is engagement in pro-
environmental behaviour.
• Immigrant status: I=immigrant, N-B=native-born.
Table 13: Variables that affect environmental behaviour. WVS
dataset years 1989-2007, Controls used in the regressions.
Control Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Education
N-B 4.60 2.23 1 8 68264
I 5.20 2.20 1 8 4668
Income
N-B 4.41 2.54 1 10 67070
I 4.96 2.71 1 10 4239
Age
N-B 40.78 15.96 15 95 76968
I 46.55 16.43 15 92 4802
Gender
N-B .51 .49 0 1 77058
I .53 .49 0 1 4820
C. Attachment
N-B .38 .48 0 1 72446
I .32 .46 0 1 4058
Orientation 1
N-B .55 .49 0 1 53477
I .57 .49 0 1 3926
Orientation 2
N-B .83 .37 0 1 58167
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Control Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
I .87 .32 0 1 3795
Trust
N-B .27 .44 0 1 73801
I .31 .46 0 1 4656
Nat Identiﬁcation
N-B .86 .34 0 1 74827
I .78 .41 0 1 3611
Empowerment
N-B .66 .47 0 1 72877
I .64 .47 0 1 4638
Pro-social traits
N-B .46 .49 0 1 74405
I .44 .49 0 1 4680
• Immigrant status: I=immigrant, N-B=native-born.
• On average, immigrants: have attained a higher level of education than
native-born; enjoy higher income than native-born; are approximately six
years older than native-born; have a slightly higher women-to-men ratio
than native-born; are less attached to their community than native-born;
have a slightly stronger preference to protect the environment over eco-
nomic growth than native-born; agree that humans should coexist with
nature more than native-born; believe they can trust in other people more
than native-born; are less proud about their nationality than native-born;
are slightly less empowered than native-born; and are less pro-social than
native-born.
Table 14: Correlation matrix of all Explanatory Variables.
194
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
In
c
o
m
e
A
g
e
G
e
n
d
e
r
C
.
A
tt
a
c
h
m
e
n
t
O
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
1
O
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
2
T
ru
s
t
N
a
t
Id
e
n
ti
ﬁ
c
a
ti
o
n
E
m
p
o
w
e
rm
e
n
t
P
ro
-s
o
c
ia
l
tr
a
it
s
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
1
.0
0
0
In
c
o
m
e
0
.3
1
1
1
.0
0
0
A
g
e
-0
.2
0
4
-0
.0
6
8
1
.0
0
0
G
e
n
d
e
r
-0
.0
3
0
-0
.0
4
7
-0
.0
1
2
1
.0
0
0
C
.
A
tt
a
c
h
m
e
n
t
-0
.0
5
3
-0
.0
2
6
0
.0
3
5
0
.0
2
4
1
.0
0
0
O
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
1
0
.0
9
2
0
.0
5
7
-0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
2
4
1
.0
0
0
O
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
2
0
.0
5
8
0
.0
4
7
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
1
4
0
.0
7
2
1
.0
0
0
T
ru
s
t
0
.0
6
9
0
.1
0
6
0
.0
3
6
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
6
4
-0
.0
1
1
1
.0
0
0
N
a
t
Id
e
n
ti
ﬁ
c
a
ti
o
n
-0
.0
6
3
-0
.0
4
5
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
2
5
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
0
2
1
.0
0
0
E
m
p
o
w
e
rm
e
n
t
0
.1
0
0
0
.1
2
8
-0
.0
3
3
-0
.0
3
0
-0
.0
2
8
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
5
1
0
.0
5
8
0
.0
7
1
1
.0
0
0
P
ro
-s
o
c
ia
l
tr
a
it
s
-0
.1
2
7
-0
.0
8
6
0
.0
4
8
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
3
5
-0
.0
1
0
0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
8
7
1
.0
0
0
195
V.
Table 15: Money and the Environment. Ordered Probit estimations
for immigrant status. Dependent variable is WILLINGNESS to perform an
environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Pay higher taxes Give part of own income Buy things 20% higher price
immigrant status -.1884 .1179 -1.0142 .7926 -.1287 .1169
education -.0304*** .0028 -.1144*** .0436 -.0168*** .0028
income -.0118*** .0023 -.0119 .0219 -.0134*** .0023
age .0107*** .0019 .0367* .0220 .0060*** .0019
age2 -.0001*** .0000 -.0004* .0002 -.0000** .0000
gender -.0560*** .0113 -.3378*** .1085 -.0576*** .0113
c attachment .0292** .0118 .1373 .1292 .0426*** .0118
orientation 1 -.4122*** .0116 -.5728*** .1201 -.3794*** .0116
orientation 2 -.0375** .0157 -.0256 .2217 -0.4641*** .0157
trust -.0794*** .0133 -.1818* .1108 -.0738*** .0133
nat identiﬁcation -.1575*** .0170 .1996 .3604 -.1392*** .0171
empowerment -.0641*** .0126 .1222 .1925 -.0917*** .0126
pro social .0775*** .0115 -.1589 .1075 .0672*** .0115
Europe -.2863*** .0351 0 (omitted) -.3623*** .0353
Asia -.4422*** .0408 0 (omitted) -.4390*** .0409
Africa -.0266 .0394 0 (omitted) -.1546*** .0396
Latin America -.3340*** .0366 0 (omitted) -.4384*** .0368
Nordic Country -.3174*** .0403 0 (omitted) -.1212*** .0404
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Middle East -.7063*** .0447 0 (omitted) -.8793*** .0447
Oceania -.1090*** .0409 0 (omitted) -.1551*** .0411
Europe imm .1900 .1235 .7819 .8079 .1796 .1226
Asia imm .1805 .1277 .6356 .8483 .1642 .1269
Africa imm .2789 .2007 1.0624 .9157 .2166 .1977
Latin imm .1483 .1613 0 (omitted) .0230 .1598
Other imm .1931 .1356 1.4698 .9314 .0329 .1346
Oceania imm .1388 .2231 .8762 .9618 .0644 .2247
Wave 2 0 (ommitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 -.3392*** .0553 0 (omitted) -.2741*** .0559
Wave 4 0 (ommited) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (ommited) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs Lr chi2(27) # obs Lr chi2(18) # obs Lr chi2(27)
36381 2680.04 448 65.09 36509 2490.09
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.0294 0.0000 0.0630 0.0000 0.0275
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for immigrant status variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
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• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 16: Specific pro-environmental Behaviour. Probit estimations
for immigrant status. Dependent variable is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an
environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Consume better products Recycle Reduce water consumption Contribute to environmental org
immigrant status .3350** .1523 .4060*** .1556 .3181** .1457 .1708 .1476
education .0286*** .0036 .0318*** .0037 .0250*** .0034 .0544*** .0041
income .0594*** .0030 .0415*** .0031 .0017 .0028 .0384*** .0034
age .0282*** .0025 .0168*** .0026 .0216*** .0023 .0109*** .0029
age2 -.0002*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000
gender .1956*** .0146 .1235*** .0149 .1169*** .0135 -.0388** .0166
c attachment -.0219 .0152 .0172 .0155 -.0710*** .0141 .0011 .0174
orientation 1 .2554*** .0148 .2419*** .0151 .1920*** .0138 .1796*** .0172
orientation 2 .1658*** .0202 .1819*** .0204 .0654*** .0186 -.1407*** .0227
trust .1376*** .0170 .0966*** .0175 -.0366** .0158 .1273*** .0191
nat identiﬁcation -.0286 .0223 -.0560** .0227 .0849*** .0202 .0097 .0261
empowerment .2018*** .0164 .1912*** .0166 .0506*** .0151 .1250*** .0193
pro social .0488*** .0149 .0099 .0152 -0565*** .0138 .0073 .0170
Europe -.8061*** .0458 -1.460*** .0545 -.1762*** .0413 -.5832*** .0462
Asia -.7026*** .0521 -1.259*** .0597 .0340 .0481 -.2191*** .0541
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Africa -.6022*** .0504 -1.266*** .0583 -.1481*** .0463 .2521*** .0507
Latin America -.5030*** .0473 -1.235*** .0557 .0691 .0431 -.2505*** .0481
Nordic Country .0156 .0525 -.1911*** .0618 -.5373*** .0477 -.0171 .0519
Middle East 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) -.2311*** .0611
Oceania .2384*** .0547 .0580 .0649 .3888*** .0491 .1054** .0523
Europe imm -.5080*** .1606 -.6598*** .1647 -.2088 .1521 -.0735 .1569
Asia imm -.6143*** .1674 -.6011*** .1707 -.1670 .1565 -.5017*** .1712
Africa imm -.5779** .2486 -.3435 .2652 .1405 .2451 -.1705 .2440
Latin imm -.1756 .2045 -.4546** .2054 -.3730* .1952 -.4504** .2242
Other imm -.2969* .1776 -.5317*** .1832 -.2331 .1678 -.1447 .1733
Oceania imm -.1543 .2763 -.0783 .2937 -.7834*** .2625 -.3345 .3189
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .2900*** .0756 .0686 .0918 .3961*** .0660 .4330*** .0739
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
_cons -1.358*** .1125 -.1943 .1277 -1.232*** .1012 -1.967*** .1180
# obs Lr chi2(26) # obs Lr chi2(26) # obs Lr chi2(26) # obs Lr chi2(27)
32522 4578.74 32573 6522.09 35559 1625.31 37087 2444.04
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.1017 0.0000 0.1446 0.0000 0.0330 0.0000 0.0780
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
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man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for immigrant status variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 17: Environmental Politically Related Behaviour. Probit
estimations for immigrant status. Dependent variable is ACTUAL ENGAGE-
MENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Attend meetings/sign petitions Join boycotts
immigrant status -.1188 .1616 .1732 .1475
education .0690*** .0043 .0491*** .0035
income .0276*** .0035 .0281*** .0029
age .0185*** .0031 .0207*** .0025
age2 -.0002*** .0000 -.0003*** .0000
gender -.0003 .0171 -.2384*** .0142
c attachment -.0494*** .0180 -.0703*** .0149
orientation 1 .2127*** .0177 .0471*** .0145
orientation 2 -.0830*** .0241 .0727*** .0199
trust .1407*** .0196 .2353*** .0166
nat identiﬁcation -.1325*** .0256 -.2205*** .0209
empowerment .0358* .0196 .0613*** .0158
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
pro social .0352** .0174 .0609*** .0145
Europe -.3835*** .0492 -.7052*** .0436
Asia -.2248*** .0584 -.2742*** .0565
Africa -.0438 .0553 -.4562*** .0484
Latin America .0406 .0508 -.9004*** .0455
Nordic Country -.0635 .0560 .3269*** .0507
Middle East -.0473 .0638 -.7308*** .0549
Oceania .4951*** .0545 .1325*** .0510
Europe imm .0451 .1713 -.2100 .1543
Asia imm -.1929 .1819 -.3959** .1599
Africa imm .0464 .2626 -.3224 .2430
Latin imm .1169 .2258 -.2435 .2002
Other imm .2074 .1841 -.0079 .1700
Oceania imm .0486 .3131 -.0988 .2839
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .3401*** .0697 -.2588*** .0766
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
_cons -2.160*** .1184 .0916 .1107
# obs Lr chi2(27) # obs Lr chi2(27)
37150 1993.30 35143 5159.79
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.0686 0.0000 0.1083
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* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for immigrant status variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 18: Money and the Environment. Ordered Probit estimations
for length of residence. Dependent variable is WILLINGNESS to perform an
environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Pay higher taxes Give part of own income Buy things 20% higher price
length of residence
11-15 years -.0764 .0825 -1.171* .6591 -.0439 .0830
>15 years -.0343 .0728 -.1990 .4395 -.0479 .0731
education -.0264* .0139 -.0445 .1362 -.0225* .0138
income -.0161 .0108 -.1119 .0755 -.0025 .0108
age .0090 .0095 .1057 .0888 -.0109 .0096
age2 -.0000 .0000 -.0011 .0008 .0001 .0001
gender -.1019* .0532 -.7404** .3425 -.1458*** .0533
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
c attachment .0459 .0578 .2189 .5136 .0808 .0580
orientation 1 -.4612* .0545 -.8728** .3913 -.4374*** .0546
orientation 2 .0442 .0756 .1751 .6278 -.1387 .0764
trust -.2345*** .0583 -.6912** .3427 -.1677*** .0585
nat identiﬁcation -.2513*** .0690 .9063 1.075 -.2230*** .0695
empowerment -.0495 .0604 .7896 .5762 -.1096* .0604
pro social -.0085 .0549 -.5141 .3184 .0998* .0551
Europe -.6063*** .1518 0 (omitted) -.5322*** .1519
Asia -1.094*** .2731 0 (omitted) -.9843*** .2734
Africa -.0487 .2001 0 (omitted) -.0412 .2000
Latin America -.6553*** .1820 0 (omitted) -.7183*** .1822
Nordic Country -.6854*** .1967 0 (omitted) -.0507 .1953
Middle East -.8762*** .2457 0 (omitted) -.7561*** .2436
Oceania -.2492 .1529 0 (omitted) -.2101 .1531
Europe imm .1893 .1464 1.574** .7229 .15799 .1458
Asia imm -.2063 .1520 1.000 .7855 .1868 .1519
Africa imm .1733 .2187 2.338** .9619 .0395 .2173
Latin imm .1387 .1765 0 (omitted) .0283 .1756
Other imm .1433 .1568 2.053** .8100 -.0105 .1566
Oceania imm .0148 .2917 1.190 .9059 .1542 .2986
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 -.3010*** .1450 0 (omitted) -.2645* .1468
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs Lr chi2(28) # obs Lr chi2(19) # obs Lr chi2(28)
203
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
1750 179.82 72 30.96 1733 181.54
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.0425 0.0408 0.1797 0.0000 0.0436
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for length of residence variable is <10 years.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 19: Specific pro-environmental Behaviour. Probit estimations
for length of residence. Dependent variable is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an
environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Consume better products Recycle Reduce water consumption Contribute to environmental org
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
length of residence
11-15 years -.0582 .1193 -.0232 .1276 -.0588 .0976 -.1781 .1240
>15 years .0239 .0994 .0965 .1062 .0511 .0871 -.0983 .1035
education -.0033 .0190 -.0190 .0198 .0056 .0164 .0116 .0211
income .0661*** .0149 .0641*** .0161 .0096 .0128 .0486*** .0157
age .0414*** .0133 .0279 .0140 .0312*** .0114 .0151 .0145
age2 -.0004*** .0001 -.0002 .0001 -.0002** .0001 -.0002 .0001
gender .2247*** .0740 .0883 .0782 .0837 .0635 -.0105 .0777
c attachment -.0091 .0807 .1039 .0838 -.0425 .0684 -.0603 .0867
orientation 1 .3684*** .0740 .4386*** .0791 .2326*** .0641 .2402*** .0803
orientation 2 .2154** .1034 .2987*** .1084 -.0323 .0894 -.2845*** .1088
trust .0837 .0796 -.0562 .0867 .0706 .0689 .2232*** .0823
nat identiﬁcation .0181 .0972 .1461 .1027 .0826 .0801 .0313 .1100
empowerment .3294*** .0832 .1335 .0871 .0774 .0713 .0412 .0926
pro social .0601 .0755 -.0491 .0804 -.0853 .0658 .0203 .0802
Europe -.7357*** .1883 -1.320*** .2036 .0654 .1758 -.5438*** .1993
Asia .5953 .3922 .0003 .3585 .4826 .3308 -.6849 .5089
Africa -.1970 .2453 -.8975*** .2550 .1162 .2348 -.1762 .2602
Latin America -.1735 .2245 -.8356*** .2398 .2797 .2111 -.2361 .2454
Nordic Country .2293 .2494 .2754 .2805 -.1810 .2267 -.0590 .2530
Middle East 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) -.3036 .3389
Oceania .4778** .1927 .4548** .2138 .5242*** .1800 .1484 .1938
Europe imm -.3257* .1954 -.5759*** .2173 -.1009 .1748 -.1725 .1886
Asia imm -.3189 .2034 -.3294 .2247 -.0469 .1812 -.6180*** .2032
Africa imm -.5182* .2769 -.2540 .3079 .2446 .2629 -.1584 .2704
Latin imm -.2020 .2268 -.7023*** .2347 -.2578 .2106 -.6202** .2564
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Other imm -.1232 .2098 -.4489* .2331 -.0938 .1886 -.2959 .2030
Oceania imm -.6455* .3804 0 (omitted) -.4919 .3363 -.2621 .3864
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .2168 .2027 -.0056 .2553 .4525*** .1741 .3094* .1857
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
_cons -1.668*** .4834 -.5361 .5290 -1.439*** .4218 -1.116** .4952
# obs Lr chi2(27) # obs Lr chi2(26) # obs Lr chi2(27) # obs Lr chi2(28)
1504 447.65 1492 635.11 1745 101.91 1785 193.13
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.2148 0.0000 0.3077 0.0000 0.0434 0.0000 0.1222
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for length of residence variable is <10 years.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
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Table 20: Environmental Politically Related Behaviour. Probit
estimations for length of residence. Dependent variable is ACTUAL ENGAGE-
MENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Attend meetings/sign petitions Join boycotts
length of residence
11-15 years -.0165 .1289 -.0012 .1022
>15 years .0902 .1076 .1183 .0907
education .0460** .0216 .0174 .0171
income .0154 .0160 .0473*** .0132
age .0416*** .0156 .0043 .0119
age2 -.0004*** .0001 -.0001 .0001
gender -.1112 .0795 -.2372*** .0654
c attachment -.0955 .0892 -.0977 .0720
orientation 1 .2078** .0820 .2164*** .0665
orientation 2 -.0735 .1187 -.0956 .0923
trust .1065 .0845 .2263*** .0716
nat identiﬁcation .0334 .1129 -.2322*** .0837
empowerment -.0176 .0949 .0855 .0741
pro social .0132 .0824 .1286* .0685
Europe -.2110 .2161 -.4805*** .1838
Asia -.6736 .5239 -.3017 .3453
Africa -.1153 .2860 -.3553 .2401
Latin America .0361 .2577 -.4751** .2218
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Nordic Country .3574 .2663 .5871** .2451
Middle East .1072 .3589 -.5183* .2991
Oceania .5462*** .2105 .3350* .1882
Europe imm -.1263 .1983 -.1433 .1858
Asia imm -.2933 .2110 -.2476 .1931
Africa imm -.0392 .2864 -.1498 .2693
Latin imm .0703 .2512 -.1778 .2203
Other imm .0863 .2106 .0737 .1987
Oceania imm .2145 .3829 -.0724 .3786
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .2671 .1868 -.1645 .1989
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
_cons -2.453*** .5217 .2526 .4452
# obs Lr chi2(28) # obs Lr chi2(28)
1780 175.64 1734 340.50
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.1178 0.0000 0.1424
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
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• The r.g. for length of residence variable is <10 years.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 21: Money and the Environment. Ordered Probit estimations for
all groups. Dependent variable is WILLINGNESS to perform an environmen-
tally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Pay higher taxes Give part of own income Buy things at 20% higher price
all groups
2nd gen .3524 .4323 -.3011 .4877 - -
<10 years -.1645 .1269 -.9431 .8838 -.0747 .1262
11-15 years -.2395* .1321 -1.604* .9847 -.1422 .1313
>15 years -.1906 .1200 -1.026 .7929 -.1493 .1189
education -.0303*** .0028 -.1129 .0436*** -.0169*** .0028
income -.0117*** .0023 -.0141 .0220 -.0135*** .0023
age .0106*** .0019 .0382 .0220* .0061*** .0019
age2 -.0001*** .0000 -.0004 .0002* -.0000* .0000
gender -.0566*** .0113 -.3415 .1086*** -.0573*** .0113
c attachment .0285** .0118 .1345 .1295 .0427*** .0118
orientation 1 -.4130*** .0116 -.5727 .1202*** -.3789*** .0116
orientation 2 -.0373** .0157 .0385 .2221 -.0452*** .0158
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
trust -.0792*** .0133 -.1890 .1111* -.0741*** .0134
nat identiﬁcation -.1549*** .0171 .2261 .3608 -.1375*** .0172
empowerment -.0663*** .0126 .1300 .1929 -.0924*** .0126
pro social .0768*** .0115 -.1552 .1076 .0672*** .0115
Europe -.2879*** .0352 0 (omitted) -.3645*** .0354
Asia -.4425*** .0409 0 (omitted) -.4394*** .0410
Africa -.0278 .0394 0 (omitted) -.1559*** .0396
Latin America -.3358*** .0367 0 (omitted) -.4406*** .0368
Nordic Country -.3183*** .0403 0 (omitted) -.1226*** .0404
Middle East -.7077*** .0448 0 (omitted) -.8798*** .0447
Oceania -.1103*** .0410 0 (omitted) -.1562*** .0411
Europe imm .1883 .1242 .8278 .8120 .1757 .1232
Asia imm .2080 .1313 .5908 .8819 .1885 .1305
Africa imm .2806 .2012 1.215 .9861 .2047 .1982
Latin imm .0822 .1685 0 (omitted) -.0267 .1667
Other imm .1880 .1357 1.477 .9317 .0353 .1347
Oceania imm .0757 .2871 .8825 .9622 .1785 .2929
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 -.3386*** .05539 0 (omitted) -.2726*** .0559
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs Lr chi2(29) # obs Lr chi2(20) # obs Lr chi2(29)
36681 2677.52 448 66.38 36360 2481.70
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.0295 0.0000 0.0643 0.0000 0.0275
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* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for all groups variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 22: Specific pro-environmental Behaviour. Probit estimations
for all groups. Dependent variable is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environ-
mentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Consume better products Recycle Reduce water consumption Contribute to environmental org
all groups
2nd gen - - - - - - - -
<10 years .2734* .1656 .2679 .1704 .2756* .1565 .3140* .1619
11-15 years .2279 .1756 .2790 .1811 .2461 .1621 .0753 .1758
>15 years .3741** .1551 .4754*** .1579 .3462** .1478 .1183 .1517
education .0288*** .0036 .0318*** .0037 .0249*** .0034 .0541*** .0041
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
income .0596*** .0030 .0419*** .0031 .0018 .0028 .0386*** .0034
age .0283*** .0025 .0168*** .0026 .0215*** .0023 .0109*** .0029
age2 -.0002*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000
gender .1959*** .0146 .1245*** .1495 .1170*** .0135 -.0384** .0166
c attachment -.0217 .0152 .0181 .0155 -.0717*** .0141 -.0002 .0175
orientation 1 .2547*** .0149 .2424*** .0152 .1924*** .0138 .1806*** .0172
orientation 2 .1654*** .0202 .1806*** .0204 .0636*** .0186 -.1400*** .0228
trust .1393*** .0171 .0968*** .0176 -.0341** .0158 .1266*** .0191
nat identiﬁcation -.0278 .0224 -.0530** .0228 .0852*** .0203 .0107 .0262
empowerment .2033*** .0164 .1895*** .0166 .0516*** .0151 .1256*** .0190
pro social .0501*** .0149 .0106 .0152 -.0548*** .0139 .0061 .0170
Europe -.8041*** .0458 -1.462*** .0546 -.1722*** .0414 -.5802*** .0463
Asia -.7027*** .0521 -1.261*** .0598 .0365 .0481 -.2142*** .0542
Africa -.6002*** .0504 -1.269*** .0584 -.1454*** .0463 .2559*** .0507
Latin America -.5010*** .0473 -1.238*** .0558 .0725* .0431 -.2482*** .0482
Nordic Country .0163 .0525 -.1935 .0618 -.5361*** .0477 -.0146 .0520
Middle East 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) -.2284*** .0612
Oceania .2415*** .0547 .0526 .0650 .3879*** .0492 .1052** .0523
Europe imm -.5554*** .1616 -.7211*** .1654 -.1873 .1530 -.0304 .1583
Asia imm -.5538*** .1719 -.5223*** .1752 -.1406 .1610 -.4776*** .1777
Africa imm -.5479** .2495 -.2840 .2660 .1654 .2458 -.1997 .2467
Latin imm -.1003 .2145 -.5389*** .2140 -.3346 .2036 -.6007** .2461
Other imm -.2971* .1779 -.5245*** .1835 -.2228 .1680 -.1276 .1738
Oceania imm -.7227* .3734 0 (omitted) -.6341* .3331 -.1348 .3834
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .2884*** .0757 .0679 .0919 .3984*** .0661 .4360*** .0740
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
_cons -1.364*** .1127 -.1931 .1280 -1.238*** .1014 -1.976*** .1181
# obs Lr chi2(28) # obs Lr chi2(27) # obs Lr chi2(28) # obs Lr chi2(29)
32421 4585.40 32452 6513.19 35409 1624.06 36933 2434.83
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.1021 0.0000 0.1449 0.0000 0.0331 0.0000 0.0780
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for all groups variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 23: Environmental Politically Related Behaviour. Probit
estimations for all groups. Dependent variable is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in
an environmentally friendly behaviour.
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Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Attend meetings//sign petitions Join boycotts
all groups
2nd gen - - .7238 .5416
<10 years -.1372 .1768 .1105 .1577
11-15 years -.1879 .1887 .1048 .1654
>15 years -.1019 .1648 .2117 .1497
education .0690*** .0043 .0490*** .0036
income 0.2765*** .0035 .0281*** .0029
age .0184*** .0031 .0208*** .0025
age2 -.0002*** .0000 -.0003*** .0000
gender -.0046 .0171 -.2401*** .0142
c attachment -.0515*** .01812 -.0712*** .0149
orientation 1 .2107*** .0178 .0467*** .0145
orientation 2 -.0826*** .0241 .0744*** .0200
trust .1404*** .01967 .2326*** .0167
nat identiﬁcation -.1326*** .0257 -.2231*** .0210
empowerment .0354* .0197 .0596*** .0158
pro social .03516** .0175 .0608*** .0145
Europe -.3816*** .0493 -.7060*** .0436
Asia -.2220*** .0585 -.2769*** .0565
Africa -0.4196 12 -.4569*** .0484
Latin America .0479 .0509 -.9008*** .0456
Nordic Country -.0611 .0561 .3264*** .0508
Middle East -.0449 .0638 -.7313*** .0550
Oceania .4961*** .05462 .1299** .0511
214
Predictor Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Europe imm .0378 .1725 -.2229 .1549
Asia imm -.2205 .05853 -.3509** .1643
Africa imm -.0419 .05539 -.2935 .2440
Latin imm .0427 .5092 -.2629 .2084
Other imm .1991 .1845 -.0116 .1697
Oceania imm .2
9
5
5
.3
7
9
2
-.1216 .3789
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .3420*** .0698 -.2610*** .07670
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
_cons -2.159*** .1185 .0975 .1109
# obs Lr chi2(29) # obs Lr chi2(29)
36997 1981.89 34994 5152.79
Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2 Prob>chi2 Pseudo R2
0.0000 0.0684 0.0000 0.1086
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for all groups variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
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• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
Table 24: Marginal effects by Money and the Environment. Or-
dered Probit estimations for immigrant status. Dependent variable is WILL-
INGNESS to perform an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Pay higher taxes Give part of own income Buy things at 20% higher price
immigrant status .0544 .0363 .1554 .1858 .02655 .0257
education .0081*** .0007 .0096** .0039 .0032*** .0005
income .0031*** .0006 .0010 .0018 .0025*** .0004
age -.0028*** .0005 -.0031 .0019 -.0011*** .0003
age2 .0000*** .0000 .0000* .0000 .0000** .0000
gender .0151*** .0030 .0285*** .0102 .0111*** .0021
c attachment -.0078** .0031 -.0115 .0110 -.0082*** .0022
orientation 1 .1110*** .0031 .0483*** .0126 .0731*** .0023
orientation 2 .0101** .0042 .0021 .0187 .0089*** .0030
trust .0214*** .0036 .0153 .0096 .0142*** .0025
nat identiﬁcation .0424*** .0046 -.0168 .0305 .0268*** .0033
empowerment .0172*** .0034 -.0103 .0163 .0176*** .0024
pro social -.0208*** .0031 .0134 .0093 -.0129*** .0022
Europe .0771*** .0094 0 (omitted) .0698*** .0068
Asia .1191*** .0110 0 (omitted) .0846*** .0079
Africa .0071 .0094 0 (omitted) .0298*** .0076
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Latin America .0899*** .0098 0 (omitted) .0844*** .0071
Nordic Country .0855*** .0108 0 (omitted) .0233*** .0077
Middle East .1903*** .0120 0 (omitted) .1694*** .0087
Oceania .0293*** .0110 0 (omitted) .0298*** .0079
Europe imm -.0512 .0332 -.0660 .0689 -.0346 .0236
Asia imm -.0486 .0344 -.0536 .0720 -.0316 .0244
Africa imm -.0751 .0540 -.0897 .0785 -.0417 .0380
Latin imm -.0399 .0434 0 (omitted) -.0044 .0308
Other imm -.0502 .0365 -.1241 .0809 -.0063 .0259
Oceania imm -.0374 .0601 -.0739 .0821 -.0124 .0433
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0913*** .0149 0 (omitted) .0528*** .0107
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 36831 # obs 448 # obs 36509
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for immigrant status variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
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• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 25: Marginal effects by Specific pro-environmental Be-
haviour. Ordered Probit estimations for immigrant status. Dependent variable
is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Consume better products Recycle Reduce water consumption Contribute to environmental org
immigrant status .1321** .0584 .1583*** .0578 .1242** .0549 .0397 .0370
education .0114*** .0014 .0127*** .0014 .0099*** .0013 .0116*** .0008
income .0236*** .0012 .0165*** .0012 .0007 .0011 .0082*** .0007
age .0112*** .0010 .0067*** .0010 .0086*** .0009 .0023*** .0006
age2 -.0001*** .0000 -.0000*** .0000 -.0000*** .0000 -.0000*** .0000
gender .0780*** .0058 .0492*** .0059 .0465*** .0054 -.0083** .0035
c attachment -.0087 .0060 .0068 .0061 -.0283*** .0056 .0002 .0037
orientation 1 .1018*** .0059 .0965*** .0060 .0765*** .0055 .0384*** .0036
orientation 2 .0661*** .0080 .0725*** .0081 .0260*** .0074 -.0301*** .0048
trust .0548*** .0068 .0385*** .0070 -.0146** .0062 .0272*** .0041
nat identiﬁcation -.0114 .0089 -.0223** .0090 .0338*** .0080 .0020 .0055
empowerment .0804*** .0065 .0762*** .0066 .0201*** .0060 .0267*** .0041
pro social .0194*** .0059 .0039 .0060 -.0225*** .0055 .0015 .0036
Europe -.3214*** .0182 -.5825*** .0217 -.0702*** .0164 -.1248*** .0098
Asia -.2801*** .0207 -.5022*** .0238 .0135 .0191 -.0469*** .0115
Africa -.2401*** .0201 -.5053*** .0232 -.0590*** .0184 .0539*** .0108
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Latin America -.2005*** .0188 -.4929*** .0222 .0275 .0172 -.0536*** .0103
Nordic Country .0062 .0209 -.0762*** .0246 -.2141*** .0190 -.0036 .0111
Middle East 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) -.0494*** .0130
Oceania .0950*** .0218 .0231 .0259 .1549*** .0195 .0225** .0111
Europe imm -.2025*** .0640 -.2632*** .0657 -.0832 .0606 -.0157 .0336
Asia imm -.2449*** .0667 -.2398*** .0681 -.0665 .0624 -.1073*** .0366
Africa imm -.2304** .0991 -.1370 .1058 .0560 .0977 -.0365 .0522
Latin imm -.0700 .0815 -.1813** .0819 -.1487* .0778 -.0964** .0480
Other imm -.1183* .0708 -.2121*** .0731 -.0923 .0668 -.0309 .0371
Oceania imm -.0615 .1101 -.0312 .1171 -.3122*** .1046 -.0716 .0682
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .1156*** .0301 .0274 .0366 .1578*** .0263 .0927*** .0158
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 32522 # obs 32573 # obs 35559 # obs 37087
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for immigrant status variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
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• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 26: Marginal effects by Environmental politically related
Behaviour. Ordered Probit estimations for immigrant status. Dependent vari-
able is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Attend meetings/sign petitions Join boycotts
immigrant status -.0220 .0279 .0682 .0586
education .0136*** .0008 .0190*** .0013
income .0054*** .0006 .0109*** .0011
age .0036*** .0006 .0080*** .0009
age2 -.0000*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000
gender -.0000 .0033 -.0926*** .0055
c attachment -.0097*** .0035 -.0273*** .0057
orientation 1 .0420*** .0035 .0183*** .0056
orientation 2 -.0164*** .0047 .0282*** .0077
trust .0277*** .0038 .0914*** .0064
nat identiﬁcation -.0261*** .0050 -.0856*** .0081
empowerment .0070* .0038 .0238*** .0061
pro social .0069** .0034 .0236*** .0056
Europe -.0757*** .0097 -.2738*** .0169
Asia -.0444*** .0115 -.1064*** .0219
Africa -.0086 .0109 -.1771*** .0188
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Latin America .0080 .0100 -.3496*** .0177
Nordic Country -.0125 .0110 .1269*** .0197
Middle East -.0093 .0126 -.2838*** .0213
Oceania .0978*** .0107 .0514*** .0198
Europe imm .0089 .0338 -.0815 .0599
Asia imm -.0381 .0359 -.1537*** .0621
Africa imm .0091 .0518 -.1252 .0943
Latin imm .0231 .0446 -.0945 .0777
Other imm .0409 .0363 -.0030 .0660
Oceania imm .0
0
9
6
.0
6
1
8
-.0383 .1102
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0671*** .0137 -.1005*** .0297
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 37150 # obs 35143
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for immigrant status variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
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• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 27: Marginal effects by Money and the Environment. Or-
dered Probit estimations for length of residence. Dependent variable is WILL-
INGNESS to perform an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Pay higher taxes Give part of own income Buy things at 20% higher price
length of residence
11-15 years .0188 .0203 .1941 .1722 .0064 .0122
>15 years .0082 .0174 .0145 .0303 .0070 .0106
education .0064* .0034 .0040 .0124 .0033 .0020
income .0039 .0026 .0101 .0076 .0003 .0016
age -.0022 .0023 -.0095 .0088 .0016 .0014
age2 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0000 -.0000 .0000
gender .0250 .0131 .0668* .0397 .0219*** .0080
c attachment -.0112 .0142 -.0197 .0471 -.0121 .0087
orientation 1 .1132*** .0136 .0787* .0452 .0657*** .0087
orientation 2 -.0108 .0185 -.0158 .0568 .0208* .0115
trust .0576*** .0143 .0623 .0381 .0252*** .0088
nat identiﬁcation .0617*** .0170 -.0817 .1001 .0335*** .0105
empowerment .0121 .0148 -.0712 .0583 .0164* .0091
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
pro social .0021 .0134 .0463 .0338 -.0150* .0083
Europe .1489*** .0374 0 (omitted) .0800*** .0231
Asia .2688*** .0673 0 (omitted) .1479*** .0416
Africa .0119 .0491 0 (omitted) .0062 .0300
Latin America .1609*** .0448 0 (omitted) .1080*** .0278
Nordic Country .1683*** .0484 0 (omitted) .0076 .0293
Middle East .2152*** .0605 0 (omitted) .1136*** .0369
Oceania .0612 .0375 0 (omitted) .0315 .0230
Europe imm -.0465 .0359 -.1420* .0817 -.0237 .0219
Asia imm -.0506 .0373 -.0903 .0769 -.0280 .0228
Africa imm -.0425 .0537 -.2109* .1136 -.0059 .0326
Latin imm -.0340 .0433 0 (omitted) -.0042 .0264
Other imm -.0352 .0385 -.1852* .0984 .0015 .0235
Oceania imm -.0036 .0716 -.1074 .0912 -.0231 .0449
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0739** .0356 0 (omitted) .0397*** .02216
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 1750 # obs 72 # obs 1733
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
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• The r.g. for length of residence variable is <10 years.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 28: Marginal effects by Specific pro-environmental Be-
haviour. Ordered Probit estimations for length of residence. Dependent vari-
able is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Consume better products Recycle Reduce water consumption Contribute to environmental org
length of residence
11-15 years -.0232 .0475 -.0092 .0507 -.0228 .0379 -.0382 .0265
>15 years .0095 .0396 .0381 .0420 .0196 .0335 -.0220 .0236
education -.0013 .0076 -.0075 .0078 .0021 .0063 .0024 .0045
income .0263*** .0059 .0253*** .0063 .0037 .0049 .0103*** .0033
age .0165*** .0053 .0110** .0055 .0120*** .0044 .0032 .0030
age2 -.0001*** .0000 -.0000 .0000 -.0000** .0000 -.0000 .0000
gender .0895*** .0294 .0348 .0308 .0322 .0244 -.0022 .0165
c attachment -.0036 .0321 .0410 .0331 -.0163 .0263 -.0128 .0184
orientation 1 .1467*** .0294 .1731*** .0312 .0894*** .0246 .0511*** .0171
orientation 2 .0858** .0412 .1179*** .0428 -.0124 .0343 -.0606*** .0231
trust .0333 .0317 -.0221 .0342 .0271 .0265 .0475*** .0175
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
nat identiﬁcation .0072 .0387 .0576 .0405 .0317 .0308 .0066 .0234
empowerment .1312*** .0331 .0527 .0343 .0297 .0274 .0087 .0197
pro social .0239 .0301 -.0194 .0317 -.0328 .0253 .0043 .0170
Europe -.2931*** .0750 -.5213*** .0803 .0251 .0676 -.1158*** .0423
Asia .2371 .1562 .0001 .1415 .1856 .1272 -.1459 .1081
Africa -.0784 .0977 -.3542*** .1006 .0447 .0903 -.0375 .0554
Latin America -.0691 .0894 -.3298*** .0946 .1075 .0812 -.0503 .0522
Nordic Country .0913 .0993 .1087 .1107 -.0696 .0872 -.0125 .0539
Middle East 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) -.0646 .0721
Oceania .1903** .0767 .1795** .0843 .2016*** .0692 .0316 .0413
Europe imm -.129* .0778 -.2273*** .0857 -.0388 .0672 -.0367 .0402
Asia imm -.1270 .0810 -.1300 .0886 -.0180 .0697 -.1316*** .0431
Africa imm -.2064* .1103 -.1002 .1215 .0941 .1011 -.0337 .0576
Latin imm -.0805 .0903 -.2772*** .0925 -.0991 .0810 -.1321** .0546
Other imm -.4911 .0835 -.1771 .0919 -.0361 .0725 -.0630 .0433
Oceania imm -.2571* .1515 0 (omitted) -.1892 .1293 -.0558 .0823
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0863 .0807 -.0022 .1008 .1740*** .0669 .0695* .0395
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 1504 # obs 1492 # obs 1745 # obs 1785
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for length of residence variable is <10 years.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 29: Marginal effects by Environmental politically related
Behaviour. Ordered Probit estimations for length of residence. Dependent
variable is ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Attend meetings/sign petitions Join boycotts
immigrant status
11-15 years -.0031 .0242 -.0005 .0401
>15 years .0180 .0211 .0468 .0357
education .0092** .0043 .0069 .0068
income .0031 .0032 .0187*** .0052
age .0083*** .0031 .0017 .0047
age2 -.0001*** .0000 -.0000 .0000
gender -.0223 .01592 -.0940*** .0259
c attachment -.0191 .0178 -.0387 .0285
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
orientation 1 .0416** .0164 .0858*** .0263
orientation 2 -.0147 .0238 -.0379 .0366
trust .0213 .0169 .0897*** .0283
nat identiﬁcation .0067 .0226 -.0920*** .0331
empowerment -.0035 .0190 .0339 .0294
pro social .0026 .0165 .0509* .0271
Europe -.0423 .0433 -.1905*** .0728
Asia -.1351 .1048 -.1196 .1369
Africa -.0231 .05738 -.1408 .0951
Latin America .0072 .0517 -.1883** .0879
Nordic Country .0717 .0534 .2327** .0972
Middle East .0215 .0720 -.2055* .1185
Oceania .1095*** .0423 .1328* .0746
Europe imm -.0253 .0398 -.0568 .0736
Asia imm -.0588 .0423 -.0981 .0765
Africa imm -.0078 .0574 -.0594 .1067
Latin imm .0141 .0503 -.0705 .0873
Other imm .0173 .0422 .0292 .0787
Oceania imm .0
4
3
0
.0
7
6
8
-.0287 .1500
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0535 .0375 -.0652 .0788
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 1780 # obs 1734
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* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for length of residence variable is <10 years.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 30: Marginal effects by Money and the Environment. Or-
dered Probit estimations for all groups. Dependent variable is WILLINGNESS
to perform an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Pay higher taxes Give part of own income Buy things at 20% higher price
all groups
2nd gen -.0801 .0803 .0328 .0664 - -
<10 years .0471 .0385 .1355 .1962 .0149 .0262
11-15 years .0707* .0422 .3462 .3400 .0296 .0293
>15 years .0552 .0371 .1568 .1863 .0312 .0267
education .0081*** .0007 .0094** .0039 .0032*** .0005
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
income .0031*** .0006 .0011 .0018 .0026*** .0004
age -.0028*** .0005 -.0032* .0019 -.0011*** .0003
age2 .0000*** .0000 .0000* .0000 .0000** .0000
gender .0152*** .0030 .0286*** .0101 .0110*** .0021
c attachment -.0076** .0031 -.0112 .0109 -.0082*** .0022
orientation 1 .1113*** .0031 .0480*** .1264 .0730*** .0023
orientation 2 .0100** .0042 .0032 .0186 .0087*** .0030
trust .0213*** .0036 .0158 .0096 .0142*** .0025
nat identiﬁcation .0417*** .0046 -.0189 .0303 .0265*** .0033
empowerment .0178*** .0034 -.0109 .0162 .0178*** .0024
pro social -.0207*** .0031 .0130 .0092 -.0129*** .0022
Europe .0775*** .0094 0 (omitted) .0703*** .0068
Asia .1192*** .0110 0 (omitted) .0847*** .0079
Africa .0075 .0106 0 (omitted) .0300*** .0076
Latin America .0905*** .0098 0 (omitted) .0849*** .0071
Nordic Country .0858*** .0108 0 (omitted) .0236*** .0078
Middle East .1907*** .0121 0 (omitted) .1696*** .0087
Oceania .0297*** .0110 0 (omitted) .0301*** .0079
Europe imm -.0507 .0334 -.0694 .0689 -.0338 .0237
Asia imm -.0560 .0354 -.0495 .0743 -.0363 .0251
Africa imm -.0756 .0542 -.1019 .0841 -.0394 .0382
Latin imm -.0221 .0454 0 (omitted) .0051 .0321
Other imm -.0506 .0365 -.1239 .0805 -.0068 .0259
Oceania imm -.0204 .0774 -.0740 .0816 -.0344 .0564
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0912*** .0149 0 (omitted) .0525*** .0108
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 36681 # obs 448 # obs 36360
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for all groups variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 31: Marginal effects by Specific pro-environmental Be-
haviour. Ordered Probit estimations for all groups. Dependent variable is
ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Consume better products Recycle Reduce water consumption Contribute to environmental org
all groups
2nd gen - - - - - - - -
<10 years .1083* .0645 .1058 .0660 .1081* .0597 .0786* .0461
11-15 years .0905 .0691 .1102 .0699 .0968 .0624 .0167 .0404
>15 years .1470** .0588 .1836*** .0571 .1347** .0552 .0268 .0364
education .0114*** .0014 .0127*** .0014 .0099*** .0013 .0116*** .0008
income .0237*** .0012 .0167*** .0012 .0007 .0011 .0082*** .0007
age .0113*** .0010 .0067*** .0010 .0086*** .0009 .0023*** .0006
age2 -.0001*** .0000 -.0000*** .0000 -.0000*** .0000 -.0000*** .0000
gender .0781*** .0058 .0497*** .0059 .0466*** .0054 -.0082** .0035
c attachment -.0086 .0060 .0072 .0062 -.0285*** .0056 -.0000 .0037
orientation 1 .1015*** .0059 .0967*** .0060 .0767*** .0055 .0387*** .0037
orientation 2 .0659*** .0080 .0720*** .0081 .0253*** .0074 -.0300*** .0048
trust .0555*** .0068 .0386*** .0070 -.0136** .0063 .0271*** .0041
nat identiﬁcation -.0110 .0089 -.0211** .0091 .0339*** .0080 .0023 .0056
empowerment .0810*** .0065 .0756*** .0066 .0205*** .0060 .0269*** .0041
pro social .0200*** .0059 .0042 .0060 -.0218*** .0055 .0013 .0036
Europe -.3206*** .0182 -.5835*** .0217 -.0686*** .0165 -.1244*** .0099
Asia -.2801*** .0207 -.5031*** .0238 .0145 .0191 -.0459*** .0116
Africa -.2393*** .0201 -.5063*** .0233 -.0579*** .0184 .0548*** .0108
Latin America -.1997*** .0188 -.4942*** .0222 .0289* .0172 -.0532*** .0103
Nordic Country .0065 .0209 -.0772*** .0246 -.2137*** .0190 -.0031 .0111
Middle East 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) -.0489*** .0131
Oceania .0963*** .0218 .0210 .0259 .1546*** .0196 .0225** .0112
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Europe imm -.2214*** .0644 -.2876*** .0660 -.0746 .0609 -.0065 .0339
Asia imm -.2208*** .0685 -.2083*** .0699 -.0560 .0641 -.1024*** .0381
Africa imm -.2184** .0995 -.1133 .1061 .0659 .0979 -.0428 .0529
Latin imm -.0400 .0855 -.2150** .0853 -.1333* .0811 -.1288** .0527
Other imm -.1184* .0709 -.2092*** .0732 -.0888 .0669 -.0273 .0372
Oceania imm -.2881* .1489 0 (omitted) -.2527* .1327 -.0289 .0822
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .1150*** .0301 .0271 .0366 .1588*** .0263 .0935*** .0158
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 32421 # obs 32452 # obs 35409 # obs 36933
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for all groups variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
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Table 32: Marginal effects by Environmental politically related
Behaviour. Ordered Probit estimations for all groups. Dependent variable is
ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT in an environmentally friendly behaviour.
Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Attend meetings/sign petitions Join boycotts
all groups
2nd gen - - .2803 .1917
<10 years -.0251 .0298 .0433 .0623
11-15 years -.0333 .0298 .0410 .0653
>15 years -.0191 .0291 .0835 .0596
education .0136*** .0008 .0190*** .0013
income .0054*** .0007 .0109*** .0011
age .0036*** .0006 .0081*** .0009
age2 -.0000*** .0000 -.0001*** .0000
gender -.0000 .0033 -.0932*** .0055
c attachment -.0101*** .0035 -.0276*** .0058
orientation 1 .0416*** .0035 .0181*** .0056
orientation 2 -.0163*** .0047 .0289*** .0077
trust .0277*** .0038 .0917*** .0064
nat identiﬁcation -.0262*** .0050 -.0866*** .0081
empowerment .0070* .0039 .0231*** .0061
pro social .0069** .0034 .0236*** .0056
Europe -.0754*** .0097 -.2742*** .0169
Asia -.0439*** .0115 -.1075*** .0219
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Predictor dy/dx Std. Error dy/dx Std. Error
Africa -.0082 .0109 -.1774*** .0188
Latin America .0084 .0100 -.3499*** .0177
Nordic Country -.0120 .0110 .1268*** .0197
Middle East -.0088 .0126 -.2840*** .0213
Oceania .0981*** .0108 .0504** .0198
Europe imm .0074 .0341 -.0865 .0601
Asia imm -.0333 .0371 -.1363** .0638
Africa imm .0123 .0521 -.1140 .0947
Latin imm .0127 .0474 -.1021 .0809
Other imm .0393 .0364 -.0045 .0659
Oceania imm .0
5
8
4
.0
7
4
9
-.0472 .1471
Wave 2 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 3 .0676*** .0138 -.1014*** .0297
Wave 4 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
Wave 5 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted)
# obs 36997 # obs 34994
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
• The r.g. for all groups variable is native-born.
• The r.g. for region speciﬁc eﬀects is North America.
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• The r.g. for immigrant region of origin is North America.
• The r.g. for time eﬀects is Wave 1.
• dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
Table 33: Environmentally friendly behaviours by length of res-
idence . WVS dataset years 1989-2007, Dependent Variables used in the re-
gressions.
Environmental Behaviour Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Willingness to pay higher taxes
N-B 2.27 .875 1 4 71294
2nd gen 2.44 .897 1 4 3805
<10 years 2.26 .872 1 4 922
11-15 years 2.26 .840 1 4 814
>15 years 2.34 .880 1 4 2161
Willingness to give part of own income
N-B 2.04 .865 1 4 14008
2nd gen 2.27 .860 1 4 3816
<10 years 2.12 .885 1 4 125
11-15 years 2.17 .954 1 4 35
>15 years 2.40 .893 1 4 327
Willingness to buy things at a 20% higher price
N-B 2.54 .854 1 4 56392
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years 2.54 .844 1 4 823
11-15 years 2.55 .815 1 4 776
>15 years 2.60 .823 1 4 1908
Choose better products for the environment
N-B .47 .499 0 1 50554
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Environmental Behaviour Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years .51 .500 0 1 717
11-15 years .40 .491 0 1 559
>15 years .54 .497 0 1 1748
Recycle
N-B .47 .499 0 1 50979
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years .54 .498 0 1 718
11-15 years .48 .500 0 1 451
>15 years .59 .491 0 1 1754
Reduce water consumption
N-B .49 .499 0 1 55590
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years .54 .498 0 1 831
11-15 years .53 .499 0 1 829
>15 years .62 .483 0 1 1853
Contribute to environmental organization
N-B .14 .347 0 1 57467
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years .15 .366 0 1 845
11-15 years .09 .286 0 1 841
>15 years .15 .366 0 1 1883
Attend meetings or sign petitions
N-B .12 .333 0 1 57603
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years .14 .350 0 1 846
11-15 years .08 .280 0 1 848
>15 years .15 .357 0 1 1891
Join boycotts
N-B .41 .492 0 1 66273
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Environmental Behaviour Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2nd gen .42 .494 0 1 3797
<10 years .47 .499 0 1 911
11-15 years .36 .480 0 1 835
>15 years .45 .497 0 1 2137
• The scale for the willingness items is 1-4 where 1 is strongly agree,
i.e. stronger pro-environmental behaviour and 4 is strongly disagree, i.e.
weaker pro-environmental behaviour.
• The scale for the actual engagement items is 0-1 where 0 is no en-
gagement in pro-environmental behaviour and 1 is engagement in pro-
environmental behaviour.
• Immigrant status: N-B=native-born, 2nd gen=second generation immi-
grant, <10 years=immigrant with 10 or less years of residence, 11-15=immigrant
with 11 to 15 years of residence, and >15 years=immigrant with more than
15 years of residence.
Table 34: Variables that affect environmental behaviour by length
of residence. WVS dataset years 1989-2007, Controls used in the regressions.
Control Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Education
N-B 4.60 2.23 1 8 68264
2nd gen 4.50 2.35 1 8 3944
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Control Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
<10 years 5.52 2.12 1 8 931
11-15 years 5.37 2.09 1 8 896
>15 years 4.97 2.25 1 8 2194
Income
N-B 4.41 2.54 1 10 66746
2nd gen 5.12 2.38 1 10 3295
<10 years 5.04 2.74 1 10 867
11-15 years 5.02 2.71 1 10 821
>15 years 4.85 2.66 1 10 1980
Age
N-B 40.78 15.96 15 95 76968
2nd gen 43.50 17.60 16 94 3954
<10 years 36.35 13.30 15 84 978
11-15 years 44.45 15.27 15 84 904
>15 years 51.66 15.42 18 88 2257
Gender
N-B .51 .49 0 1 77058
2nd gen .52 .49 0 1 3969
<10 years .51 .50 0 1 979
11-15 years .55 .49 0 1 906
>15 years .53 .49 0 1 2264
C. Attachment
N-B .38 .48 0 1 72446
2nd gen .5 .52 0 1 10
<10 years .29 .45 0 1 893
11-15 years .35 .47 0 1 865
>15 years .31 .46 0 1 2004
Orientation 1
N-B .55 .49 0 1 53477
2nd gen .60 .48 0 1 3558
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Control Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
<10 years .57 .49 0 1 757
11-15 years .58 .49 0 1 747
>15 years .53 .49 0 1 1876
Orientation 2
N-B .83 .37 0 1 58167
2nd gen - - - - 0
<10 years .85 .35 0 1 825
11-15 years .87 .32 0 1 835
>15 years .88 .31 0 1 1863
Trust
N-B .27 .44 0 1 73801
2nd gen .27 .44 0 1 3826
<10 years .30 .46 0 1 931
11-15 years .29 .45 0 1 862
>15 years .31 .46 0 1 2213
Nat Identiﬁcation
N-B .86 .34 0 1 74827
2nd gen .91 .27 0 1 3759
<10 years .72 .44 0 1 677
11-15 years .60 .48 0 1 648
>15 years .84 .36 0 1 1693
Empowerment
N-B .66 .47 0 1 72877
2nd gen .80 .39 0 1 3895
<10 years .62 .48 0 1 946
11-15 years .52 .49 0 1 861
>15 years .68 .46 0 1 2187
Pro-social traits
N-B .46 .49 0 1 74405
2nd gen .42 .49 0 1 3855
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Control Status Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
<10 years .47 .49 0 1 945
11-15 years .37 .48 0 1 879
>15 years .47 .49 0 1 2213
• Immigrant status: N-B=native-born, 2nd gen=second generation immi-
grant, <10 years=immigrant with 10 or less years of residence, 11-15=immigrant
with 11 to 15 years of residence, and >15 years=immigrant with more than
15 years of residence.
• Orientation 1=Environment vs Economic Growth stance; Orientation 2=Hu-
man vs Nature stance.
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Chapter 3: Identity selection and the activation
of pro-environmental behaviour
Luis Serra-Barragán∗
Abstract
Pro-environmental behaviour can be the result of two diﬀerent pro-
cesses: a process of norm internalisation carried out by individuals through
which they become aware of the consequences of their actions on other
individuals and ascribe responsibility from those actions, i.e. direct norm
activation; and a process of adhesion to social norms inﬂuenced by jus-
tice, commitment, fairness, reciprocity, and framing eﬀects, i.e. indirect
norm activation. There is empirical evidence that policy in the form
of informational campaigns can disrupt the direct norm activation pro-
cess by imposing an excessive burden of responsibility on the individuals.
Yet it has been neglected that other popular instruments supported by
economists could also have an indirect negative eﬀect on norm activation
by introducing a situational cue that fosters a change of identity among in-
dividuals with potential negative consequences on their pro-environmental
behaviour. This chapter investigates this issue with a two-period identity
selection model based on self-veriﬁcation theory. In each period there are
two types of selves an individual can take: selﬁsh and pro-environmental.
The process of identity selection is driven by the desire of individuals to be
consistent across the two periods in order to avoid social disapproval due
to self-change. Results show that the monetary component of an environ-
mental policy introduces an asymmetry in the identity selection process
that produces a failure of norm activation: while selﬁsh agents preserve
their selﬁsh identity after the policy is implemented, pro-environmental
agents might change their identity despite they experience social disap-
proval due to a reduction in the cognitive beneﬁts of keeping such identity.
Implications for environmental policy design are discussed.
When people obey norms, they often have a particular outcome in mind: they want
to avoid the disapproval -ranging from raised eyebrows to social ostracism - of other
people J. Elster, 1989.
JEL Nos.: D03, H23, H41, Q57, Q58.
∗Contact information: The Department of Economics, The University of Warwick, Coven-
try, CV47AL, United Kingdom; email: L.A.Serra-Barragan@warwick.ac.uk. I would like to
thank my supervisor, Eugenio Proto, for his patient guidance and his time, and Rosario Mac-
era for guidance and comments. All remaining errors are mine.
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Introduction
Psychologists, sociologists and a growing number of economists have now rec-
ognized that worldwide environmental degradation is not merely a by-product of
industrial and technological evolution, but behavioural and attitudinal as well.
Cooperation (or defection) among individuals lies at the heart of the problem
of environmental services underprovision given their public good nature. De-
spite tragic predictions inﬂuenced by a somewhat extreme version of the rational
paradigm (Hardin [23]), a vast body of theoretical and empirical research has
made progress in elucidating the conditions under which individuals are in fact
willing to cooperate in social dilemmas.1
A certain environmentally friendly behaviour might be followed by those
individuals who are attached to a speciﬁc set of norms. Norms are shared beliefs
about how the individuals should act, and they are enforced by the threat of
sanctions or the promise of rewards (Schwartz and Howard [40]). Norms can be
divided into two groups according to their level of internalisation: personal and
social (Thøgersen [51]).
A personal norm is a self-expectation of speciﬁc action in a particular con-
text, commonly experienced as a feeling of moral obligation (Schwartz [39]).
Inasmuch as norms are a behavioural guide for individuals, their violation leads
to sanctions. When a sanction is executed by the same individual it is said
that the norm has been internalised. According to Schwartz [39], and Schwartz
1The Introduction of Chapter 1 provides references on the literature of cooperation mech-
anisms in social dilemmas.
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and Howard [41], internalised norms are personal norms. Thus, personal norms
are followed because of internalised values and conceptions of what is right and
wrong.
On the other hand, a social norm is based on a group-expectation where the
rewards and punishment are externally enforced. Hence, individuals follow a
social norm on account of (real or imagined) social pressure (Ajzen [1]). Biel and
Thøgersen [8] consider that social norms are a reason for departure from rational
choice insofar as they prescribe the manifestation of a particular behaviour and
the proscription of other in a given context. In that sense, Fehr and Fischbacher
[18] explain that, despite little is known about the formation process of social
norms, they are greatly driven by non-selﬁsh motives and largely enforced by
sanctions.
Norm adhesion is of great relevance to the analysis of pro-environmental be-
haviour. Bamberg and Schmidt [5], Bratt [9], Harland et al [24] and Thøgersen
[48] and [52] have documented an important correlation between environmen-
tally responsible behaviour and social and personal norms. While there is re-
search which demonstrates that personal norms often have stronger and more re-
liable behavioural implications than social norms (Thøgersen [53]), other studies
have shown there are cases where this need not be true (Bamberg and Schmidt
[5] and Hunecke et al [25]),2 at least in an indirect way.
It is possible for individuals to display pro-environmental behaviour if norms
related to such behaviour are somehow activated. In social dilemmas, norm ac-
tivation depends on personal and situational factors (Biel and Thøgersen [8]).
Personal factors are associated to an obligation that lies within the individuals
2Bicchieri [6] also argues that social norms are determinant for cooperative behaviour
between individuals. Yet, she points out that people must know the norm, and also be aware
that it applies to the situation under consideration. More importantly, she regards that the
individual must believe that a suﬃcient number of others will conform to the social norm,
and that a suﬃcient number of others expect the individual to conform. Such requirement is
similar to the belief-dependent framework presented in Chapter 1.
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to protect a particular natural resource. The norms activated by these factors
are considered to be moral norms that individuals internalise and that have a
direct eﬀect on the environment. They determine the environmental respon-
sibility held by individuals through the establishment of environmental values.
Conversely, situational factors are associated with norms related to cooperation,
or in Kerr's taxonomy (Kerr [27]): general interaction norms that are elicited
by the behaviour of others and which have an indirect eﬀect both on other in-
dividuals' welfare and on the environment. Situational factors that aﬀect the
activation of norms indirectly encompass the salience of need and actions, bene-
ﬁts and costs, framing eﬀects (e.g. market vs non-market frames), behaviour of
others, and communication. These situational factors alter the individuals' per-
ception of fairness and justice, reciprocity and commitment in social dilemmas
with consequences on cooperation.
The left hand side of the diagram above, i.e. personal factors, refers to the
environmental responsibility that arises in individuals from the activation of
personal norms. One inﬂuential model representing this activation mechanism
is Schwartz's Norm Activation Theory (Schwartz [39]). Under such model, a
norm is activated when: a) the individual recognizes his private actions have a
public good aspect, or in other words, become aware of the consequences of his
actions; and b) the individual ascribes personal responsibility for the issue at
hand.
Although Schwartz's theory seems to enjoy empirical validation (Van Liere
and Dunlap [55], and Stern et al [42]),3 a group of researchers claim that some
environmental policies might actually disrupt such process of norm activation.
Bruvoll and Nyborg [11] show that even though authorities may succeed in
increasing consumers' voluntary contributions to a public good through infor-
3See Bratt [9] for a survey-based study on recycling behaviour that does not support
Schwartz's theory.
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mation campaigns that appeal to consumer responsibility, this will generally
come at a social cost which may or may not be outweighed by the policy ben-
eﬁts such as improved environmental quality and increased warm glow. Hence,
when consumers ascribe responsibility for a certain contribution level to a public
good, they may experience a warm glow of giving and a cold shiver of not giving
enough. By tightening the norm and thus requiring higher contributions from
the individuals, environmental policy will usually increase the cold shiver.
Brekke et al [10] explain that responsibility may represent a burden, and
so duty-oriented individuals (i.e. those who prefer to think of themselves as a
responsible person) may consciously or unconsciously avoid settings in which
they suspect a heavy burden of responsibility will be lay upon them, especially
when they possess uncertain information about others' behaviour.4
A theoretical model in the same spirit is the one found in Nyborg [28]. She
considers that individuals with preferences for keeping moral obligations may
not like learning that voluntary contributions are socially valuable. This infor-
mation can then trigger irksome feelings of cognitive dissonance. So, information
campaigns which promote environmental responsibility can present individuals
with information they would rather not have, imposing on them an excessive
feeling of moral responsibility.
Fig 1. Factors inﬂuencing the activation of norms in social dilemmas. Source: Biel and
Thøgersen [8].
4To test their model, Brekke et al [10] collected survey data on glass recycling in Nor-
wegian households since such activity stands as an example of voluntary contributions to a
public good. The policy implication of their model is that when responsibility ascription is
endogenous, economic incentives for voluntary contributions could be counterproductive.
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The right hand side of Figure 1 depicts the situational factors that aﬀect
norm activation. The type of norms activated through this mechanism are
norms related to cooperation or social norms. The beneﬁts of communication
for cooperation5 have been studied in Isaac and Walker [26] and Ostrom and
Walker [32]. Orbell et al [30] reported a strong correlation between commitment
and cooperation rates. Moreover, communication gives rise to a commitment
norm (Kerr [27]) that produces on other individuals an expectation about future
consistent behaviour (Cialdini [12]).
Fairness acts as a norm in a social dilemma that if bolstered it promotes
higher contributions to the public good from individuals, but if the situation is
perceived to be unfair, it will activate their defective behaviour (Biel et al [7]).
A sequential model of justice is provided by Schroeder et al [37]. They highlight
that when resources are perceived to be distributed in an unjust fashion, then
some individuals might try to change the rules of allocation. Those who defect,
should compensate those harmed by their actions, restoring the just distribution.
Reciprocity is a widely studied norm (Rabin [34], Ostrom [31], Dufwenberg
5See Balliet [4] for a Meta-Analytic review of studies devoted to the analysis of the eﬀects
of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas.
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and Kirchsteiger [14], and Falk and Fishbacher [17]) which prescribes conditional
cooperation among individuals, i.e. an individual should be kind to those that
are kind to him, but be unkind to those who are unkind.
The reference point in a decision situation aﬀects the choice of individu-
als. Fleishman [20] provides experimental evidence on the matter in a social
dilemma. Framing eﬀects on cooperation in public good games are studied by
Andreoni [3]. He shows there is a behavioural asymmetry because individuals
are more willing to cooperate under positive framing than under a negative
one. Other studies are Pillutla and Chen [33] and Tenbrunsel and Messick [46].
They show that individuals adjust their competitive behaviour depending on
the frame. Economic-oriented contexts elicited a more competitive-behaviour.
Most research focused on failure of social norms activation due to a change in
the prevailing situational factors is related to the analysis of framing eﬀects. In
particular, interest has been drawn to analyze the eﬀects of monetary incentives
on the behaviour of individuals in laboratory experiments (Frey and Jegen [21]
and Reeson and Tisdell [35]).
While Figure 1 is an extensive depiction of the diﬀerent mechanisms of norm
activation, it does not acknowledge that the identity of individuals can also
trigger a speciﬁc norm of environmental behaviour given that identities describe
social roles.
An identity is a set of meanings related to the self that functions as a ref-
erence that guides behaviour in diﬀerent contexts (Stets and Biga [43]). An
environmental identity prescribes a course of action that is compatible with in-
dividuals' sense of who they are (Clayton and Opotow [13]). Weber et al [56]
stress that the identity of the decision maker is a signiﬁcant factor for cooper-
ation in social interaction scenarios.6 Moreover, Stets and Biga [43] claim that
6The other two signiﬁcant factors for cooperation according to their framework are: classi-
ﬁcation of the situation, and identiﬁcation of rules and heuristics that could guide behavioural
choice.
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while traditional environmental sociology linked attitude processes to the de-
termination of environmentally responsible behaviour, it is the identity process
which inﬂuences such type of behaviour.7
The identity of the individual is also relevant for policy design. An indi-
vidual's sense of self is linked to his social environment (Akerlof and Kranton
[2]), and so it is reasonable to suspect that by changing situational factors, en-
vironmental policy might in turn aﬀect the individuals' sense of who they are.
Hence, understanding which identities are salient is important to evaluate how
individuals react to a particular threat or distribution of rewards (Clayton and
Opotow [13]).
This chapter outlines an identity selection model and inquires about how
identity selection can activate a particular environmentally friendly norm. More
importantly, it shows how environmental policy (a situational factor) might
produce unwanted outcomes by aﬀecting the process of identity selection. It
is worth to notice though, that the issue at hand (i.e. social norms activation
failure due to situational factors) should not be confounded with motivation
crowding-out. Whilst both can represent cooperation failure in a public good
provision setting, and so both can explain why individuals might not display
pro-environmental behaviours, motivation crowding-out theory does not seek to
establish the origin of the environmentally friendly inclination of the individ-
ual, just the mechanism through which such preference is distorted. In turn,
this chapter proposes that the literature has paid no attention to the study
of the identity of individuals as a source of pro-environmental behaviour or to
environmental policies as key determinants of such source.
The plan for the rest of the chapter is the following: Section 2 introduces
7 Evidence that a pro-environmentally oriented identity is associated to engagement in
environmentally friendly behaviour is provided by Fielding et al [19].
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the set up of a two-period self-selection model. Section 3 presents the basic
problem where individuals choose whether to keep or change their identity based
on situational factors. In section 4, a monetary incentive scheme will be also
analysed and its impact on the self-selection process will be compared to the
case where there is no environmental policy. Section 5 discusses the results of
the model and provides policy implications. Finally, concluding remarks are
provided and empirical research is suggested.
2. The Model
2.1 Motivation example
Individuals have a sense-of-self which deﬁnes which type of person they are,
e.g. selﬁsh, pro-social, friendly, etc. For the sake of simplicity, assume that
upon birth an individual is given an exogenous identity which is deﬁned by
a social norm which prescribes a course of action under a particular set of
circumstances.8 Whenever the individual has to make a choice, he must decide
whether to take a course of action that is coherent with the social norm or not.
In order to do that, he performs a cost-beneﬁt analysis based on the situational
factors (or situational cues) that might aﬀect his decision. Should he change
his identity he will face a punishment in the form of social disapproval. Thus, if
he is psychologically coherent and decides to conform to the norm (and avoid
the cost of social disapproval), he becomes accepted by others. Given that his
sense-of-self originates from a social norm, he then revalidates who he is.
Matters are diﬀerent if he decides not to conform to the social norm. If
8This might be too simplistic, but it is plausible to think that the individual creates a
sense-of-self through the norms created by his family or community.
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that is the case, he is considered not to be psychologically coherent because he
takes a course of action not prescribed by the social group he belongs to, and in
retaliation he faces social disapproval. Thus, a change in his sense-of-self takes
place, or in other words, he changes his identity.
As it turns out, which course of action the individual takes depend on his
proclivity to conform to the social norm, or in other words, on the likelihood that
he is psychologically coherent. The more psychological coherence the individual
has, the more likely he will conform to the social norm and take the course of
action prescribed by the norm.
The next section formalizes this idea and shows that if an individual is
suﬃciently psychologically coherent, he will likely conform to the social norm
and keep his identity. However, if he is not suﬃciently psychologically coherent,
he will not conform to the social norm and will change his identity. Moreover,
the section also shows that a monetary payment might reduce the likelihood that
certain individuals maintain their psychological coherence and end up changing
their identity.
2.2 The model set up
This section draws extensively on Teraji's model of self-veriﬁcation (Teraji [47]).
Assume a two-period economy: t = 0 and t = 1. In each of these periods there
are two types of selves (or identities) an individual can take: selﬁsh (S ) and pro-
environmental (PE ). Regardless of which self the individual adopts he receives
material payoﬀs pi. Those material payoﬀs are deﬁned like in a standard linear
public good game, i.e. the individual has to decide whether to put in eﬀort
e at a cost c in the production of a public good or put in eﬀort 1 − e in the
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production of a private good.9 Assume c > 0 ⇐⇒ e > 0, ∂pi∂e > 0 , ∂
2pi
∂e2 < 0,
∂c
∂e > 0 and
∂2c
∂e2 > 0. The following are the payoﬀs of each self in period 0:
U0S = pi
0
S (e)− c (e)
U0PE = pi
0
PE (e) + ϑ (e)− c (e)
Notice that besides material payoﬀs, the pro-environmental self also obtains
cognitive payoﬀs related to the provision of the public good deﬁned by ϑ. It can
be perfectly interpreted that the pro-environmental self derives a warm glow
from his contribution to the public good. However, he can only obtain such
warm glow if he provides eﬀort, i.e. ϑ > 0 ⇐⇒ e > 0. Furthermore, assume
that: ∂ϑ∂e > 0, and
∂2ϑ
∂e2 < 0.
In period 0 the individual cannot chose which identity to adopt, i.e. it is
exogenous. Hence, given a determined self, he chooses the optimal level of eﬀort
provided to the production of the public good in order to maximize his utility.
The problem he faces is: max
e
U0self . The optimal level of eﬀort which is solution
to such problem is that which equates the marginal beneﬁts of providing eﬀort
to its marginal costs. In other words we have the following (expressions in bold
denote derivatives):
pi0S (e
∗) = c (e∗)
pi0PE
(
e†
)
+ ϑ
(
e†
)
= c
(
e†
)
As the expressions above suggest, the identity of each individual prescribes
a diﬀerent behaviour which means that a diﬀerent optimal level of eﬀort is
9For simplicity it is assumed that the cost of eﬀort is the same for both selves, and the
maximum amount of eﬀort the individual can provide to the production of either good has
been normalised to 1.
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selected. The selﬁsh individual selects to provide zero eﬀort to the production
of the public good because the beneﬁts of provision do not compensate its costs,
or in other words, the selﬁsh individual maximizes his utility by devoting all
his eﬀort to the production of the private good. On the contrary, the pro-
environmental individual selects to devote all his eﬀort to the production of the
public good because despite it is costly to do so, he receives a warm glow from
helping others, which added to the material payoﬀs obtained from contributing
to the public good, outweighs the beneﬁts of devoting his eﬀort to the production
of the private good.
After period 0 and once payoﬀs for such period are materialized, the indi-
vidual faces the decision whether to keep his identity for the next period. If he
decides to do so, he is considered to be consistent.10 These are his payoﬀs:
U1S|S0 = pi
1
S (e)− c (e)
U1PE|PE0 = pi
1
PE (e) + ϑ (e)− c (e)
So, if the individual is consistent and selects the same self in the two periods
he obtains in t = 1 the same utility he obtained in the previous period because
his prescribed behaviour is the same, i.e. the level of eﬀort he provides to the
production of the public good does not change.
If for some reason the individual decided to change his identity in period 1,
then he would face social disapproval that stems from the adoption of a diﬀerent
behaviour prescribed by a diﬀerent identity to the one he held in the previous
period.11 This creates in the individual a discrepancy he might feel as guilt,
10This term does not imply that individuals are interested in consistency for its own sake.
Rather, as Swann et al [45] explain, individuals strive for psychological coherence to strengthen
own perceptions of prediction and control.
11It is assumed that the adhesion to the social norm of the individual is valuable to other
individuals sharing the same identity.
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anxiety or embarrasment (Elster [16] and [15]).12 In this model such feature is
represented by a cost d. If the individual changes his identity from period 0 to
period 1 then he is considered to be inconsistent. In such case, these are his
payoﬀs:
U1PE|S0 = pi
1
PE (e) + ϑ (e)− c (e)− d (e)
U1S|PE0 = pi
1
S (e)− c (e)− d (e)
Where the cost of social disapproval depends on the level of eﬀort provided
by the individuals for a simple reason: the individuals' identity prescribes a
particular behaviour, i.e. a selﬁsh self is expected to provide zero eﬀort to the
production of the public good, while a pro-environmental self is expected to
provide all his eﬀort to such activity. It is assumed that the social disapproval
will be higher if the level of eﬀort provided at t = 1 diﬀers more with respect to
the expected level of eﬀort of the identity held at the previous period.
The individual will decide to keep his identity and avoid social disapproval
as long as the costs of self-change are higher than its beneﬁts. The following
consistency conditions reﬂect this for the selﬁsh and pro-environmental selves,
respectively:
d (e) > pi1PE (e) + ϑ (e)− pi1S (e)
d (e) > pi1S (e)− pi1PE (e)− ϑ (e)
12Despite social disapproval comes from other individuals sharing a common identity, it is
unlikely they will complain to him for not following the social norm. Just the fact that the
individual knows his current behaviour is not supported by his identity will make him feel not
approved by others (Rege [36]).
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3. Identity selection
In order to select an appropiate self under the current situation (no environ-
mental policy), the individual assesses his expected utility. So, he compares the
payoﬀs he would get by being consistent with the payoﬀs he would get by being
inconsistent. Deﬁne θ as the subjective belief he holds about keeping the same
self in the two periods, i.e. θ denotes the individual's psychological coherence
bias. So, with probability θ he is consistent (and has strong psychological co-
herence) and with probability 1−θ he is inconsistent (and has low psychological
coherence) and changes his identity.
Assume that in t = 0 the individual holds a selﬁsh identity and he has to
decide whether to keep it next period or change it and adopt a pro-environmental
self. His expected utility at t = 1 is:
EU = xθ
(
U1S|S0
)
+ (1− x) (1− θ)
(
U1PE|S0
)
Where x is the probability that the same self of period 0 will be activated
in period 1. Thus, x is the objective probability of self-consistency. If the
individual is suﬃciently psychologically coherent (i.e. θ is high enough) then
the selﬁsh self is activated in period 1. If the individual is not suﬃciently
psychologically coherent (i.e. θ is low enough) , the reverse is true. Substituting
some terms we get that the expected utility then becomes:
EU = xθ
(
pi1S (e)− c (e)
)
+ (1− x) (1− θ) (pi1PE (e) + ϑ (e)− c (e)− d (e))
The individual then maximizes his expected utility with respect to the ob-
jective probability of self-consistency, i.e.:max
x
EU .
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The FOC of such problem is:
θ
(
pi1S (e)− c (e)
)− (1− θ) (pi1PE (e) + ϑ (e)− c (e)− d (e)) = 0
From here we arrive at the value of the subjective belief of the individual or
optimal psychological coherence for which he is indiﬀerent to keep or change his
identity:
θ∗ ≡ pi1PE(e)+ϑ(e)−c(e)−d(e)
pi1S(e)−c(e)+pi1PE(e)+ϑ(e)−c(e)−d(e)
If θ > θ∗ ⇒ x = 1 and the individual is consistent. But if θ < θ∗ ⇒ x = 0
and the individual suﬀers a self-change. This means that if the individual is
suﬃciently psychologically coherent (θ is high enough), he will keep his identity
in all likelihood (the probability that he keeps his identity x, is equal to one),
whereas if he is not suﬃciently psychologically coherent, he will change his
identity in all likelihood. If the latter case holds, a diﬀerent norm becomes
activated because the individual adopts a pro-environmental identity.
Keeping an identity or switching from a selﬁsh to a pro-environmental self
thus depends on the material payoﬀs that each self would receive in period 1, the
cost of eﬀort provision, the warm glow that a pro-environmental obtains from
providing eﬀort to the production of a public good, and the social disapproval
that the individual experiences from being inconsistent.
From the individual's optimal belief of self-consistency expression the next
comparative statics follow. Higher material payoﬀs for a pro-environmental self
in period 1 increases the value of θ∗, i.e. ∂θ
∗
∂pi1
PE
> 0. As expected, higher material
payoﬀs for a pro-environmental self increases the probability of switching a
selﬁsh identity in t = 0 for a pro-environmental one in t = 1. In turn, the
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probability of identity switching decreases in period 1 if there are higher material
payoﬀs for a selﬁsh self, i.e. ∂θ
∗
∂pi1
S
< 0. A higher warm glow from the provision of
the public good increases the probability of adopting a pro-environmental self in
period 1 because it represents an increase in the total payoﬀs for an individual
with such identity, i.e. ∂θ
∗
∂ϑ > 0. The cost of eﬀort represents a burden on
the individual for performing an action prescribed by a given identity. Thus, a
higher cost of eﬀort increases the probability of identity switching in period 1,
i.e. ∂θ
∗
∂c > 0. Finally, and as it was expected, higher social disapproval for being
inconsistent deters the individual from self-changing, i.e. ∂θ
∗
∂d < 0. The sign of
all these derivatives (except the last two) would be reversed if the individual
held a pro-environmental identity at t = 0 instead and he were to consider an
identity change in t = 1 to a selﬁsh self.
4. Identity selection under a
monetary environmental policy
Now, it is the aim of this chapter to show that environmental policy can indi-
rectly aﬀect the activation of a particular social norm through a change in the
identity of individuals. This self-change modiﬁes the behavioural prescription
of the individuals with the potential to ultimately aﬀect their decision about
the level of eﬀort to be provided to the production of a public good. For this
matter, this section focuses on economic incentives in the form of a monetary
payment delivered to those individuals who provide eﬀort in the production of
the public good. In other words, the policy to be analyzed is a Payment for
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Environmental Services (PES).
Under a PES, all individuals willing to provide eﬀort to the production of a
public good are rewarded with a monetary payment that increases their mate-
rial payoﬀs. Notice that while a pro-environmental self already does it because
it is his prescribed behaviour, a selﬁsh self will also do it because his prescribed
behaviour is to maximize his total payoﬀs. The monetary payment thus gives
the selﬁsh self the incentive to participate in the production of the public good
by decreasing the relative cost of eﬀort. Therefore, a PES increases the material
payoﬀs of the individual regardless of which self he holds. However, the mone-
tary payment has diﬀerent eﬀects for each self outside the material realm. Given
that the behavioural prescription for a pro-environmental self is to provide eﬀort
to the production of the public good because it generates a warm glow for him,
oﬀering a reward for such behaviour with a monetary payment is understood
as a cue that involves material aspects. In other words his benevolence has a
price now. Thus, the monetary payment produces a cognitive distortion in the
pro-environmental self that reduces his cognitive beneﬁts from providing eﬀort
to the production of a good that will beneﬁt other individuals.
Assume that a PES is enacted at t = 1. The total payoﬀs of individuals are
modiﬁed in the following way:
U1SPES = pi
1
S (e) + λpi (e)− c (e)
U1PEPES = pi
1
PE (e) + λpi (e) + ϑ (e)− ψϑ (e)− c (e)
Where λpi represents the monetary payment oﬀered by the PES and λpi >
0⇐⇒ e > 0. The negative eﬀect on the warm glow that a pro-environmental self
suﬀers from participating in the PES is denoted by ψϑ, and ψϑ > 0⇐⇒ e > 0.
By assumption, the production of the public good increases when more eﬀort
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is provided, thus a higher monetary payment is received by such individual,
i.e. ∂λpi∂e > 0. Moreover, and precisely because higher eﬀort entails a higher
monetary payment, it also produces a higher negative cognitive eﬀect for a pro-
environmental self, i.e. ∂ψϑ∂e > 0.
Let us analyze what is the eﬀect of a PES policy on the process of identity
selection of the individual. Once more, the individual assesses his expected
utility so as to select an adequate self under the current situation. Again he
compares the payoﬀs he would get by being consistent with the payoﬀs he would
get by being inconsistent under the PES scheme. Assume ﬁrst that at t = 0 the
individual holds a selﬁsh identity. His expected utility is then:
EUPES = xθ
(
U1SPES |S0
)
+ (1− x) (1− θ)
(
U1PEPES |S0
)
Making some substitutions the expression then becomes:
EUPES = xθ
(
pi1S (e) + λpi (e)− c (e)
)
+
(1− x) (1− θ) (pi1PE (e) + λpi (e) + ϑ (e)− ψϑ (e)− c (e)− d (e))
The individual then maximizes his expected utility with respect to the ob-
jective probability of self-consistency, i.e.:max
x
EUPES .
The FOC of such problem is:
θ
(
pi1S (e) + λpi (e)− c (e)
)−
(1− θ) (pi1PE (e) + λpi (e) + ϑ (e)− ψϑ (e)− c (e)− d (e)) = 0
From here we arrive at the value of the individual's subjective belief for
which he is indiﬀerent to keep or change his identity under the PES policy:
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θ∗PES ≡ pi
1
PE(e)+λpi(e)+ϑ(e)−ψϑ(e)−c(e)−d(e)
pi1S(e)+λpi(e)−c(e)+pi1PE(e)+λpi(e)+ϑ(e)−ψϑ(e)−c(e)−d(e)
Once more, if θPES > θ∗PES ⇒ x = 1 and the individual is consistent. But
if θPES < θ∗PES ⇒ x = 0 and the individual suﬀers a self-change and becomes
pro-environmental. Keeping and identity or switching from selﬁsh to a pro-
environmental self depends on the same parameters that were analyzed when
no PES took place. Yet, there are two new terms in the expression shown above:
the amount of the monetary payment delivered by the PES scheme λpi and the
negative eﬀect on the warm glow ψϑ produced by such payment.
With respect to the comparative statics, the next conditions still hold:
∂θ∗PES
∂pi1
PE
> 0, ∂θ
∗
PES
∂pi1
S
< 0, ∂θ
∗
PES
∂ϑ > 0,
∂θ∗PES
∂c > 0, and
∂θ∗PES
∂d < 0. But there
are now two eﬀects of interest: the material (λpi) and cognitive (ψϑ) impacts of
the monetary payment from the PES on the probability of identity switching.
The more eﬀort is provided, the higher the monetary payment from PES will
be because the production of the public good increases. An individual with
a selﬁsh identity does not care about such production and rather cares about
maximizing the total payoﬀs he receives. But since higher eﬀort provided means
a higher monetary payment and thus higher total payoﬀs, he would be moti-
vated by the PES to actually participate in the production of the public good.
Then, ∂θ
∗
PES
∂λpi
< 0, i.e. a higher monetary payment from PES increases the prob-
ability that a selﬁsh identity will be maintained in t = 1. However, since more
eﬀort provided generates a higher monetary payment from PES, the cognitive
negative eﬀect is also higher, i.e. the warm glow obtained by helping others is
somewhat decreased because the eﬀort provided no longer represents and act of
sheer benevolence, but rather an act motivated by the desire to increase own
material payoﬀs. Then, ∂θ
∗
PES
∂ψϑ
< 0, i.e. the higher the cognitive negative eﬀect
from providing eﬀort to the production of a public good for monetary reasons
rather than warm glow alone, the higher the probability of self-consistency is.
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Isolating the two eﬀects from the monetary payment of the PES scheme, it can
be observed that both work in the same direction. In other words, an individual
with a selﬁsh identity, ceteris paribus, will still be selﬁsh in t = 1 when the PES
scheme is in operation.
Now let us assume that at t = 0 the individual self is pro-environmental.
His expected utility is then:
EUPES = xθ
(
U1PEPES |PE0
)
+ (1− x) (1− θ)
(
U1SPES |PE0
)
Making some substitutions the expression then becomes:
EUPES = xθ
(
pi1PE (e) + λpi (e) + ϑ (e)− ψϑ (e)− c (e)
)
+
(1− x) (1− θ) (pi1S (e) + λpi (e)− c (e)− d (e))
The individual then maximizes his expected utility with respect to the ob-
jective probability of self-consistency, i.e.:max
x
EUPES .
The FOC of such problem is:
θ
(
pi1PE (e) + λpi (e) + ϑ (e)− ψϑ (e)− c (e)
)−
(1− θ) (pi1S (e) + λpi (e)− c (e)− d (e)) = 0
From here we arrive at the value of the individual's subjective belief for
which he is indiﬀerent to keep or change his identity under the PES policy:
θ∗PES ≡ pi
1
S(e)+λpi(e)−c(e)−d(e)
pi1PE(e)+λpi(e)+ϑ(e)−ψϑ(e)−c(e)+pi1S(e)+λpi(e)−c(e)−d(e)
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Once more, if θPES > θ∗PES ⇒ x = 1 and the individual is consistent. But
if θPES < θ∗PES ⇒ x = 0 the social norm which prescribes environmentally
friendly behaviour fails to be activated. Despite social disapproval, the individ-
ual suﬀers a self-change and adopts a selﬁsh identity. Comparative statics now
change slightly. We still have the same derivatives that prevailed when no PES
took place: ∂θ
∗
PES
∂pi1
S
> 0, ∂θ
∗
PES
∂pi1
PE
< 0, ∂θ
∗
PES
∂ϑ < 0,
∂θ∗PES
∂c > 0, and
∂θ∗PES
∂d < 0.
For the case of an individual with a selﬁsh identity at t = 0 it was mentioned
that the two eﬀects of PES (the material (λpi) and cognitive (ψϑ) impacts of the
monetary payment) on the probability of identity switching worked in the same
direction and thus the individual kept his identity in t = 1. Regardless of the
identity of the individual, more eﬀort provided increases the production of the
public good, and a higher monetary payment from PES is received. Since the
pro-environmental self maximizes his total payoﬀs by increasing the production
of the public good, he will receive a higher monetary payment from PES that
will reinforce his motivation to produce the public good and further increase
his total payoﬀs. This increases the probability that the individual remains
consistent with respect to his identity selection at t = 1, i.e. ∂θ
∗
PES
∂λpi
< 0. By
nature of PES, more eﬀort provided is rewarded with a higher monetary pay-
ment, which means the cognitive negative eﬀect perceived by the individual is
higher, or in other words, the warm glow obtained by helping others is some-
what decreased because such eﬀort is associated to a monetary incentive. Then,
∂θ∗PES
∂ψϑ
> 0, i.e. the higher the cognitive negative eﬀect from providing eﬀort to
the production of a public good for monetary reasons rather than warm glow
alone, the higher the probability of self-change is. In this case, the two eﬀects
of the monetary payment of the PES scheme work in opposite direction. This
means that an individual with a pro-environmental identity, ceteris paribus,
will still be pro-environmental in t = 1 when the PES scheme is in operation
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iﬀ
∣∣∣∂θ∗PES∂λpi ∣∣∣ >∣∣∣∂θ∗PES∂ψϑ ∣∣∣.13 Yet, a PES will transform an individual's identity from
pro-environmental to selﬁsh iﬀ
∣∣∣∂θ∗PES∂λpi ∣∣∣ <∣∣∣∂θ∗PES∂ψϑ ∣∣∣+∣∣∣∂θ∗PES∂d ∣∣∣. In consequence,
ceteris paribus, a PES scheme can produce a self-selection inconsistency only
for those individuals whose identity's behavioural prescription is in conﬂict with
the monetary payment from PES, i.e. for pro-environmental selves. The next
section discusses when such scenario might happen and its consequences for
environmental policy design.
5. Discussion
While the model presented in the last three sections is heavily inﬂuenced by
Teraji's work (Teraji [47]), there are noticeable diﬀerences between them. For
Teraji, the self-change experienced by the individuals is intentional. In fact, they
need not remain the same because they possess optimistic self-views that im-
prove their performance, thus developing diﬀerent characteristics through time.
In turn, the identity change represented here takes place because of situational
factors (e.g. an environmental policy with a framing eﬀect) that the individual
does not control.14
In Teraji, there is a dual motivational drive for individual self-change: self-
enhacement (the drive to convince ourselves that we are intrinsically worthwile)
and self-veriﬁcation (the drive to maintain a consistent and maybe negative view
13This expression already takes into account on the right hand side the eﬀect of social
disapproval. However it does not appear since the individual does not actually self-change.
This means that d=0 and
∂θ∗PES
∂d
= 0.
14PES programmes are voluntary in nature. So, an individual can decide not to participate
if it does not suit his interest, but he cannot determine the monetary component of the
programme or the actual policy instrument to be used. In other words, he does not control
the situational factors.
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of ourselves).15 The present model presumes that individuals would like to be
consistent with their identity choice because adopting a new identity does not
bring about self-enhancement (no identity is superior to another), but rather
social disapproval. Thus, the motivational drive of individuals here is iden-
tity preservation and not quite self-veriﬁcation as understood by Teraji because
keeping the same identity in the model presented in the past three sections does
not involve a negative or pessimistic self-perception of the individual.
Because of this negative connotation on self-veriﬁcation, Teraji regards that
those individuals unwilling to change (due to low self-conﬁdence) may fail to
reach optimal economic outcomes. In this model this is not entirely true. With-
out a PES, a selﬁsh individual that remains selﬁsh by period 1 diminishes the
production of the public good and this might be considered not socially opti-
mal, yet from his private standpoint it is. And if a pro-environmental individual
keeps his identity, there will not be underprovision of the public good, which
means that the outcome will not be suboptimal. Therefore, self-veriﬁcation in
the present model does not necessarily have a negative impact.
Finally, Teraji regards self-change as a positive outcome which can only
bring about self-enhancement. The stance of this chapter is that self-change
produced by environmental policy, apart from entailing social disapproval for
the individual, might actually have negative behavioural, environmental, and
social consequences.
Stets and Burke [44] argue that the self-veriﬁcation process involves a com-
parison of the own perceptions of the identity in the current situation to the
same perception held in the standard. If a discrepancy arises, then the process
will resolve it by adapting behaviour to the standard or through a change of
identity.
15Teraji's self-change mechanism relies on self-discrepancy theory because when faced to
the decision of self-change, the individual compares his actual self to an ideal he would like
to become.
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The present model is in line with this idea. Once period 1 arrives, the
individual undergoes a self-veriﬁcation process in which he has to decide whether
to keep the identity he held in period 0 or change it. It was shown that when the
situational factors in the two periods remain unaltered (e.g. there is no policy
intervention), it is likely that the individual will not experience any discrepancy
by being consistent with his identity selection throughout the periods.
Yet, if an environmental policy is implemented and therefore the situational
factors change, in this case by the introduction of a monetary payment (PES),
those individuals who change their behaviour with respect to their identity's
behavioural prescription because of the enforcement of the policy will experi-
ence social disapproval. In particular, selﬁsh individuals remain selﬁsh insofar
as the payment does not interfere with their behavioural prescription, i.e. max-
imize total payoﬀs. On the contrary, the payment reinforces such prescription.
Nevertheless, the payment symbolizes a diﬀerent behavioural prescription for
pro-environmental individuals. Thus, they could undergo a self-change process
since they experience a discrepancy produced by the monetary payment. Be-
cause of this, they might ﬁnd it worthwile to change their identity.
Notice that despite there is a possibility of self-change in t = 1 for those
individuals who were pro-environmental at t = 0, there will not be a change
in the level of eﬀort that they provide to the production of the public good
when the environmental policy (PES) takes place. In that respect thus, there is
no crowding-out in this model. While this is good news from the policymaker
standpoint, the induced identity change may still present adverse consequences
in two diﬀerent ways. First, if the PES no longer takes place in the future and
the identity of the pro-environmental individual has switched to a selﬁsh one,
the level of eﬀort devoted to the production of the public good will diminish be-
cause the social norm will no longer become activated (given that selﬁsh selves
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preserve their identity). Second, the identity change may have a spillover eﬀect
(Frey and Stutzer [22]) on other aspects related to cooperative and environmen-
tal behaviour, e.g. it is unlikely that selﬁsh selves would engage in recycling
activities or sacriﬁce money in order to save the environment by being willing
to pay higher taxes to prevent an environmental damage.
It can be argued that the ﬁrst of these consequences is not a real concern as
long as the PES can be sustained. The problem is precisely that, particulary
in developing countries. Instead of being established as a market, PES has
appeared in such countries as a public policy where the government acts as
the manager of the payment for environmental services, linking supply and
demand for these services. In terms of enforcement this is a good strategy when
it is both diﬃcult to deﬁne the environmental service to be sold and identify
the consumers for such service. However, in terms of sustainability it is not
ideal since the enforcement of the PES relies on the political agenda of the
government. Then, an identity change originated by the environmental policy
might actually activate a diﬀerent norm with unwanted consequences if the PES
ceases to be enforced.
Even if the PES is established without government participation and be-
comes a full-ﬂedged market, the identity change produced by it will have ad-
verse consequences on the cooperative behaviour of the targeted individuals.
This is specially true if there is a relatively strong correlation of environmen-
tal behaviour across diﬀerent spheres, e.g. environmental services provision,
recycling, water pollution, biodiversity protection, etc.16 The identity change
produced by the PES activates a set of selﬁsh prescriptions such that if the
individual was once willing to provide an environmental service for free out of
16There are studies that ﬁnd a strong correlation across diﬀerent environmental responsible
behaviours and there are others which ﬁnd no correlation at all. Thøgersen [50] discusses
those studies and provides evidence that individuals have consistent behavioural patterns in
the environmental ﬁeld. While he claims that the spillover is more likely when personal norms
are activated, he recognizes that social norms may also have inﬂuence on such process.
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the warm glow he derived from helping others, he would sell it now for a mone-
tary reward. Likewise, he would expect now a monetary reward for undertaking
similar activities that involve a cooperative or pro-environmental behaviour like
recycling, biodiversity protection, reduction of water use or green consumption.
A ﬁnal caveat with respect to the eﬀects of the PES on the individuals' self-
selection process is the following. Suppose the PES was established as a market
without government intervention such that it could be sustained through time.
The policymaker could then argue that despite it introduces and identity switch,
the environmental behaviour addressed by the PES would be continuously fos-
tered because there is a sustainable monetary incentive. However, there is still
a tradeoﬀ present here: environmental protection at the price of a given iden-
tity. Some ancient cultures possess an identity which dictates a protection of
their natural resources and their environment.17 It is true that most population
of such cultures lives in poverty conditions and that a monetary payment for
environmental protection would represent a good source of income for them.
But such payment would alter their behavioural prescriptions and ultimately
transform their identity.18 Therefore, the PES must be gradually implemented
and adapted to their social schemes and traditions.
A PES certainly has the potential to bring about environmental protection,
17Some of these cultures are: Chinantecos in Northern Oaxaca, Mexico; Embera, Wainan,
and Kuna in the Darien Biosphere Reserve, Panama; Cabecar, Bribi, Teribe and Guaymi
in La Amistad Bioshpere Reserve, Costa Rica and Panama; Miskito, Paya and Garifunos in
Río Plátano Biosphere Reserve, Honduras; Chenchu, Konda Savara, and Khond in Andhra
Pradesh, India; and Thai, Hmong, and Kinh in Lai Chau and So La, Vietnam.
18Many of these cultures' identity is closely related to the physical characteristics of their
habitats. Thus, they do not only have a positive emotional bond with the place they live in,
they also possess a sense of self that stems from their surroundings. In other words, the
individuals of such ancient cultures understand who they are because of their habitat. Such
sense of belongingness is denominated as sense of place in the environmental psychology
literature. The negative eﬀects a situational cue such as a PES can pose on the individuals'
identity can also produce a transformation of such sense of place. This is because individuals
with a sense of place most likely hold a pro-environmental identity rather than a selﬁsh one,
otherwise they would not be interested in contributing to the environmental protection of their
habitat. Hence, a PES could bring about a self-change in those individuals and a detrimental
eﬀect on their contributions to the preservation of the physical characteristics of their habitat,
consequently aﬀecting their sense of place.
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but the results of this chapter give way to two important questions: Given its
eﬀects on identity selection, can the policymaker estimate the ultimate eﬀect
on social welfare of the PES? A relatively good proxy for the payment for
environmental services provision is the opportunity cost of land use, what would
be the payment a community should receive in order to transform their identity?
Conclusion
The study of social norms activation is crucial to analyze environmental degra-
dation problems since social norms can trigger cooperation in social dilemmas.
Self-selection processes as mechanisms for social norms activation have been
neglected in the literature despite the fact it is acknowledged that a particular
identity dictates a behavioural prescription for speciﬁc situational contexts.
The selection of a selﬁsh or pro-environmental identity is inﬂuenced by sit-
uational factors such as the beneﬁts and costs of performing a given behaviour,
the warm glow of contributing to a public good, and the social disapproval from
adopting a behaviour diﬀerent to the one originally prescribed. Without any
exogenous intervention, individuals are expected to undergo a self-veriﬁcation
process and keep their identity. However, if a monetary payment is oﬀered as
a reward to the provision of an environmental service, the probability of self-
veriﬁcation is reduced for those individuals who experience a discrepancy be-
tween their prescribed behaviour and their behaviour under the new situational
factors. In fact, if the warm glow of those individuals is severely aﬀected by the
the perception of a monetary payment and despite suﬀering social disapproval,
they will change their identity.
The policy implications of the model are straightforward. A monetary re-
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ward increases the provision of environmental services regardless of the identity
the targeted individuals hold. However, it might end up inducing a selﬁsh trans-
formation for those individuals with prior pro-environmental inclination. Hence,
if the policy depends on the political agenda of the government at oﬃce and
cannot be sustained or if the environmental behaviour of individuals is corre-
lated across diﬀerent spheres, selﬁsh prescriptions will dictate their post-policy
behaviour, thus creating a negative spillover eﬀect.
The model presented in this chapter suggests a new research agenda for
social norm activation. Future empirical work should analyze the eﬀects of a
PES programme on the identity selection process of individuals and its eﬀects on
environmental behaviour. A possible study consists in the natural experiment
provided by the Chinanteco communities in Northern Oaxaca. Some of those
communities are currently participating in a PES scheme administered by the
Mexican government while others are not. However, those not participating can
constitute a good control group which possess the exact same characteristics of
those communities that are actually receiving the payment.
The spillover eﬀect produced by the monetary payment could also be tested.
The Chinantecos have a form of community service denominated tequio. Under
this institution, all members of the community are obliged to provide labour
for maintenance of roads, public buildings and communal pastures. The policy
implications of the identity selection model would predict that those Chinantecos
exposed to the payment for environmental services probably underwent a self-
change. Hence, the amount of time they devote to tequio activities should be
considerably lower to the time that Chinantecos not exposed to PES devote.
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Conclusion
The thesis consists of three self-contained studies. These are (i) Payments for
Environmental Services and motivation crowding-out: A Psychological Games
approach, (ii) This land is your land, this land is my land: The environmental
behaviour of native-born and immigrants and (iii) Identity selection and the
activation of pro-environmental behaviour. Here, conclusions and implications
of each chapter and conclusions of the thesis are addressed.
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the social production of an environmental
protection motivation and its erosion originated by monetary incentives could
not be represented by behavioural models based on self-interest, kindness (reci-
procity) or inequity aversion. Instead, it is best described by the altruistic-
sacriﬁce of individuals which leads them to exchange personal material gains
for a social beneﬁt. Without external intervention, such social beneﬁt is de-
livered by the provision of an environmental service, if and only if individuals
believe their altruistic-sacriﬁce is reciprocated. However, no formation of such
motivation is possible for those individuals who believe otherwise.
External intervention in the form of a PES produces a distortion in the
beliefs held by individuals regarding others' altruistic-sacriﬁce, and despite their
willingness to contribute their endowment to the provision of the environmental
service, such altruistic-sacriﬁce is deemed as inexistent. In other words, their
environmental protection motivation is deterred by PES programmes, i.e. they
become a disease. Yet, the provision of the environmental service is viable as
long as the transaction costs from participation in such incentive-based scheme
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are low enough and if the monetary payment is available to all individuals. Then
PES become a temporary cure.
In general, the perception of individuals about the others' altruistic-sacriﬁce
is not distorted exclusively by PES. Any external imposition that overlooks the
individuals' beliefs and which changes their social interaction will produce such
distortion. In that respect, it is appealing to experiment with inclusive measures
such as grassroots participation schemes, and explore alternative designs of PES
programmes which might include a non-monetary component that reinforces the
perception of sacriﬁce of all participants and operate as a long-lasting cure.
The notion of the altruistic-sacriﬁce in the environmental services provision
decision-making of individuals generalizes the cognitive processes between indi-
viduals and their physical surroundings. An individual's sense of place can be
constructed through the sacriﬁce of personal gains in beneﬁt of others, and the
identiﬁcation and attachment that he has with respect to a speciﬁc place might
be lost or reduced to a commodity by intrusive environmental policies. So, the
modiﬁcation (or even destruction) of a pro-environmental motivation like sense
of place is generalized by the present framework.
Chapter 1 is only the ﬁrst part of a more ambitious research agenda on
natural resources management which tries to elucidate the motives for cooper-
ation among individuals in order to provide environmental services and explain
the mechanism through which such motivation can be destroyed or altered by
environmental policy. Therefore, future research could be conducted along the
following line.
Empirical evidence about the validity of the present model's predictions
is pending to show the actual eﬀects of incentive-based policies in developing
countries, particularly of PES programmes in vulnerable communities which
are endowed with key natural resources and whose management is governed by
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socially produced environmental protection motivations. Two potential candi-
dates for such assessment are Mexico's PSAH and the Scolel Té project. The
former is the largest PES in Mexico and consists in a pure monetary scheme (di-
rect cash transfer to the landowners), while the latter resembles a dual incentive
PES that increases the participation of individuals in the environmental services
provision decision-making process and delivers a payment in recognition for such
service. Hence, the empirical research will consist in a frame ﬁeld experiment
that will test some of the propositions produced by Chapter 1. In particular,
it will test diﬀerences between the motivation crowding-out produced by pure
monetary incentives and the one produced by a policy mix. Furthermore, it
will test what happens to the motivation of individuals who do not receive a
monetary compensation for their eﬀorts to provide environmental services while
others do.
In Chapter 2, it was claimed that immigrants have been traditionally re-
garded as a burden by the host countries' governments in a wide variety of
issues. Yet, such negative connotation seems to be politically charged insofar
as there is strong evidence that their ﬂow into host countries do not necessar-
ily entail negative impacts. That is also true with respect to environmental
degradation issues.
Chapter 2 analyzed a sample of the World Values Survey dataset to shed
light on the debate about whether governments of recipient countries should be
threatened by immigration on environmental grounds. In that respect, Chapter
2 showed the New Environmental Paradigm predictions do not hold inasmuch as
there are robust diﬀerences in immigrant/native-born environmental behaviour.
Therefore, claims that maintain immigration into an environmentally unfriendly
society such as the U.S. would increase environmental degradation are not sup-
ported by the empirical results. Since immigrants display higher engagement
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in environmentally friendly behaviours such as choosing better products for
the environment, recycling, and reducing water consumption, a greater ﬂow
of immigrants into the host country might actually have a positive impact on
the protection of the environment. In fact, while residents in North America
do have weaker pro-environmental attitudes if compared to residents from any
other region of the world, North American native-born and resident immigrants
engage more in pro-environmental action.
Although it cannot be fully discarded, the results do not suggest that immi-
grants display stronger engagement in pro-environmental behaviour than native-
born because of higher environmental awareness produced by previous exposure
to environmental problems in their source countries. They do not suggest either
that the individuals' community attachment and national identiﬁcation (i.e.
their sense of belongingness or sense of place) explain diﬀerences in envi-
ronmental behaviour. Rather, they suggest that a modiﬁed Post-Materialistic
Hypothesis holds. A certain proﬁle of immigrant engages more than native-born
in pro-environmental behaviour: educated and of relatively high income, mostly
not from Europe, Latin America or Oceania, with preferences oriented towards
protecting nature as opposed to economic growth, who are also relatively old
and women, empowered and with social capital.
The policy implications are straightforward: restrictive immigration policies
should not be based on threats of negative environmental impacts for the host
country; and national environmental policy should be group-targeted, given
that native-born and short and long residence immigrants do not have the same
probability to actually engage or display willingness to perform an environmen-
tally friendly behaviour. However, there biggest challenge for the policymaker
is to transform the native-born and immigrants' willingness to sacriﬁce money
in order to save the environment into actual engagement.
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There is ample room for further research in the topic. First, the results of
this chapter are driven by a dataset which considers highly educated and high
income immigrants. Thus, further research with a dataset which includes more
information about low-skilled immigrants could be conducted. Second, although
the present work controls the inﬂuence that the region source of the immigrant
has on his pro-environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour, an ex-
tension to this chapter might try to establish if the results would hold controlling
for the source country of immigrants. Is there an inﬂuence on the immigrant's
environmental behaviour driven by speciﬁc cultural traits? If so, immigration
policy based on environmental impacts would likely become country-selective.
Third, the analysis of the individuals' development of a sense of belongingness
or sense of place for the host country will provide a better understanding of
why an environmental acculturation process does not take place. Finally, the
environmental behaviour of second generation immigrants deserves attention.
Unfortunately, the WVS dataset does not contain enough information to carry
it out at the moment. But their apparent weak environmental behaviour raises
some questions: is it related to the fact they simultaneously do not identify
either with their immigrant parents' culture or the host country's culture? A
careful analysis of such topic is determinant to assess the long-run eﬀects of
immigration on the host country's environment.
In Chapter 3, it was sustained that the study of social norms activation is
crucial to analyze environmental degradation problems since social norms can
trigger cooperation in social dilemmas. Self-selection processes as mechanisms
for social norms activation have been neglected in the literature despite the fact
it is acknowledged that a particular identity dictates a behavioural prescription
for speciﬁc situational contexts.
The identity selection model presented in Chapter 3 is more suitable to ana-
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lyze social norms activation failure than other self-veriﬁcation models because of
two reasons. First, the self-change experienced by the individuals is not inten-
tional; it rather takes place because of situational factors (e.g. an environmental
policy with a framing eﬀect) that the individual does not control. Monetary
environmental policies like PES programmes are voluntary in nature. So, an
individual can decide not to participate if it does not suit his interest, but he
cannot determine the monetary component of the programme or even the actual
policy instrument. In other words, he does not control the situational factors.
Second, the model presented in Chapter 3 does not impose a dual motivational
drive for individual self-change: self-enhacement (the drive to convince ourselves
that we are intrinsically worthwile) and self-veriﬁcation (the drive to maintain a
consistent and maybe negative view of ourselves). Rather, the model presumes
that individuals would prefer to be consistent with their identity choice because
adopting a new identity does not bring about self-enhancement (no identity is
superior to another), but rather social disapproval and negative environmental
consequences.
The selection of a selﬁsh or pro-environmental identity is inﬂuenced by sit-
uational factors such as the beneﬁts and costs of performing a given behaviour,
the warm glow of contributing to a public good, and the social disapproval from
adopting a behaviour diﬀerent to the one originally prescribed. Without any
exogenous intervention, individuals are expected to undergo a self-veriﬁcation
process and keep their identity. However, if a monetary payment is oﬀered as a
reward to the provision of an environmental service, an asymmetry is introduced
in the self-selection process: selﬁsh individuals remain selﬁsh insofar as the pay-
ment does not interfere with their behavioural prescription, i.e. maximize total
payoﬀs. On the contrary, the payment reinforces such prescription. But the
probability of self-veriﬁcation is reduced for pro-environmental selves who ex-
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perience a discrepancy between their prescribed behaviour and their behaviour
under the new situational factors. In fact, if the warm glow of those individuals
is severely aﬀected by the the perception of a monetary payment and despite
suﬀering social disapproval, they will change their identity. Notice that even
when there is a possibility of self-change in period 1 for those individuals who
were pro-environmental at period 0, there will not be a change in the level of
eﬀort that they provide to the production of the public good when the environ-
mental policy (PES) takes place. In that respect there is no crowding-out in
this model.
The policy implications of the model are straightforward. A monetary re-
ward increases the provision of environmental services regardless of the identity
the targeted individuals hold. However, it might end up inducing a selﬁsh
transformation for those individuals with prior pro-environmental inclination.
Hence, if the policy depends on the political agenda of the government at of-
ﬁce and cannot be sustained or if the environmental behaviour of individuals is
correlated across diﬀerent spheres, selﬁsh prescriptions will dictate their post-
policy behaviour, thus creating a negative spillover eﬀect. But even if a PES
is established as a market without government intervention such that it could
be sustained through time, there is still a tradeoﬀ present here: environmen-
tal protection at the price of a given identity. Some ancient cultures possess
an identity which dictates a protection of their natural resources and their en-
vironment and which is closely related to the physical characteristics of their
habitats. The negative eﬀects of a situational cue such as a PES extend thus to
the transformation of their sense of belongingness or sense of place.
The model presented in Chapter 3 suggests a new research agenda for social
norm activation. Future empirical work should analyze the eﬀects of a PES
programme on the identity selection process of individuals and its eﬀects on
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environmental behaviour. A possible study consists in the natural experiment
provided by the Chinanteco communities in Northern Oaxaca. Some of those
communities are currently participating in a PES scheme administered by the
Mexican government while others are not. However, those not participating can
constitute a good control group which possess the exact same characteristics of
those communities that are actually receiving the payment.
The spillover eﬀect produced by the monetary payment could also be tested.
The Chinantecos have a form of community service denominated tequio. Under
this institution, all members of the community are obliged to provide labour
for maintenance of roads, public buildings and communal pastures. The policy
implications of the identity selection model would predict that those Chinantecos
exposed to the payment for environmental services probably underwent a self-
change. Hence, the amount of time they devote to tequio activities should be
considerably lower to the time that Chinantecos not exposed to PES devote.
To conclude, the thesis has considered three important issues of interest to
economists in the behavioural and environmental spheres. These are (i) motiva-
tion crowding-out, (ii) immigrant/native-born environmental behaviour diﬀer-
ences, and (iii) pro-environmental behaviour activation failure. Additionally, a
secondary objective of the thesis has been to include the study of the individuals'
sense of belongingness or sense of place into the discussion of environmen-
tal problems within the Economics realm. It stands as a central element in
the analysis of environmentally friendly behaviour that, so far, has only been
seriously considered in other disciplines such as Environmental and Social Psy-
chology, and Geography. These three issues (four with the inclusion of sense of
place) have strong implications for the current worldwide (and life-threatening)
environmental degradation problematic. Leaving aside the U.S., bigger eﬀorts
to tackle environmental resources depletion and global warming have been car-
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ried out by the international community under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change through the Kyoto Protocol. Yet, a deeper un-
derstanding of the elements of environmental services provision involves more
interest and research in: the mechanism through which pro-environmental be-
haviour becomes activated in the ﬁrst place; the elements that determine the
probability of engagement in environmentally friendly behaviour of individuals
in a culturally-diversiﬁed society; the process through which environmental pol-
icy might destroy the individuals' willingness to protect the environment; and
the process of creation, evolution and erosion of the individuals' sense of belong-
ingness or sense of place. Environmental policies which take such themes into
account are more likely to be successful and avoid the imposition of additional
social costs to the society.
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